N31240

Substantial
Serious

Beech 1900C S/N: UC-28

Accident Details

Date
Friday, February 12, 1999
NTSB Number
ANC99FA028
Location
SAINT MARY'S, AK
Event ID
20001205X00118
Coordinates
62.060230, -163.290786
Aircraft Damage
Substantial
Highest Injury
Serious
Fatalities
0
Serious Injuries
1
Minor Injuries
0
Uninjured
0
Total Aboard
1

Probable Cause and Findings

The pilot's descent below the minimum descent altitude on the instrument approach. Factors were pilot fatigue resulting from the pilot's rest period being interrupted by scheduling discussions and the night weather conditions of low ceilings and whiteout.

Aircraft Information

Registration
N31240
Make
BEECH
Serial Number
UC-28
Engine Type
Turbo-shaft
Model / ICAO
1900C B190
Aircraft Type
Fixed Wing Multi Engine
No. of Engines
2

Registered Owner (Historical)

Name
RAYTHEON AIRCRAFT CREDIT CORPORATION
Address
PO BOX 85
Status
Deregistered
City
WICHITA
State / Zip Code
KS 67201-0085
Country
United States

Analysis

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On February 11, 1999, at 2345 Alaska standard time, a Beech 1900C airplane, N31240, was destroyed when it collided with terrain 3.2 nautical miles north of the Saint Mary's Airport, Saint Mary's, Alaska. The solo airline transport pilot sustained serious injuries. The on-demand cargo flight was operated under 14 CFR Part 135 by Alaska Central Express, Inc., of Anchorage, Alaska, from Anchorage to Saint Mary's. The flight departed Anchorage at 2145. Night instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident, and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed.

The flight was cleared for the LOC/DME 16 instrument approach at 2325. The last radar contact with the airplane was at 2340. The radar controller observed the airplane about 10 miles north of the airport, executing the procedure turn for the approach. The flight was reported overdue at 2355. An emergency locator transmitter (ELT) signal was received by satellite about 0100. The wreckage and pilot were located about 0400 by searchers on snow machines. The airplane had broken into three sections, and both pilot seats were found about 200 feet from the cockpit. The airplane came to rest about 1/4 mile east of the localizer course centerline, about the same elevation as the airport.

The pilot told the NTSB investigator-in-charge (IIC) during an interview on February 16, and wrote in his NTSB Pilot / Operator report, that he did not recall any discrepancies with the airplane. He said that he was established on the final approach course, inside the final approach fix, and then woke up face down in the snow.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The pilot holds an airline transport pilot certificate for multi-engine airplanes. He holds airplane type ratings in the Beech 1900, and the Boeing 747. His most recent first class medical certificate was issued on December 30, 1998, with no restrictions.

The pilot had accrued 12,187 hours of total flight experience at the time of the accident; 1,587 hours were in the Beech 1900C. In the previous 30 and 90 days, he had flown 91, and 206 hours, respectively. All flights were in the Beech 1900C. In the previous 30 days, the pilot had flown all flights without a copilot.

A review of the pilot's flight records revealed he had accrued 96.8 hours in the accident airplane since it was put into revenue service with the company.

The pilot was hired by the company in March 1997. He completed initial training on March 10, 1997. He completed pilot training, to include a type rating in the Beech 1900, at Flight Safety International, LaGuardia Airport, New York, on May 19, 1997.

On May 29, 1997, the pilot was administered a second-in-command, 14 CFR 135.293 and 135.299 proficiency and line check by a company check airman. He was assigned and flew as a second-in-command until he was administered a 14 CFR 135.297 instrument proficiency check on July 31, 1997. At that time, he was assigned as a pilot-in-command in the Beech 1900C.

The pilot's most recent flight check was in the Beech 1900C, on September 27, 1998, and met the requirements of 14 CFR 135.293, 297, and 299. The flight check was conducted by a company check airman.

According to company records, the pilot had flown to Saint Mary's on five occasions prior to the accident flight. On all of these flights, the airport was reporting weather greater than 1000 feet ceilings and visibility greater than 3 miles. The first three were with a two pilot crew. The last two were single pilot.

Flight and Duty Time

The pilot was based, and lived, in Fairbanks. He normally flew his trips from there.

The pilot flew as a pilot-in-command the night prior to the accident. According to company flight records, the pilot completed his flights at 0604 on February 11. According to the company mail records, he completed unloading the mail at 0725 on February 11, in Fairbanks.

The company scheduler / flight follower from Anchorage, contacted the cargo supervisor in Fairbanks about 1130, and asked him to send the pilot to Anchorage on the company's flight leaving Fairbanks at 1425, so he could fly the accident flight. According to the cargo supervisor, he responded that he would not call the pilot because he had just got in and was tired.

About 1130, the pilot was called at home by the company scheduler / flight follower from Anchorage, and asked if he would fly the accident flight to Saint Mary's. At 1330 the pilot arrived at the company's base in Fairbanks. The cargo supervisor told an FAA inspector that when the accident pilot arrived for the flight to Anchorage he looked "awfully tired." The flight to Anchorage arrived at 1519. According to the pilot, he went to his brother's home and slept. At 2045, he returned to the company base in Anchorage to begin preparation for the accident flight.

When questioned by an FAA inspector about assigning the pilot to the accident flight, both the Director of Operations, and the Anchorage crew scheduler / flight follower replied that they don't assign extra flights. Rather, the company offers them to pilots. The PIC, and the crew scheduler, share responsibility to tell the company if the pilot is exceeding flight or duty times. The Director of Operations also stated that he did not consider the jumpseat flight an assignment, but rather, the same as an airline pilot commuting from his home to an assigned domicile. According to the FAA inspector, he was told by the Fairbanks cargo supervisor that the accident pilot stated "if you turn down flights, you will not be called for flights in the future." The Director of Operations wrote to the NTSB IIC that when company officials asked both the pilot, and cargo supervisor if they had said this, they both denied having made such a statement.

The NTSB IIC discussed the pilot's assignment to the flight with the Director of Operations on June 28. The Director of Operations told the IIC that the company did not contact the pilot. He provided copies of the company telephone records which showed no calls from the Anchorage scheduler's number to the pilot's home. Three telephone calls were placed to the Fairbanks freight company number; at 0707, at 1104, and at 1433. He further provided a record showing a call placed from the pilot's home, to the Anchorage scheduler's "1-800" number at 1253. The Director of Operations stated that the pilot called the company asking for a flight, because he wanted the extra flight time. He indicated that there were crews available in Anchorage to fly the accident flight, but the accident pilot was allowed to take the flight because he asked for it. He further said that jumpseating to Anchorage was the pilot's choice.

The NTSB IIC attempted between June 29, and July 14, to hold a telephone interview with the pilot to clarify how he was assigned to the accident flight. The IIC was unable to reach the pilot, or the pilot's brother, who told the IIC he was acting as the pilot's legal representative and requested that any interview be conducted from the brother's law offices in Fairbanks. Telephone calls by the NTSB IIC were not returned, and a series of written questions was sent to the pilot via certified mail. The questions were received by the pilot on July 16. No response to these questions was received by the IIC as of August 30, 1999.

In the 24 hours prior to the accident, the pilot had flown 5 hours 54 minutes, and been on duty for 12 hours 30 minutes. During this 24 hours, he had three interrupted rest periods. One of four hours, between 0730 and 1130. Two hours rest from 1130 to 1330, after which he traveled via jumpseat on a company airplane to Anchorage. He then had another rest period of five hours 10 minutes, after which he arrived at the company base in Anchorage for the accident flight.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The airplane was a Beech 1900C, and was used in an all cargo configuration. The airplane was certified as a single pilot airplane. The minimum crew required by the limitations section of the Pilot Operating Handbook was one pilot.

The airplane was maintained on a Beech periodic maintenance schedule, under an Approved Aircraft Inspection Program (AAIP). This was authorized on the company's Operating Specifications in paragraph D73. This program contains inspections performed approximately every 100 hours.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

The pilot was provided current and forecast weather by the company prior to departing Anchorage. The company weather packages are compiled by the dispatchers, who obtain National Weather Service observations and forecasts. They also access weather through the internet service "PILOTbrief." The weather package recovered from the pilot's flight bag included the Saint Mary's 2000 observation which stated, in part: winds 120 degrees at 19 knots gusting to 29 knots, 9 miles visibility, and 300 feet overcast ceilings. The general outlook provided by "PILOTbrief" said: "Tonight...snow showers. Areas of blowing snow this evening. Winds 15 to 30 mph this evening...diminishing a bit."

The pilot told the NTSB IIC, and the last Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) controller who spoke with him, that he had obtained the most recent Saint Mary's weather from the automated surface observing system (ASOS) broadcast.

The ASOS at Saint Mary's, taken at 2255, was a 200 feet overcast ceiling, 3 miles visibility, winds from 110 degrees at 23 knots gusting to 31 knots, altimeter 29.57, and a temperature of -15 degrees Centigrade.

The ASOS at Saint Mary's, taken at 2335, was a 200 feet overcast ceiling, 1 1/2 miles visibility, winds from 130 degrees at 12 knots gusting to 32 knots, altimeter 29.59, and a temperature of -14 degrees Centigrade.

The ASOS at Saint Mary's, taken at 2355, was a 200 feet overcast ceiling, 2 1/2 miles visibility, winds from 150 degrees at 14 knots gusting to 27 knots, altimeter 29.58, and a temperature of -15 degree...

Data Source

Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# ANC99FA028