N2209P

History of Flight

On January 14, 1995, at 1945 hours Pacific standard time, a Bell 206B helicopter, N2209P, collided with a high-voltage transmission wire and crashed next to State Highway 101 (aka Hollywood Freeway), Los Angeles, California. The pilot was conducting a visual flight rules (VFR) air taxi flight to the TransAmerica Building in downtown Los Angeles. He did not file a flight plan. The pilot was operating under the provisions of Title 14 CFR Part 135. The helicopter, registered to Fleet Management, Pasadena, California, and operated by Wolfe Air Aviation Ltd., Burbank, California, was destroyed. The certificated airline transport pilot and the left front seat passenger sustained fatal injuries; the two rear seat passengers sustained serious injuries. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed. The flight originated at Burbank Airport at 1939 hours.

According to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Burbank Airport Traffic Control Tower recorded communications media, the pilot initially contacted the local controller at 1938:28 hours and requested a special vfr clearance " . . . southeast bound . . . ." The local controller responded, " . . . will that be to the special flight rules aah correction aah to cahuenga pass . . . ? The pilot responded, "Aah I'll tell you we'll head towards cahuenga pass, but Im gonna assume we'll have to follow the Ventura Freeway from there eastbound then." The local controller issued the pilot a special VFR clearance out of the Class C airspace and instructed the pilot to remain at or below 1,500 feet mean sea level (msl).

At 1742:06 hours, the local controller instructed the pilot to maintain special VFR south of the Ventura Freeway and said that a Boeing 737 will be departing toward the southwest under instrument flight rules (IFR). The pilot achkowledged the instructions. The local controller then asked the pilot to advise him if he needed to go on a different direction other than south.

At 1744:06 hours, the pilot reported that he was south of the airport and clear of the Class C airspace. The local controller acknowledged the pilot's report and cleared him for a frequency change. At 1744:11 hours, the pilot acknowledged the controller's instruction. There were no further communications between the pilot and any other FAA air traffic facilities.

The available recorded radar data showed that the helicopter departed Burbank in a southerly direction and initially climbed to 900 feet msl (about 225 feet above the ground). At 1942:35 hours, the helicopter climbed to 1,000 feet msl and maintained that altitude until 1944:12 hours (the last radar acquisition target). The available radar data showed that the helicopter maintained a southerly course. The last radar target was about 7 miles south of Burbank Airport.

The operator's vice-president/chief pilot (herein called the chief pilot) responded to the accident site. He told National Transportation Safety Board investigators that the company was contracted to provide the flight about a week before the accident. The pilot was to fly the passengers to the TransAmerica building for dinner and then fly them on a sightseeing tour of the city. After the passengers had dinner, the pilot was scheduled to return to Burbank Airport.

The chief pilot said that the pilot checked the weather with the FAA Hawthorne [California] Flight Service Station, before departing on the accident flight. He also said that he told the Media Aviation dispatcher that he checked Burbank Airport terminal information service (ATIS) and decided that the weather was good enough for the flight.

In an interview conducted on January 17, 1994, the chief pilot repeated his statement given to Safety Board investigators at the accident site on January 14, 1994. Additionally, he said that he dispatched the flight about an hour before the accident. He said that the company does not list the passengers names or addresses in the load manifest; the company does require that the lead passenger (the passenger who books the flight) be listed in the manifest.

Safety Board investigators recovered the flight's load manifest at the accident site. The load manifest did not contain any of the passengers' names.

The Media Aviation dispatcher was interviewed by Safety Board investigators on January 19, 1995, via telephone. The dispatcher said that the accident operator based their aircraft at Media Aviation. She said that the pilot arrived at the Media Aviation terminal 45 minutes before the flight departed (about 1847 hours), and engaged in a casual conversation with the pilot. At the pilot's request, she gave him the Burbank Airport ATIS telephone number. The pilot called the ATIS telephone number and obtained the Burbank Airport weather information.

The pilot told her that the weather was satisfactory for the flight. He said, however, that he would like to cancel the flight because he was concerned about the passengers' comfort and not because of the weather. He said the weather might frighten the passengers. The pilot also told her that he was going to fly around Griffith Park (about 3 miles east of the accident site) to the TransAmerica building, instead of the normal routing over the Cahuenga Pass (the accident site).

When the passengers arrived at the terminal, the pilot repeated his routing statement to the lead passenger, the co-owner of the limousine service. He also told the lead passenger that he was not going to fly over Universal Studios (on the northeast side of Cahuenga Pass), as customary. The lead passenger concurred.

A Los Angeles Sheriff's Department deputy reported that he observed a blue and white helicopter circling over Universal Studios between 200 and 300 feet above the ground. The helicopter then flew toward the Hollywood Freeway.

Safety Board investigators interviewed several other ground witnesses. The consensus of the ground witnesses was that clouds and ground fog obscured wires, light to moderate rain conditions prevailed, and that the ground visibility was between 1/4 and 1/2 mile.

A passenger in an automobile driving south on the Hollywood Freeway said she observed a helicopter entangled in the transmission wires between 5 and 10 seconds before it fell to the ground. The helicopter was "jarring up and down." Moments later, she observed a "bright blue and white blinding explosion."

She said that she saw "something fall" from the helicopter and then it plunged downward as their automobile approached the wires. The helicopter struck some trees as it nosed-down to the ground. The witness said their automobile was next to the helicopter when it struck the ground.

The passenger's husband told Safety Board investigators that he did not see the helicopter until it crashed. He thought the wire explosion was a transformer failure.

Another witness driving south on the Hollywood Freeway said that the helicopter was "hovering" over the freeway. He said he thought that it was a police helicopter because he saw what appeared to be a searchlight shining from the helicopter. The witness also said that the helicopter's lights were distinguishable, but the rest of the helicopter was not due to the inclement weather.

Other Damage

Safety Board investigators contacted the Los Angeles Department of Power and Water Company on January 16, 1994. The principal engineer described the wires that cross the freeway as two sets of three vertical high-voltage wires and one ground conductor wire that spans the freeway (about 1,242 feet). The helicopter severed the southern set of wires. The horizontal distance between the two sets of wires is 23.08 feet.

The wires are connected to a transmission tower on the top of the hills east and west of the freeway (#581 & #582, respectively). The tops of the transmission towers are about 300 feet above the ground, and the wires slope downward to their lowest point (about 135 feet above the ground) near the middle of the freeway.

Each set of vertical wires is connected to the northern and southern arms of each transmission tower and is about 25 feet apart (horizontally). The ground conductor wire is 20 feet above the top high-voltage transmission wire and contains international orange colored balls.

The high-voltage transmission wires are 1.802 inches in diameter and transmit 230KV (kilovolts) of power. Each wire contains a 0.047-inch steel core, with 19 aluminum wire strands wrapped around the core. The breaking strength of the wire/core is 56.7 1000-foot pounds.

The top transmission wire is named A Phase, the middle wire is B Phase, and the lower wire is C Phase, with a clearance between each phase of about 15 feet. The helicopter struck the B phase wire about 150 feet above the ground midway between #581 and #582 transmission towers.

Pilot Information

The pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate with airplane multiengine land, CE-500, Lear Jet, and N-B25 type ratings; the B-25 type rating is valid for VFR flights only. The certificate was endorsed for commercial privileges with airplane single engine land and rotorcraft-helicopter ratings. He also held a first class medical certificate issued by an FAA designated airman medical examiner on July 27, 1994; the certificate contained a "must wear corrective lenses" limitation endorsement.

Safety Board investigators did not find the pilot's personal flight hours' logbook. The flight information reflected on page 3 of this report were obtained from the operator. The total helicopter times listed in the report were valid until January, 1994. The operator estimates the pilot accrued 500 hours in helicopters. As of January 1, 1994, the records show that the pilot accrued 389 total helicopter flight hours, of which 311 hours were accrued as pilot-in-command.

The pilot accrued 59 total flight hours during the 90 days preceding the accident. He accrued 5 flight hours in the acciden...