N3071R

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On July 26, 1996, about 0900 mountain daylight time, N3071R, a Piper PA-28R-200, operated by Action Flying Service, Inc. Hayden Lake, Idaho, collided with rising terrain and was destroyed near Libby, Montana. There was a ground fire. The airline transport pilot and his two passengers were fatally injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan had been filed. The aerial survey business flight departed from Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, about 0840 and was conducted under 14 CFR 91. The flight was destined for Libby, Montana.

According to the vice president of the Intermountain Forest Industry Association (IFIA), a trade organization, the passengers were employees of the IFIA. The vice president was aware of the itinerary of the accident flight because it was discussed in a staff meeting a few days prior to the accident. The vice president stated that the purpose of the flight was to review and photo-document proposed salvage logging project sites in the Kootnai National Forrest.

The vice president understood that the passengers were to hire a pilot and aircraft and fly from Coeur d' Alene direct to an area near the head waters of the Yaak River just south of the Canadian border in Montana. After over-flying the area and taking some photographs of proposed logging project sites, the airplane was to land at Libby and drop off one of the passengers, so that he could attend a meeting of the Interagency Grizzly Bear Committee held at the U.S. Forest Service office in Libby. A car had been driven to the Libby Airport by the passenger's staff assistant, so that the passenger could drive his car home to Missoula, Montana, after the meeting. Meanwhile, the staff assistant was supposed to board the airplane in Libby, then fly with the pilot and other passenger to Orafino, Idaho, to photograph more sites. From Orafino, the airplane was to return to Coeur d'Alene.

The vice president stated that his employees had the authority to hire pilots and airplanes and pay them in various fashions. It was done routinely. The vice president stated that he thinks one of the passengers contacted the accident pilot on the evening prior to the accident on his own accord. The pilot was not an employee of IFIA.

According to a representative of the Idaho Forest Industry (IFI), the accident pilot was employed as a corporate pilot for the IFI Cessna Citation business jet. The IFI representative, who had no knowledge of the flight prior to the accident, stated that he thought the accident flight was supposed to depart Coeur d'Alene to pick up a passenger in Libby, then fly to the Yaak River Valley.

According to the operator of Action Flying Service, the accident pilot was "checked out" in the airplane on the evening prior to the accident. The operator stated that the pilot arrived on the afternoon previous to the day of the accident with the intention of renting an airplane from Action Flying Service. The operator stated that it was the first time the pilot had ever rented airplanes there.

The operator stated that the pilot seemed to "feel fine" during the 15-minute flight. He said that the pilot told him he was going to fly the airplane the next day to Kalispell to perform some aerial photography. He also stated that the pilot departed the next day from runway 23 about 7:40 a.m. (0840 mountain daylight time). It was the operator's understanding that the flight had been delayed because one of the passengers had forgotten to bring a camera and had to go back home and get it.

The operator stated that he had no knowledge of any problems with the airplane prior to the accident flight, and that the airplane had been "topped off" with fuel prior to the 15-minute check-out flight. The airplane had not been flown until the accident flight.

A ground witness (statement map location attached) stated that he heard an airplane flying overhead at an altitude of about 1,500 to 2,000 feet above Bull Lake "around nine o'clock" in the morning on the day of the accident. He stated that he was fishing in a boat with his son on the "very north end of Bull Lake" about the time of the accident. Bull Lake is located about 2 miles west of the accident site. The witness stated that he looked up at the airplane and noticed it was white with a colored stripe. He stated that the "... motor was missing..." and "...cutting in and out" as the airplane flew overhead. He remembered commenting to his son that "...the engine sounded worse than his boat motor." He described the sound as similar to the frequent "popping" of a "...lawn mower engine or clunker car." The witness' boat motor was not running at the time the witness heard the airplane. He stated that he thought the airplane "...wasn't high enough to clear" the terrain. He did not notice any fire or smoke coming from the airplane, and he cannot recall if the landing gear was extended or retracted.

The witness observed the airplane flying straight and level for about one minute, until it disappeared from view behind trees. He stated that the airplane did not climb, descend, or turn during the entire one minute he observed it. About "three or four minutes" later, he heard a sound that he later surmised was the airplane's impact with terrain. He then observed smoke rising from the ground and he reported the smoke to the campground host. He did not realize the smoke was from the aircraft accident at the time.

The witness stated that the airplane flight path took it "...toward Libby, across the valley..." and toward the crash area in higher terrain. He stated that clear, calm, sunny daylight conditions existed at the time of the accident. The witness also stated that he saw and heard another airplane earlier that morning (around dawn) and that the airplane "sounded normal."

Another witness (statements and maps attached), who was employed by the U.S. Forest Service as a campground host, was near the north end of Bull lake on the morning of the accident. The witness stated that he observed a "... light plane coming from the [southeast] over Bull Lake...." He stated that the airplane was flying about 800 to 1,000 feet above the lake, and the engine "... seemed to almost quit." He stated that the engine "coughed or missed three times and then ran normal..." and the airplane "dropped some in altitude then picked up and regained altitude..." twice within a two-minute time span. He then observed the airplane flying in a northeasterly direction toward rising terrain. He did not observe any smoke or fire coming from the airplane, nor did he observe any other airplanes that morning.

At 0910, U.S. Forest Service personnel spotted smoke rising from the Cabinet Mountains near Libby; they dispatched a helicopter to survey the scene. The airplane wreckage was located at 1218 and was engulfed in a ground fire. The accident occurred during the hours of daylight at the following coordinates: North 48 degrees, 17.04 minutes, and West 115 degrees, 46.33 minutes.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The aircraft, a 1969 Piper model PA-28R-200 "Cherokee Arrow II", was a four-seat, low-wing, airplane powered by a single 200-horsepower Lycoming fuel-injected engine with a controllable-pitch propeller. The airplane was operated as a lease-back rental aircraft by Action Flying Service, Inc.

An examination of the airframe and engine maintenance logbooks did not reveal any unresolved discrepancies prior to the accident. An examination of the airplane's flight log for the month of July 1996 indicated that the airplane had been flown for about 50 hours with no discrepancies recorded.

An examination of a fuel receipt dated July 25, 1996, indicated that the accident airplane received 16.1 gallons of 100 low lead aviation gasoline on the evening prior to the accident.

The airplane was equipped with retractable landing gear, which is hydraulically actuated by an electrically powered reversible pump. According to technical information from the New Piper Aircraft Company, the pump is controlled by a selector switch on the instrument panel, and the landing gear is retracted or extended in about seven seconds. The landing gear is held up in the retracted position with hydraulic pressure, and locked down into the extended position with the aide of mechanical downlock mechanisms.

Also incorporated in the system is a pressure sensing device which lowers the gear regardless of gear selector position, depending upon airspeed and engine power (propeller slipstream). Gear extension is designed to occur, even if the selector is in the up position, at airspeeds below approximately 105 miles per hour (mph) with power off. The extension speeds will vary from approximately 85 mph to approximately 105 mph depending upon power settings and altitude.

Manual override of the automatic gear extension device is provided by an emergency gear lever located between the front seats. The lever must be held in the raised position, at which time the gear position is controlled by the selector switch regardless of airspeed/power combinations. The lever can also be locked into the raised (override) position by pushing in a latching device located on the left side panel of the console below the level of the lever.

According to performance charts (excerpt attached) found in the accident airplane owners handbook, the maximum rate of climb is about 560 feet per minute under the following conditions: gross weight of 2,600 pounds; density altitude of 6,700 feet; flaps retracted; landing gear retracted. This rate of climb would be decreased if the landing gear were extended or the best rate-of-climb airspeed was not maintained.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The pilot, age 61, was issued an FAA airline transport pilot certificate with a rating for multi-engine land airplanes, and a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land airplanes, and mu...