N4931U

Destroyed
Fatal

Cessna 210E S/N: 210-58631

Accident Details

Date
Saturday, August 17, 1996
NTSB Number
LAX96FA308
Location
BIG BEAR CITY, CA
Event ID
20001208X06540
Coordinates
34.259452, -116.840721
Aircraft Damage
Destroyed
Highest Injury
Fatal
Fatalities
1
Serious Injuries
1
Minor Injuries
0
Uninjured
0
Total Aboard
2

Probable Cause and Findings

an inadequate annual inspection conducted by other maintenance personnel.

Aircraft Information

Registration
N4931U
Make
CESSNA
Serial Number
210-58631
Engine Type
Reciprocating
Year Built
1965
Model / ICAO
210E C210
Aircraft Type
Fixed Wing Single Engine
No. of Engines
1

Registered Owner (Historical)

Name
BODELL MFG INC
Address
20023 MODOC RD
Status
Deregistered
City
APPLE VALLEY
State / Zip Code
CA 92308-4526
Country
United States

Analysis

History of Flight

On August 17, 1996, at 0933 hours Pacific daylight time, a Cessna 210E, N4931U, collided with a dirt mound while executing an emergency landing about 2.33 statute miles southwest of the Big Bear City Airport, Big Bear City, California. There was no postimpact fire. The emergency landing was precipitated by a total loss of power. The pilot was conducting a visual flight rules personal flight to Big Bear City Airport. The airplane, registered to and operated by Bodell Manufacturing Company, Hesperia, California, was destroyed by the resulting impact forces. The certificated commercial pilot died on August 26, 1996, from injuries resulting from the accident; his passenger sustained serious injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed. The flight departed San Bernardino International Airport, San Bernardino, California, about 0905.

A San Bernardino Sheriff's deputy interviewed the pilot before he was transported to Loma Linda Hospital, Loma Linda, California. The deputy reported that the pilot said he departed Hesperia Airport early in the morning and then flew to San Bernardino International Airport and refueled the airplane. He topped off the tanks and then flew to Big Bear City Airport. When the flight was about 3 miles southwest of the airport, the engine lost total power. During the ensuing forced landing, the airplane collided with dirt mound and then became entangled with a telephone support cable.

A fixed-base maintenance facility operator at San Bernardino International Airport said in a telephone interview and written statement that on August 15, 1996, he worked on the accident airplane. He said that the pilot reported that the landing gear system, including the warning horn, was inoperative. Mr. Blue said that he found a hole in the main landing gear system hydraulic line and that the throttle warning horn was wired backward. The hydraulic hose was original equipment installed when the airplane was manufactured. After he repaired the landing gear system, he called the pilot and told him that the landing gear was fixed. The pilot asked him to fly the airplane to Hesperia, but the operator declined to fly the airplane because of other obvious discrepancies. He told the pilot that he would pick him up in his airplane. The operator is a certificated commercial pilot and aircraft mechanic. His mechanic certificate is endorsed with an inspection authorization.

The operator said that on the day of the accident the pilot called him and asked him if he had his airplane tow bar. The operator told him that he had the tow bar and the pilot said he would pick it up later that morning. About 30 minutes later, the pilot arrived at his hangar. In a brief discussion with the pilot, the operator told the pilot, with the pilot's wife present, that the last annual inspection was poor and that there were many discrepancies that needed to be corrected. He told the pilot that ". . .whoever had signed off his annual [inspection] had not done him any favors. The aircraft could not have been looked at in years. . . ." The pilot told him that he would bring the airplane to him the following week to correct any maintenance discrepancies. The accident occurred shortly thereafter.

The accident coordinates are: north 34 degrees, 15 minutes and west 116 degrees, 53 minutes.

Pilot Information

The pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with an airplane single engine land rating. He also held a second-class medical certificate that was issued on December 5, 1994; the certificate contained a "must have available glasses for near vision" limitation endorsement. According to current federal air regulations, a second-class medical certificate is valid for 12 calendar months. After 12-calendar months and before 24 calendar months, the certificate reverts to a third-class medical certificate and the pilot can exercise the private pilot privileges during this period.

The pilot's family could not provide the Safety Board with the pilot's personal flight hours logbook. The flight hours reflected on page 3 of this report were obtained from the pilot's last medical certificate application form. Safety Board investigators could not determine if the pilot complied with the general recency requirements of current federal regulations, or if he received a biennial flight review within 2 years preceding the accident.

According to the pilot's family, within 2 years preceding the accident, the pilot had both hips replaced and a coronary by-pass operation.

Title 14 CFR 67.15 Second-class medical certificate eligibility requirements states, in part:

(a) To be eligible for a second-class medical certificate, an applicant must meet the requirements of paragraphs (b) through (f) of this section.

Section (e) Cardiovascular states:

(1) No established medical history or clinical diagnosis of: (i) Myocardial infarction; (ii) Angina pectoris; or (iii) Coronary heart disease that has required treatment or, if untreated, that has been symptomatic or clinically significant.

Aircraft Information

The airplane was manufactured in 1965. Safety Board investigators retrieved the no. 2 airframe and powerplant logbooks. According to the logbooks, the airplane accrued 2,352.11 hours' flight hours at the time of the accident; the engine accrued 1,019.4 hours. The last annual inspection was performed on January 13, 1996; the airplane accrued 2,344.24 hours at the time of the inspection. The mechanic noted that all applicable airworthiness directives were accomplished.

The logbooks also revealed that on the annual inspection preceding the January 13, 1996, inspection was conducted on February 15, 1994. An annual inspection was not accomplished during 1995. At the time of the 1994 annual inspection, the airplane accrued 2,344.16 hours. According to the maintenance logbooks, the airplane accrued 7.95 hours between February 15, 1994, and the date of the accident.

Wreckage and Impact Information

The on-scene investigation was conducted by an FAA airworthiness inspector from the Riverside [California] Flight Standards District Office. The inspector reported that the airplane initially struck a 3-foot-high dirt mound, bounced, and its tail section entangled with a telephone line support cable about 71 feet north of the dirt mound. The airplane came to rest, inverted, about 200 feet from the initial ground impact point. The engine separated from the airplane and was found about 15 feet south of the main wreckage.

According to the wreckage retriever, all of the airplane's major components were found at the accident site. The flight controls remained connected at their respective attach points. Both wings sustained leading edge damage, but were attached at their respective wing-to-fuselage attach points. A section of the telephone wire was found wrapped around the airplane's vertical fin. The retriever said that he established continuity of the flight control system to the cockpit area before he cutoff the tail section and removed both wings for transport. He also said that both flaps were extended about 20 degrees.

Safety Board investigators examined the airplane at Aircraft Recovery Service, Compton Airport, Compton, California, on August 20, 1996.

The leading edge of the left wing was crushed downward to a point about 3 1/2 feet from the inboard section. The underside near the leading edge exhibited a rock impact signature.

The leading edge of the right wing exhibited a puncture about 7 feet inboard from the root. The upper side of the right wing displayed extensive spanwise and 45-degree chordwise scrape marks. The aileron displayed a concave tear from midspan to the outboard section.

The nose section was found crushed upward from its lower horizontal plane. The nose crushing angle was about 45 degrees. The three landing gears separated at impact.

The section of the fuselage near the rear bulkhead had separated and was found torn and twisted. The empennage was intact; the leading edge of the vertical fairing exhibited a telephone line cut from the lower section up toward the rear section about 19 inches.

The fuel selector valve handle was found positioned to the right fuel tank. The fuel selector valve position corresponded to the fuel selector handle position.

Both wing fuel tanks and their respective fuel screens were intact and free of contaminates. The right wing fuel line was found unobstructed after air was blown through the line. The left wing fuel line was torn away from its fuel tank attach point. Both bladder fuel tanks displayed several wrinkles on the bottom of each tank.

The left reservoir tank was removed. Examination of the tank showed no evidence of any fuel leakage. The lines were connected and not compromised.

The right fuel reservoir tank was crushed and exhibited a tear at the inlet port. The vapor vent return line was found severed. The tank did not contain any fuel.

The gascolator was intact and did not contain any fuel or contaminates.

The fuel line between the engine driven fuel pump and the fuel control unit contained about 1/8 ounce of uncontaminated blue colored fuel.

The fuel line from the fuel flow divider to the throttle body contained a few drops of fuel. The fuel was clean and free of contaminates. The fuel injectors and their lines were unobstructed and free of contaminates.

The left side of the engine cylinders displayed impact damage on the upper side.

Continuity of the engine gear and valve train assembly was established. Except for the number 2 cylinder, thumb compression was noted on the cylinders. The number 2 cylinder did not produce any compression when the crankshaft was rotated. The number 5 cylinder compression was present, but was less that the other cylinders that produced compression. See "Differential Compression...

Data Source

Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# LAX96FA308