NX72WP

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On September 19, 1996, at 1721 eastern daylight time, a Grumman F9F-2, NX72WP, overran runway 35 during an emergency landing at the Kalamazoo/Battle Creek International Airport, Kalamazoo, Michigan. The pilot was seriously injured. The airplane was substantially damaged during its collision with a chainlink fence, ditch, road shoulder, berm, and the postlanding fire. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and the runway was dry at the time of the accident. The flight departed Kalamazoo about 1715 on a 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight operating on an instrument flight rules flight plan.

During postaccident interviews, the pilot reported that the engine did not hesitate when he applied full power for the takeoff from runway 35. The pilot reported that the takeoff run and lift-off were normal for a hot day. He stated that about 200 feet above ground level (agl), he felt a sudden deceleration and was thrown forward in his seat. He stated that the airplane would not accelerate beyond 120 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS). Shortly after noting that the airspeed was not increasing, and thinking that an engine flameout was imminent, the pilot made a tight turn, continued to climb, and contacted the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT). He stated that he told the controller that he had a "problem" and wanted to return to Kalamazoo to land. The Kalamazoo ATCT transcript shows that the accident airplane was cleared for takeoff at 1715:58. At 1717:56, the pilot called the ATCT stating, "Whiskey Pops got a problem." The pilot told the ATCT that he was not certain what the problem was and that he intended to return to the airport. A few moments later the pilot said, "we'll stay in the pattern...normal pattern...seems as though we're not accelerating...it could be a problem with the pitot." The controller asked the pilot if he needed any assistance. The pilot replied, "Negative, we'll be all right, we're just...precautionary."

The pilot stated that the airspeed remained at 120 KIAS, but he sensed that the airplane was actually moving faster than 120 KIAS. The pilot stated that he flew the airplane to 2,000 feet above mean sea level (msl) in a left climbing turn to the downwind leg for runway 35. He stated that this altitude was a little higher than the normal traffic pattern for the airplane. While on the downwind leg, the pilot retarded the throttle to the idle stop. He stated that the rpm rolled back to about 65 percent instead of the normal 28 percent.

The pilot stated that during the downwind leg he recalled seeing a red light glowing on the left-hand console; however, he was unsure exactly when it illuminated. He stated that he believed that the red light was the Emergency Fuel System Warning Light. He stated that he did not manually switch on the emergency position fuel system. He stated that he knew that the emergency fuel system adds more fuel to the engine and that in the emergency mode rapid movement of the throttle could flame out the engine. Unable to obtain less than 65 percent rpm, and unsure of what the engine was going to do, the pilot stated that he shut down the engine to make a power-off landing.

According to FAA Form 8020-6, "Report of Aircraft Accident," at 1723, the wind direction and speed were 030 degrees magnetic at 6 knots. The pilot stated that he aimed for a point about one-third to one-half the way down runway 35 and that the airplane landed "long and hot." He stated that he retracted the flaps and applied the brakes after touchdown. The pilot stated that he observed obstacles at the end of the runway and to avoid them he put all of the pressure on the right toe-brake and steered the airplane onto the grassy area to the right side of the runway.

WITNESSES

A witness at the fixed base operation on the airport's west side stated that he "first saw the aircraft west of the airport at...pattern altitude. The aircraft sounded and looked okay." He said that the airplane "banked from the downwind all the way around and came out on final just like all military landings. The airplane was going very fast and looked like it was going to be a high speed pass." A second witness, who was on Kilgore Road at the time of the accident-north of the airport-watched the airplane's landing roll. The police reported that the witness said he observed the accident airplane's wheels being cherry red during the landing roll as it neared the highway.

According to the ATCT controller statement, the accident airplane's ground speed was "220 knots on final approach...less than a mile from the runway." The controller also stated that the airplane touched down between taxiways B-2 and B-3 and "was going at a high rate of speed."

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate. In addition, the pilot held a "Statement of Acrobatic Competency" (FAA Form 8710-7) dated June 6, 1996, with the following maneuver limitations: "All Aerobatic Maneuvers Within AC Operations Limitations / Formation Non Aerobatic." The altitude limitations were "Level 3, 500 FT" and the authorized aircraft was listed as "F9F-2 Panther."

The pilot provided copies of his logbook that were directly related to the F9F-2 airplane to the investigator-in-charge (IIC). The logbook copies showed that he received 2 hours of dual instruction in a DeHavilland Vampire on September 25, 1985. He began flying the accident airplane on October 7, 1985. An entry in the pilot's logbook showed that he had received an "FAA Comp. Ck. 3 TO Ldgs" in the accident airplane on October 29, 1985. The pilot subsequently received Letters of Authorization (LOA) from the FAA to fly the F9F-2 airplane dated November 7, 1985; November 14, 1986; and October 20, 1987. A copy of the FAA Form 8710-7, a copy of the letter verifying the training in the DeHavilland Vampire, and a copy of the LOAs are appended to this report.

The logbook showed a total of 226.85 hours in the accident airplane. No other Grumman F9F-2 airplane flight times were shown. National Transportation Safety Board Form 6120 1/2, "Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report," listed "236+" hours. In subsequent correspondence, the pilot indicated that he had a total of 333.4 hours in the accident airplane. According to the logbook, the pilot had flown the airplane 5.5 hours during June 1996. The last entry in the pilot's logbook was on June 8, 1996, which showed that the pilot had flown the accident airplane 1.5 hours and made three landings that day. Excerpts from the logbook are appended to this report.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The accident airplane was a Korean War vintage military jet airplane.

The pilot provided copies of the airframe and powerplant logbooks to the IIC. According to the July 27, 1983, airframe logbook entry, NX72WP, serial number (S/N) 12078, was assembled "using new, spare, and surplus parts." The airplane received its special airworthiness certificate from the FAA on July 27, 1983. The logbook showed that the airplane had zero total time in service when it received the special airworthiness certificate.

The airframe logbook showed that the accident airplane's last annual inspection was completed on May 21, 1996, and that it had 373.4 hours on its Hobbs meter. There were no other logbook entries describing any airframe maintenance after the May 21st entry. The accident airplane's total airframe time, which is based on a review of the accident airplane's airframe logbook and the pilot's logbook copies, was 378.9 hours at the beginning of the accident flight.

According to a July 27, 1983, powerplant logbook entry, the accident airplane's Pratt and Whitney J42-P8 engine, S/N P400638, was "overhauled from new, spare, and surplus parts." This entry showed that the main fuel control unit (Bendix model TJ-Cl, S/N 17441) had been overhauled before installation on the accident airplane's J42-P8 engine. There were no logbook entries associated with the engine's main fuel control unit after the July 27, 1983, entry. Copies of the pilot-supplied airframe and powerplant logbooks from the accident airplane are appended to this report.

The pilot supplied other documents to the Safety Board concerning the fuel control unit, including invoices for fuel control repairs, a certification of the history of fuel control repairs from a mechanic at Kal-Aero, a company that performed maintenance on the accident airplane, and a report of the metallurgical and physical examination of the fuel control. Copies of these documents are appended to this report.

See the Powerplant Group Chairman's Factual Report for additional details about the powerplant and component maintenance history.

AIRPORT INFORMATION

The Kalamazoo/Battle Creek International Airport field elevation is 874 feet above msl. The touchdown zone elevation for runway 35 is 868 feet msl. Runway 35 is 6,499 feet long by 150 feet wide, and its surface has grooves perpendicular to its centerline. The grooves are about 1/4 inch deep and cover the runway surface, except for about a 3-foot border on each edge. Runway 35 is intersected by runway 09-27 about 3,400 feet from its approach end.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

During the on-scene investigation, runway 35 was examined for tire skid marks. Gray colored skid marks, spaced about 9 feet apart, were observed from the intersection of runways 35 and 27 to the blastpad at the departure end of runway 35, a distance of about 3,015 feet. As the skid marks neared the end of the runway, their individual width and color intensity gradually reduced. According to the airplane's maintenance manual (AN 01- 85FGA-2), the main landing gear tread is 8 feet, 3 inches wide. Excerpts from the manual showing this information are appended to this report.

The skid marks continued off the north end of runway 35. A tire skid mark that correlates with the position of the...