N408GV

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On April 10, 1997, about 2030 Alaska daylight time, N408GV, operated by Hageland Aviation Services, Inc., as Flight 502, collided with the frozen Arctic Ocean while maneuvering near Wainwright, Alaska. The commercial pilot and all four passengers were fatally injured and the airplane was destroyed. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed. The pilot had previously filed an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan, but departed with a visual flight rules (VFR) flight plan. The regularly scheduled commuter airline passenger flight had departed from Barrow, Alaska, at 1955 and was destined for Wainwright. The flight was operating under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135.

According to transcripts, statements, and records (attached) provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), a person identifying himself as the pilot of N408GV telephoned the Barrow Flight Service Station (FSS) at 0819 on the morning of the accident and requested a "... standard briefing for the North Slope." The FSS briefer provided a briefing that described instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) at the Barrow Airport. The pilot continued to telephone and visit the FSS in person to determine if the weather would improve to visual meteorological conditions (VMC). [At the time of the accident, Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) prohibited commercial passenger-carrying operations in single-engine airplanes during IMC.]

At 1231, the pilot telephoned the FSS again and asked if there were "... any changes in the weather?" The briefer again reported that the visibility at Barrow was below VFR minimums. About one hour later, the pilot telephoned a third time and told the FSS briefer that VMC were being reported by a local automated weather observation station (AWOS). Sky conditions at Barrow were reported as scattered clouds at 200 feet with a visibility of 10 miles. The pilot then filed an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan for a proposed 20-minute flight to Wainwright. The flight plan called for a cruising altitude of 4,000 feet with six hours of fuel on board and a departure time of 1430 local time.

Twenty minutes later, at 1402, the pilot called again and asked if the weather went "... back down again?" After the briefer responded that it had, the pilot stated: "Shoot... [as] soon as I call the passengers the darned stuff comes down." The briefer replied that "...VFR flights still not recommended..." and told the pilot that the reported visibility at Barrow was one and one-half mile with an indefinite ceiling of 300 feet overcast. The pilot asked the briefer "... if it's legal?" The briefer stated: "Well I don't know. I don't delve into the legal or no-legal area. You have to decide."

Thirty-six minutes later, at 1440, the pilot called the FSS again and was told that the ceiling remained at 300 feet overcast. At 1600, the pilot personally visited the FSS and obtained an abbreviated weather briefing. The reported weather conditions had not changed. After casually talking with the briefer, the pilot left the FSS. He then called the FSS four more times at 1645, 1703, 1733, and 1853. Each time he was told by the FSS briefer that the weather conditions had remained the same.

At 1920, the pilot called the FSS once more. The briefer told the pilot "... VFR flight still not recommended," and that the ceiling had risen to 500 feet overcast with a visibility of 7 miles. The pilot responded with: "Okay, that's fine. I guess I'm going to Wainwright." The pilot then boarded the passengers and began the flight.

At 1952, the pilot contacted the FSS by radio and requested a "taxiing advisory." The briefer replied that the "...weather in the Barrow Class E surface area is below VFR minimas. Air traffic control clearance is required to depart the surface area. Say intentions." The pilot requested and was granted a special VFR clearance out of the Barrow Class E surface area. He also filed and activated a VFR flight plan to Wainwright.

At 1958, the pilot reported that he was clear of the Class E surface area. This was his last recorded radio transmission with the FSS.

The Safety Board requested and received recorded radar data from the U.S. Air Force for the time and location of the accident. According to recorded radar data (raw data attached), a radar target was tracking from Barrow toward Wainwright (plot of data attached) beginning about 30 minutes before the accident. The radar track began near Barrow at 2002 and ended near Wainwright at 2021. The recorded track of the target never deviated from 243 degrees during the entire period of recorded radar coverage. The recorded ground speed of the target varied between 135 and 145 knots during the majority of the track, and then gradually increased to 157 knots as the target descended toward Wainwright. The recorded altitude values initially varied between 4,000 feet and 5,000 feet msl, and then gradually decreased to 2,200 feet as the target approached Wainwright and disappeared below radar coverage.

According to a representative of the U.S. Air Force's 611th Communication Flight in Anchorage, Alaska, the recorded values for latitude, longitude, speed, and heading from the radar equipment are considered reliable and accurate; however, the altitude values have a tolerance of plus and minus 3,000 feet due to the characteristics of the radar and the lack of a mode-C signal from the target. The radar data is a computer compilation of data extracted from three Air Force FPS-117 long range, three-dimensional Alaska radar antenna sites located in Barrow, Olitok, and Cape Lisburne. According to the Air Force representative, the radar has a usable range of 200 miles and utilizes a FYQ-93 computer processor.

According to a Wainwright ground agent employed part-time by Hageland Aviation Services (statements attached), the pilot contacted him by radio about 2030 to report that the flight was inbound for landing. The ground agent stated that he was outside on the ramp of the Wainwright Airport at the time. He stated that he was communicating with the pilot via a portable marine radio that was tuned to "Marine 83." He stated that the normal procedure was to communicate with Hageland pilots via the marine radio, not the aviation radio, for improved communications.

The ground agent stated that he heard an airplane make two passes over the Wainwright Airport. During the first pass, the ground agent could hear the airplane, but he could not see it. The ground agent stated that the airplane approached the airport "... from the north" and was "... above the weather." During the second approach, the ground agent remembered that the airplane flew "... from the south heading north," and the airplane was flying "... parallel to the runway." He stated that he "... could see definitely the windows and tail of the airplane" as it flew overhead during the second pass, but "... there was weather" between him and the airplane.

The ground agent stated that he told the pilot via radio that the weather was overcast and the visibility was about 1/4-mile to the east with a "half a sock" of wind. At the time the ground agent heard the airplane directly overhead during the first approach, the pilot radioed something similar to: "I can't see the village. I'm going down south to make another run through."

The ground agent remembered that as the pilot flew overhead during the second pass, the pilot announced that he could not see the airport and he was "going to go back." The ground agent stated that he could see the outline of the airplane in the haze, about 500 to 600 feet above the ground, on a northerly heading, and one-eighth of a mile laterally from the center line of the runway. The ground agent stated that the propeller sounded like the airplane was at landing speed.

The ground agent stated that the pilot immediately responded with a "good bye" statement, and he "...picked up no weird noises [from the airplane and ] no frustration in [the pilot's] communications... no excitement." About 10 seconds later, he radioed to the pilot in order to ask him when he would be returning again. He received no response from the pilot. The ground agent stated that he may have asked the pilot a second time, but he is not sure. He never heard from the pilot again. Another ground witness, a resident of Wainwright who was employed as a part-time ticket agent for another operator, reported (statement attached) that he was in his home near the Wainwright Airport on the evening of the accident. He stated that he heard the Hageland ground agent over his citizens band radio talking to other villagers. He heard that the Hageland airplane was going to be landing at Wainwright, so he "... turned up the volume" on his airport scanner. "A few minutes later," the resident heard "clicking" over the airport radio and surmised that the pilot was attempting to activate the pilot-controlled lighting at the Wainwright Airport.

The resident stated that he then attempted to contact the pilot via his airport radio to tell the pilot that he "... didn't want [the pilot] to land..." because the weather was "pretty bad." The resident attempted to contact the pilot "four or five times," and he tried three different aviation frequencies; he never received a response from the pilot.

The resident remembered that he heard the airplane fly over his house on two separate occasions. He stated that it flew "... from the north... coming up over the village toward the airport" on the "first pass." The airplane then sounded like it "turned left." On the "second pass," he thought that the airplane "... sounded like he was higher." He also stated that the engine sounded "normal" during both passes, and that "about 10 minutes passed" between the first and second "passes."

The North Slope Borough Search and Rescue Unit was subsequent...