N4590

Destroyed
Fatal

Bell UH-1H S/N: 65-09986

Accident Details

Date
Wednesday, December 23, 1998
NTSB Number
LAX99FA057
Location
QUINCY, CA
Event ID
20001211X11576
Coordinates
39.960762, -121.000068
Aircraft Damage
Destroyed
Highest Injury
Fatal
Fatalities
1
Serious Injuries
0
Minor Injuries
0
Uninjured
0
Total Aboard
1

Probable Cause and Findings

An inaccurate exhaust gas temperature gauge, that allowed the engine to be run over-temperature unknowingly by the pilot, which resulted in the subsequent failure of the turbine sections. Also causal was the pilot's failure to maintain rotor RPM during the autorotation. A factor in the accident was the operator's failure to adequately perform engine health indicator tests.

Aircraft Information

Registration
N4590
Make
BELL
Serial Number
65-09986
Engine Type
Turbo-shaft
Model / ICAO
UH-1H UH1
Aircraft Type
Rotorcraft
No. of Engines
1

Registered Owner (Historical)

Name
WESTWIND HELICOPTERS INC
Address
11353 SUNRISE GOLD CIR STE J
Status
Deregistered
City
RANCHO CORDOVA
State / Zip Code
CA 95742-6558
Country
United States

Analysis

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On December 23, 1998, at 1151 hours Pacific standard time, a Bell UH-1H, N4590, entered an uncontrolled descent following a loss of engine power and impacted in Belden Reservoir, 7 miles west of Quincy, California. The helicopter was destroyed and the commercial licensed pilot was fatally injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the external load operation that was conducted by Westwind Helicopters, Inc., under 14 CFR Part 133.

According to the operator, the helicopter was engaged in a long line external load operation in support of Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E). The pilot was lifting construction equipment, typically in 500 pound loads, from a hillside construction site to a base location at a small resort at the north end of Belden Reservoir.

There were three ground witnesses, who were PG&E employees, handling the loading of equipment into the external load sling at the mountain top construction site. The witnesses reported that after 4 or 5 loads had been picked up routinely, the helicopter made an abnormal sound as it approached for the next load. The sound was described by the first witness as "an alarm going off" and "like a beeping." The second said, "It wasn't a beeping but more like a tone," and the third said it was "like a buzzer or like an alarm like a whistle almost." The three said that the pilot then radioed something about it being cold, intake icing and the engine needing more heat. He interrupted the pickup operation and flew around in the area for 2 or 3 minutes before resuming the pickup operation. They then did 5 to 10 more pickups that were routine. After the next pickup, with an external load estimated at only 50 to 75 pounds, one of the witnesses reported that "the helicopter didn't sound quite right . . . I would describe it as a metallic sound like a grinding kind of sound." One of the witnesses noted that as the helicopter flew away with the load the pilot headed toward his landing (refueling) site rather than toward the drop-off zone. The pilot then radioed that he had experienced an engine failure. The witnesses reported that as the helicopter passed from their view behind a ridge, the rotor blades were more visible because they were slowing and the helicopter was in a steep descent.

A ground refueler employed by the operator for about 7 years also witnessed the accident. At the time of the accident he was standing on the dam at the south end of Belden Reservoir about 1/3 mile south of the accident site. They were using the dam as a landing site for refueling. He was looking at the ice on the water and subconsciously listening to the helicopter flying in the distance. He "heard the sound change and knew something was wrong." He looked up and the helicopter "came down like a rocket." When asked by the Safety Board investigator if the sound change was in the "whop - whop" of the rotor or the high frequency whine of the engine, he could only say, "all the sound changed."

According to the operator, the pilot flew external load operations from the left seat. The engine/main rotor tachometer, torque, EGT, and gas producer rpm gages are located on the right side of the center instrument panel. A 100-foot-long kevlar line was used.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The aircraft was delivered to the United States Army as an UH-1H in 1965. Following military retirement, it was issued a type certificate in the restricted category in August 1996 following civilian conversation by Western International Aviation, Inc.

The operator of the helicopter said that the aircraft is maintained on a 100-hour program and had come out of maintenance on the morning of the accident. The helicopter was in for scheduled replacement of time expired swashplate, scissor sleeve assembly, and rotating control bolts. While the replacement of the time expired items was in progress, mechanics noted that on the right rear engine mount one attachment bolt was broken, the other was loose, and the shims under the mount were laying loose on the engine deck. The mechanics were concerned that some of the shims might have been lost and were reluctant to reassemble the mount without checking the installation alignment of the engine. Although the aircraft was not a Garlik type certificated UH-1H, the mechanics proceeded to realign the engine installation by reshimming in accordance with a Garlik Service Bulletin which, according to the operator, mirrors Bell Helicopter's procedure.

The operator reported that several of their pilots had taken checkrides in the helicopter for their U.S. Forest Service authorization card, and that the aircraft had demonstrated satisfactory autorotative landings during those checkrides. The operator also stated that health indicator test (HIT) records were kept in a book in the helicopter. The book was not located among the recovered wreckage.

Another pilot reported having flown the accident helicopter under contract to the U.S. Forest Service about 600 hours through the summer of 1998. His last flight in it was on December 20, 1998, 3 days before the accident, when he ferried it to the operator's base at Lincoln, California. He said that through the 600 hours he never had any problem with the helicopter. The aircraft was reliable, and the only unscheduled maintenance he recalled was a blown transmission seal. He also said that "HIT checks" were performed in the field both by him and the accident pilot, who was his supervisor. They were performed about once every 20 flight hours. He thinks they were required by the Forest Service and were recorded on a form provided by the Forest Service. The recordings were taken by the mechanic and were kept at the home base; they were not kept in the aircraft. He was certain that there was no recording of engine parameters on the daily flight log kept in the aircraft. He also recalled that the engine ran up against the temperature limit before it reached the torque limit. It was engine exhaust gas temperature that limited power available, not the torque limit.

Review of the helicopter's Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Type Certificate Data Sheet (H15NM) revealed the requirement for HIT checks to be accomplished prior to each takeoff and recorded in a log record.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

A refueler who was present at the time of the accident said that the weather was clear and sunny, cold, and there was little wind. A PG&E foreman estimated the temperature to have been in the mid-30 degree Fahrenheit range.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The aircraft impacted in the Belden Reservoir near the northwestern shore, approximately 500 feet north of the dam forming the reservoir. The site is at longitude 121 degrees 09.62 minutes west and latitude 40 degrees 04.70 north (GPS). The elevation is approximately 3,000 feet msl. The reservoir, a hydro-electric generating facility on the north fork of the Feather River, is located in a mountain canyon oriented northeast to southwest, and is about 500 feet wide (southeast to northwest) and 1/2 mile long with the dam at the southwest end. On the southeast and northwest side of the reservoir, mountain terrain rises steeply to approximately 2,500 feet above the reservoir level. The shores of the reservoir and the adjacent mountain slopes are densely populated with trees typically 75 feet tall. At the northeast end of the lake is a small resort with a clearing where the helicopter was lowering its external loads; however, the helicopter was landing on the dam itself when necessary to refuel. According to witnesses, at the time of the accident there was approximately 3 inches of snow on the ground, temperatures were in the mid-30 degree Fahrenheit range, and the surface of the lake was covered with a thin layer of ice, mostly in areas near the shore. There was no fire.

The aircraft was removed from the reservoir by direction of the Plumas County Sheriff and taken to a local impound facility prior to arrival of the Safety Board investigator. According to early responders, there was a hole in the surface ice approximately 30 feet in diameter against the shoreline, and the aircraft was lying on its right side with the nose pointing southeast toward the powerhouse. The tailboom was separated from the fuselage and was adjacent to it. The helicopter components and the external load were recovered from that location.

On the bank of the reservoir where the aircraft was removed, the Safety Board investigator found a severed aluminum power transmission cable about 1-inch in diameter. The severed ends of the cable strands were dull in appearance and areas of the cable, which were under dirt, and rocks on the bank were discolored and corroded. The end of the cable was anchored into the bank about 10 feet above the water level. The foreman for PG&E told the Safety Board investigator that this was an old wire and that there had been no wires strung across that portion of the reservoir at the time of the accident.

The aircraft was examined at the facilities of Plain Parts in Sacramento, California, on December 29, 1998. All of the aircraft was present except for several doors and light sheet metal panels, paper documents, and the engine to transmission driveshaft.

The fuselage was in four sections: the cockpit and forward fuselage; the center fuselage with the engine and main rotor transmission; a section of the tailcone with the 42-degree gearbox; and the vertical fin and 90-degree gearbox. According to early responders, the forward fuselage was attached to the center fuselage at the accident site but was broken apart during the recovery. The entire fuselage exhibited uniform crushing damage along the lower surface with greater damage to the right side of the bottom. The large skin panels on the lower forward fuselage exhibited smooth, upward deflection between fuselage frames. The separated aft tailcone section exhibited a slici...

Data Source

Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# LAX99FA057