N56192

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On June 9, 1999, about 2054 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-28R-200, N56192, registered to Major Strategies, Inc., dba Dolphin Holiday Flying Club, was lost from radar and radio contact approximately 2.2 nautical miles north of the Cape Canaveral Air Force Station Skid Strip, Cape Canaveral Air Station, Florida. Instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) prevailed in the area and no flight plan was filed for the 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight. The airplane was destroyed and the private-rated pilot, the sole occupant, was fatally injured. The flight originated about 1903, from the Fort Lauderdale Executive Airport, Fort Lauderdale, Florida.

Before taxiing to takeoff, the pilot advised the controller that he received Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS) information "Echo", which indicated a thunderstorm distant southwest moving north, and hazardous weather information for south Florida and coastal waters available on HIWAS, Flight Watch, or Flight Service frequencies. The pilot received taxi clearance, requested flight following to the Sanford Airport, and received takeoff clearance. After takeoff at 1904:18, the local controller broadcast on the tower frequency, "attention all aircraft hazardous weather information for florida and coastal waters available through in flight advisory hiwas or flight service convective activity in the area." At 1905:53, the pilot requested a frequency change with the local controller. Air traffic control communications were transferred to Miami Approach Control then to West Palm Beach Approach Control where radar services were terminated and frequency change was approved.

There was no record that the pilot contacted the Witham Field Air Traffic Control Tower, the St. Lucie County International Air Traffic Control Tower, the Vero Beach Municipal Air Traffic Control Tower, the Melbourne International Air Traffic Control Tower, the Space Coast Regional Air Traffic Control Tower, or the Jacksonville Air Route Traffic Control Center.

The pilot radioed Orlando Approach Control and was advised to stand by two times. At 1946:14, the Orlando Approach controller advised the pilot to squawk 0322 and to maintain visual flight rules (VFR) outside of class "B" airspace. The pilot responded at 2046:22, with, "and ah I would like flight following in the storms and I also got diverted and I am now over the shoreline ah right now ah approximately abeam sanford is there any way you can get me in there with a special ifr clearance." Air traffic control communications were transferred to Daytona Beach Approach Control.

At 2048:10, the pilot contacted initially contacted Daytona Beach Approach Control and after acknowledgment by the controller, advised that, "...I got diverted in the storms and uh lost my flight following." The controller asked the pilot to ident. At 2049:08, the controller advised the pilot that the flight was radar identified and, "...fly heading of 290 degrees to the sanford airport maintain vfr the altimeter at melbourne is two niner niner seven." At 2049:27, the pilot acknowledged the transmission from the controller by repeating the heading. At 2051:52, the controller advised the pilot that while flying around, he violated restricted area 2932, class "D" airspace at Melbourne, and that he was going to provide a phone number to the pilot to call after he landed. The pilot responded at 2052:06 with, "ah sorry sir I'm in a major storm right now uh can I change altitude." The controller advised the pilot that he could descend to 5,000 feet or did he want to ascend. The pilot then questioned the controller if ascending would be clearer, and the pilot advised the controller that ascending, "...would be better." The controller advised the pilot to maintain VFR to climb as requested and to advise when able to copy the phone number to call. The controller again questioned the pilot if he was able to copy a phone number and the pilot responded at 2053:21 with "negative sir I'm in a major storm right now (unintelligible) just holding things straight." The controller advised the pilot that "alright if you need to you can turn northbound that will take you ah looks like further away from the weather." The pilot acknowledged with "ah roger sir we'll try." At 2054:14, the controller stated, "five six one niner two your over head restricted area twenty nine thirty two it's in use below five thousand feet suggest you fly eastbound if you need to descend anymore." This transmission was not acknowledged by the pilot.

Review of the Jacksonville Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) National Track Analysis Program (NTAP) revealed that between 2051:48, to 2054:00, indicates a nearly 540-degree turn to the left. Two primary radar returns were recorded in the immediate vicinity of the secondary radar returns and both occurred during the approximate 540-degree left turn. The first primary radar return occurred at 2053:13, at 28 degrees 30 minutes 33 seconds North Latitude and 080 degrees 33 minutes 07 seconds West Longitude. The second primary radar return occurred at 2053:37, at 28 degrees 31 minutes 04 seconds North Latitude and 080 degrees 33 minutes 48 seconds West Longitude. The radar data also indicates that from 2053:48, to 2054:00, the altitude decreased from 6,400 to 5,400 feet. The airplane was lost from the Jacksonville ARTCC radar at 2054:00, at 28 degrees 30 minutes 19 seconds North Latitude and 080 degrees 34 minutes 07 seconds West Longitude. Review of the radar data from Orlando Approach Control revealed that from 2049:31, and 2050:49, revealed that the heading changed from 196 degrees to 313 degrees. The last radar return with the discrete transponder code and altitude reported was at 2054:08, when the airplane was at 3,700 feet. Radar data from the Jacksonville Air Route Traffic Control Center and Orlando Approach Control are attachments to this report.

According to a controller on duty on the night of the accident at the Shuttle Landing Facility, he observed an aircraft intrude into Restricted airspace R-2932, fly to nearby airports, then re-enter Restricted airspace R-2932. He also noted a thunderstorm just west of the Indian River moving east. He observed that the airplane made a left turn and lost the airplane from radar when the airplane was at 5,400 feet. Another controller notified security and the fire department at Kennedy Space Center about the possible downed airplane.

A search for the airplane was performed by the U.S. Coast Guard, the Civil Air Patrol, aircraft from the 301'st Rescue Squadron Air Force Reserve located at Patrick Air Force Base, and a HC-130 type airplane from Moody Air Force Base. Pieces believed to be from the airplane were spotted first about 1330 hours on June 11, 1999, in an open field; the main wreckage was located approximately 40 minutes later.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

According to FAA records, the pilot was not instrument rated. Review of his pilot logbook which begin with an entry dated October 7, 1997, to the last logged entry dated May 30, 1999, with no flight time carried forward, revealed he recorded a total of 13.1 hours of simulated instrument instruction. He also logged a 1.4 hour flight as pilot-in-command in actual instrument conditions, a flight that took place on July 3, 1998. The remarks section for that flight indicates "x country/smoke/storms fuel stop pick up *[unreadable]-*[unreadable]." The logbook also indicates that he had logged a total of 11 instrument instructional flights after receiving his private pilot certificate.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

On the day of the accident about 1730 hours, the airplane was flown on a maintenance test flight which lasted approximately 15 minutes; following replacement of the landing gear hydraulic pump. According to the pilot who performed the flight, the landing gear and all other systems functioned properly during the flight. According to the airplane hour meter, the airplane had been operated for 2.0 hours since the accident pilot rented the airplane. The airplane was not equipped with weather radar.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

There was no record of the pilot obtaining a preflight weather briefing with the Miami, St. Petersburg, Gainesville, Macon, Anderson, Anniston, Raleigh, Nashville, or McKeller Automated Flight Service Stations. Additionally, the pilot did not have access to either of the DUAT vendors to obtain a preflight weather briefing. There also was no record of the pilot obtaining any in-flight weather briefing.

The flight track of the airplane obtained from the Orlando ASR-9 radar, was correlated with weather radar images which begin at 2058:32, or approximately 4 minutes after the last radar contact from the aircraft. The 1.4 degree elevation scan completed at 2059:13, which best depicts the conditions observed at the last known flight altitude of the aircraft, indicate the maximum reflectivity observed along the flight track is 33 dBZ. This would result in light to moderate intensity. There were no recorded pilot reports in the central Florida area between 1700 to 2300 local.

The end of civil twilight was calculated to be 2052, which was approximately 2 minutes before the airplane was lost from the Jacksonville ARTCC radar, for the last known position and altitude of the airplane. The Meteorology Factual Report is an attachment to this report.

COMMUNICATIONS

Transcriptions of communications with the Fort Lauderdale Executive Airport Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT), West Palm Beach Approach Control, Orlando Approach Control, and Daytona Beach Approach Control are attachments to this report.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The airplane crashed on Cape Canaveral Air Station in a wooded area near Launch Complex 20 (See photographs 1-3). The main wreckage consisting of the fuselage with engine and propeller ...