N814M

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On March 17, 2000, about 1802 Eastern Standard Time, a Dassault DA-900, N814M, operated by BP Amoco Corporation, was substantially damaged when it overran the runway while landing at Barnstable Municipal-Boardman/Polando Field (HYA), Hyannis, Massachusetts. The two certificated airline transport pilots and two passengers were not injured. Two occupants of vehicles on a public road received minor injures. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed for the executive/corporate flight that originated from the La Guardia Airport (LGA), Flushing, New York. The flight was conducted under 14 CFR Part 91.

According to the pilot-in-command (PIC), the VOR Runway 6 approach to HYA had been briefed prior to departing LGA. Arriving in the Hyannis area, the crew received the ATIS "Mike", issued at 1650, which stated that winds were from 040 degrees true at 20 knots, gusts to 33 knots, 1/2 statute mile visibility, snow and freezing fog. Cloud conditions were 900 feet broken, 1,400 feet broken, and 2,000 feet overcast. The ILS Runway 15 approach was in use.

The crew determined that the visibility for the VOR Runway 6 approach was below minimums, and the PIC determined that the tailwind component for the ILS Runway 15 approach would have exceeded the airplane's limitations. The PIC requested the ILS Runway 24 approach, and the airplane was then vectored to, and cleared for that approach.

During an interview, the PIC stated that he made the decision during the approach that he would land the airplane if the braking action was reported as fair, and discontinue the approach if it was reported as poor.

The PIC further stated that the airplane was configured to land, and that he flew the glideslope to the runway. After touchdown, he applied maximum reverse thrust and braking, and called for the "air brakes." As the airplane continued down the runway, he noticed an acceleration, and a lack of braking effectiveness. However, he decided not to attempt a go-around, but opted to "rid[e] it out to the end."

A Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector, who arrived at the airport shortly after the accident, stated that the airplane departed the end of the runway, slid through the Runway 24 localizer antenna array and a chain link fence. With a 200-foot section of the chain link fence attached to the number two engine pylon, the airplane crossed a two-lane road and struck three vehicles that were traveling on the road. The airplane continued into a parking lot, and impacted four concrete parking barriers. It then impacted three cement parking lot light fixture bases and two parked vehicles, before coming to a stop.

During the overrun, the airplane's left and right wing fuel tanks ruptured. The Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection estimated that approximately 1,200 gallons of Jet-A fuel spilled from the airplane after it came to a stop.

A witness, who was standing outside of the airport operations building, stated that he had an unobstructed view of Runway 24 when he observed the accident airplane approach the runway. The witness estimated that the airplane touched down at a point 2,500 beyond the approach end. The airplane continued another 1,500 feet until the thrust reverser was deployed. As the airplane passed the operations building, the speed was excessive for the remaining runway. The witness then realized that the airplane was not going to stop on the airport property and proceeded to a rescue vehicle.

The FAA inspector and a representative from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Aeronautics Commission examined Runway 24 after the accident. They observed one set of tire tracks in the snow on the runway that correlated to the ground track of the accident airplane. The tire tracks began about 2,640 feet from the approach end of the runway, which was about 2,785 feet from the departure end.

According to the passenger seated in the main cabin of the airplane, he could see snow outside the window and it was extremely windy, as the airplane passed though 3,000 feet in it's decent to HYA. As the airplane passed through 1,500 feet, he could see the ground continuously and the airplane was "fighting" to stay level. The airplane was at a very steep angle of decent until touchdown. As the airplane was landing, he could see snow covering the runway and the airplane was not decelerating. The passenger did not recall where the airplane touched down on the runway, or if he had heard the thrust reversers or seen the wing spoilers. The passenger did recall that there was a heavy exhaust noise after the landing.

A pilot, who was flying a Piper PA-31 the night of the accident, stated that he had flown from HYA about 1715, and returned to the airport area around 1745. He recalled that the weather conditions were, winds from 070 degrees at 28 knots and gusting. The visibility was about 2 1/2 miles, with an indefinite ceiling. The decision was made to land on Runway 6. After landing, the airplane was turned off of the runway at taxiway Bravo due to the high winds slowing the airplane down after landing. The pilot did not recall if he made a braking action report to the tower, but estimated the conditions as poor, due to the depth of snow and ice on the runway.

Excerpts of the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) transcript revealed the following:

At the beginning of the transcribed recording, HYA ATIS weather information "Mike" was repeated three times on the CAM (cockpit area mike) and the co-pilot's channel.

At 1732:42, the ATIS recording stated, "Hyannis tower information Mike two one five zero weather. the wind zero four zero at two zero gusting three three. visibility one half mile with snow and freezing fog. ceiling's broken at nine hundred broken at one thousand four hundred overcast at two thousand. temperature minus one. dew point minus two. altimeter two niner niner seven. ILS approach runway one five's in use. departing traffic runway six. bird activity on and in the vicinity of the airport. clearance delivery frequency's out of service utilize ground. breaking action is re- reported poor by a Cessna four oh two. all s- surfaces are covered with a patchy thin layer of snow and ice. there are delays to Boston and La Guardia. advise on initial contact. you have Mike."

At 1749:36, the pilot stated, "I don't know if you get time to check with the tower to see what the winds are right now. I wouldn't want to get a surprise after we set up on the..."

At 1749:43, the co-pilot stated, "Okay."

At 1749:45, the pilot stated, "...on the approach you know and have the winds right down the."

At 1750:01, the co-pilot stated on the radio, "yes sir we-re gonna be with you in just a second. Could you give me your current winds please."

At 1750:11, the tower controller stated, "wind ah zero one zero at ah two five."

At 1750:16, the co-pilot stated on the radio, "zero one zero at two five. How's that runway now?"

At 1750:22, the tower controller stated, "ah no one's ah landed ah. the last braking action report I received was at ah two zero four one * zulu ah braking action was reported poor by a Cessna four oh two. It's ah looks like it appear to be a little more snow on the runway now."

At 1750:43, the co-pilot stated, "all right he said ah the winds are zero one zero at twenty five now. braking action was ah."

At 1750:50, the pilot stated, "that's not gonna work. that's a big tailwind on landing."

At 1750:54, the pilot stated, "two four would almost work better wouldn't it?"

At 1751:11, the pilot stated, "we're gonna have to go around to two four@. I mean I-I that's less tailwind component on two four then would you agree?"

At 1751:18, the co-pilot stated, "yeah # you know. one five. you're gonna just..."

At 1751:22, the pilot stated, "okay which*..."

At 1751:23, the co-pilot stated, "...go over the airport? but see that's you*."

At 1751:25, the pilot stated, "...yeah why don't you go ahead and ask ah approach to set us up with that please."

At 1751:29, the co-pilot stated, "two four? okay."

At 1751:31, the pilot stated, "I don't see how we can do it w-with that much tailwind on landing."

The co- pilot replied, "okay."

At 1751:38, the co-pilot stated on the radio, "yes sir I wonder if you'd set us up with the ILS to runway two four ah it looks like the winds ah not in our favor on runway one five."

At 1751:46, the approach controller stated, "eight one four Mike roger turn right zero niner zero vectors ILS two four final approach course."

At 1751:54, the co-pilot stated, "I'll get you set up in one second." The pilot responded, "okay."

At 1752:02, the pilot stated, "that sound like the right thing to do to you."

At 1752:04, the co-pilot stated, "yeah * your right it's you know I was hoping for a little better but i guess it's not going to work is it."

At 1752:12, the co-pilot stated, "I'm gonna get back with it in just a second. I'm gonna get the ah." The pilot responded, "okay."

At 1752:33, the pilot stated, "I'd say that's a little less than ten knots of ah tailwind on on landing."

At 1754:22, the co-pilot stated, "standby one second I'm gonna get you some."

At 1754:31, the co-pilot stated on the radio, "okay we didn't like the winds. we're gonna switch around to the ILS to runway two four. What have you got for braking action and winds now?"

At 1754:40, the tower controller stated, "the wind ah zero two zero at two six gusts to three four...ah no braking action reports ah received for runway ah two four."

At 1754:57, the copilot stated, "okay he's got zero two zero. # that's gonna be a direct tailwind right there on runway."

At 1755:02, the pilot stated, "what what'd he call it now?"

At 1755:04, the co-pilot stated, "he's calling it zero two zero." The pilot responded, "okaay."

At 1755:08, the co-pilot stated, "see that's gonna be a direct tailwind."

At 1755...