N941FE

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On October 9, 2000, approximately 0951 Pacific daylight time, a Cessna 208B, N941FE, operating as Empire Airlines flight 665 on a 14 CFR 135 non-scheduled domestic air cargo flight, crashed in wooded terrain near the northwest end of Lummi Island, Washington. The aircraft, which was owned by Federal Express Corporation (FedEx) and carrying FedEx cargo at the time, was substantially damaged, and the airline transport pilot-in-command (who held commercial privileges for single-engine land airplanes), the airplane's sole occupant, was fatally injured. The flight had departed Bellingham, Washington, on a special visual flight rules (Special VFR) air traffic control (ATC) clearance approximately 8 minutes prior to the accident, bound for Orcas Island Airport, Eastsound, Washington. Instrument meteorological conditions (ceiling 500 feet broken, 2 miles visibility in mist) were reported at Bellingham (approximately 8 nautical miles northeast of the crash site) at 0942 and 0953, and the FAA reported no record of a flight plan being filed for the flight.

Personnel from the Bellingham FedEx station stated that the flight's target departure time was about 0930. The flight's loading manifest indicated that 1,110 pounds of cargo were aboard for the accident flight, with no dangerous goods. The operator reported that the pilot obtained weather information at the Bellingham FedEx station prior to departure, and that the flight took off with about 1,000 pounds of Jet A fuel on board. Empire Airlines' chief pilot stated to the NTSB investigator-in-charge (IIC) that the Bellingham to Orcas Island flight is a visual flight rules (VFR) leg, since there is no published instrument approach procedure into Orcas Island Airport.

Review of a re-recording of the flight's communications with the Bellingham air traffic control tower (ATCT) disclosed that about 0940, the pilot asked the tower for the ceiling and visibility. The tower controller replied that the ceiling was 500 feet broken and visibility was 2 to 2 1/2 miles. At 1642, the pilot requested taxi, and clearance out of the Bellingham Class D airspace to the west. The tower cleared the pilot to taxi to runway 16, and issued a Special VFR clearance to exit the Class D airspace to the southwest at or below 2,000 feet. The tower controller also instructed the pilot to report leaving the Class D surface area to the southwest. The flight was cleared for takeoff about 0943:00. About 0946:20, the pilot reported leaving the Class D airspace to the southwest. The tower asked the pilot, "how's it look?" The pilot replied that the weather was "scuddy", with ceiling 500 feet and visibility 2 to 2 1/2 miles "as reported", with weather "lower in other areas but about the same."

Following the aircraft's takeoff from Bellingham, the approach control radar at Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, recorded a 1200 beacon code on a southerly track from the airport to the shoreline of Bellingham Bay, then turning onto a southwesterly track to a point over Bellingham Bay approximately 3 nautical miles southwest of the airport, at which point radar contact was lost. The target's pressure altitude at the last point of radar contact was 600 feet.

A witness reported that while waiting at the Lummi Island ferry terminal (on the east side of the island), he observed the accident airplane flying in a generally south-to-north direction up Hale Passage (between Lummi Island and the mainland) at very low altitude, which he estimated as 50 to 100 feet above the water, and just below the clouds. The witness stated that the airplane appeared to him to be flying very fast, and to be going in and out of the clouds. The witness reported that the airplane subsequently turned to the west (generally in the direction of Orcas Island), at a point that appeared to him to be prior to reaching the northwest end of the island. The witness stated that the aircraft then disappeared into the weather; he estimated that the aircraft was 1 mile away from him when it disappeared. The witness reported that the aircraft never climbed, and that the cloud deck was in the trees. He further indicated that he observed no signs of any malfunction (such as smoke, fire, or pieces falling off of the aircraft), that the aircraft sounded to him like a normal turboprop-powered airplane, and that the aircraft appeared to him to be under control during the whole time he observed it (about 20 seconds.)

Seven other witnesses on the island gave statements in which they reported hearing a low-flying aircraft, and/or the sound of a crash, at about the accident time. Only one of these reported actually seeing the plane; this witness stated that the aircraft was "barely visible in the fog." One couple, who reported hearing the aircraft pass near their home near the crash site and subsequently hearing it crash nearby, both reported they heard the engine sputter a few seconds before the sound of impact. Another witness reported that he did not hear any engine noise, only the sound of impact. The remaining four witnesses reported the engine noise as "full bore", "cruising power (strong and regular)", or an RPM change "as if the pilot was applying climb power" with the engine RPM appearing "higher than normal"; or that they did not note any pops, bangs, or sputtering. Five of the witnesses noted the low ceiling and visibility, or "extra dense" fog in the area, with ceiling estimates ranging from 100 to 200 feet and visibility estimates ranging from 100 feet to "1 1/2 blocks."

An emergency call was received by local dispatch at 0951, reporting that an aircraft was down on Lummi Island.

The accident occurred during daylight hours. The coordinates of the main crash site were approximately 48 degrees 44.1 minutes North latitude and 122 degrees 42.8 minutes West longitude.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

A Meteorological Factual Report on the accident (attached) was prepared by a meteorological specialist of the NTSB Operational Factors Division, Washington, D.C. This report indicated that at 0800 on October 9, a cold front extended from a weak low pressure center over south central Washington northeastward through central Washington into British Columbia, Canada. A trough of low pressure also extended along the Oregon-Washington coastline to the Strait of Juan de Fuca.

The aviation area forecast (FA) amendment issued at 0600 on October 9, valid during the accident time frame, forecast the conditions for the coastal sections of the Washington Cascades westward as: broken 1,000 to 2,000 feet; overcast 5,000 feet; layered up to flight level (FL) 220; occasional visibility 3 to 5 miles in light rain and mist; isolated embedded thunderstorms and light rain showers with cumulonimbus tops FL 300; and outlook as being for marginal visual flight rules conditions due to ceiling, rain showers and mist. AIRMET SIERRA Update 2 for IFR and mountain obscuration, issued at 0645 on October 9 and valid for the accident time frame, advised of occasional ceiling below 1,000 feet and visibility below 3 miles in mist in the accident area. The terminal aerodrome forecast (TAF) for Bellingham, issued at 0433 on October 9 and valid during the accident time frame, forecast conditions there for the accident time frame as: calm winds, visibility 3 miles in light rain, scattered clouds at 600 feet; ceiling 1,500 feet broken; overcast at 3,500 feet; with temporary conditions of visibility 1 mile in light rain; ceiling 200 feet broken; broken clouds at 600 feet; and overcast at 1,500 feet.

Bellingham was the closest meteorological observation facility to the accident site. A special meteorological observation (SPECI) taken at Bellingham at 0942 and a METAR observation taken there at 0953 reported the same conditions, except for a change in wind direction from 290 degrees (at 0942) to 310 degrees (at 0953). Both otherwise gave conditions as: wind speed 6 knots; visibility 2 miles in mist; ceiling 500 feet broken; broken clouds at 6,000 feet; overcast at 8,000 feet; temperature 12 degrees C; dewpoint 12 degrees C; and altimeter setting 29.74 inches Hg.

Further details on the meteorological conditions that existed at the time of the accident are presented in the NTSB Meteorological Factual Report.

FLIGHT RECORDERS

The accident airplane was not equipped, nor was it required to be equipped, with a cockpit voice recorder (CVR) or flight data recorder (FDR). However, it was equipped with a Power Analyzing Recorder (PAR) manufactured by Avionics Specialties Inc. of Earlysville, Virginia. This unit recorded various engine operation parameters in a non-volatile memory for maintenance purposes. The PAR was located and removed from the accident aircraft at the accident scene, and sent to the facilities of its manufacturer in Earlysville for readout under the supervision of a flight recorder specialist from the NTSB Vehicle Recorders Division, Washington, D.C. Readout of the unit, conducted on October 30, 2000, disclosed a "system reset" consistent with the time of the accident that indicated engine operating parameters at the time of the accident as: inter-turbine temperature (ITT) 644 degrees C; torque 1,373 foot-pounds; gas generator RPM (Ng) 92.9%; propeller RPM (Np) 1,895 RPM; fuel flow 358 pounds per hour; pressure altitude 1,608 feet; indicated airspeed 135 knots; and outside air temperature 10 degrees C.

The values of ITT, torque, Ng, Np, and indicated airspeed recorded at system reset were all noted to be within, and toward the high end of, their respective normal operating ranges as per the Limitations section of the Cessna 208 Caravan I Information Manual (for Airplanes with PT6A-114 [600 SHP] Engine) (excerpts attached). Additionally, the Performance section of the Caravan I Information Manual (excerpt attached) indicates a fuel flow of 350 pounds per hour and true airspeed of 151 knots under the following co...