YV2466P

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On June 13, 2001, about 2122 eastern daylight time, a Beech C90, YV2466P, Venezuelan registered to a private individual, operating as a Title 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight, crashed while on final approach to Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport, (FLL) Florida. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed and an international instrument flight plan had been filed. The aircraft was destroyed, a Venezuelan single engine private pilot-rated passenger in the right pilot's seat was fatally injured, and the left seated Venezuelan BE-90 rated captain was seriously injured, as was a passenger in the cabin. The flight originated from Caracas, Venezuela's Oscar Machado Zuloaga International Airport, (SVCS) at 1516 eastern daylight time.

According to the FLL tower controller who was directing the aircraft for landing, the flight was routinely handed off to his position from Miami Approach Control radar for a visual landing. When YV2466P made his initial radio call to FLL tower at 2117, he was given the following instructions, " YV2466P, you are number one for [runway] 9R, winds are 140 at 7, cross the shoreline at one thousand", [feet-altitude, msl]. At 2120, the tower controller transmitted, "2466P cleared to land." At 2121, the pilot of YV2366P transmitted, "I need the field, I have difficulties here...small problem with engine." The controller transmitted, "wind check, 140 at 8, no need to acknowledge", and estimated YV2466P was 500 feet agl, and 3/4 mile from the threshold to runway 9R with landing lights illuminated, when he momentarily directed his attention to an air carrier jet rolling out on the north runway. When he redirected his attention to runway 9R, he could no longer see YV2466P's lights.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The pilot held a private pilot certificate issued by the Republic of Venezuela on April 10, 1979. Endorsements on the license include the Beechcraft Bonanza 33A, Baron 55 and 58 with instrument, and BE-90 Captain. The pilot stated he owned VY2466P exclusively for 6 years, and that he was in the process of selling 6/7 ownership to a friend in Venezuela. Personal log books were not produced, but the pilot stated that he had accrued 3,203 flight hours total, with about 1,800 of those hours in the King Air aircraft. He stated his most recent proficiency check ride was on March 1, 1994. The pilot possesses a valid medical, (No. 7837) for private pilot that expires on November 30, 2001.

The pilot stated he was a principal and attorney for a business in Barcelona, Venezuela, known as Soltuca, a steel pipe factory. The flight was for the purpose of continuing on to Charleston, South Carolina, the following day for business meetings. The two passengers aboard were connected to the business, as well. The right seat occupant was the pilot's nephew and held a Venezuelan private pilot's license, with single engine rating.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

According to the type certification data sheets, the 1973 Beech King Air C90, Serial No. LJ-591, was manufactured with Pratt and Whitney PT6A-20 turbo-propeller engines developing 550 shp. YV-2466P's engine data plates revealed installation of PT6A-20A engines. The factory confirmed that the original PT6A-20's had been fitted with PT6A-27 propeller reversing and exhaust cases which effectively converts the -20 to a -20A engine. Both engines, Serial Nos. 24022 and 24032, had been overhauled by Pratt and Whitney Engine Services, West Virginia, on February 21, 1996. The aircraft underwent Beechcraft model 90 series phase inspections one through four on June 26, 2000, by Raytheon Aircraft Services, Inc., of Fort Lauderdale, Florida at an aircraft total time of 8052.3 hours. The latest entry in the log pages, dated December 13, 2000, showed accomplishment of phase one inspection at 1,258.5 hours since overhaul for both engines, 116.4 hours since overhaul for both propellers, and 8,168.7 hours on the airframe. The pilot reported the aircraft had flown 207 hours since last inspection. The hour-meter read 1904.35 at the accident site.

The aircraft was modified in accordance with STC SA00257AT; replacement of the original air-cooled nickel-cadmium battery with a Concorde RG-380E sealed lead-acid battery on June 26, 2000, by a Raytheon service dealer in Fort Lauderdale, Florida.

Prior to departure from Caracas, on the day of the accident, the aircraft underwent removal and replacement of the two left engine igniter plugs because of engine start problems. This information was not entered in the maintenance log pages, but was reported by the pilot.

Reference to the aircraft trip log sheets reveal that aircraft onboard fuel is adequate for non-stop flight between Caracas and Fort Lauderdale. Between November, 1998 and August, 1999, the aircraft flew the trip 15 times. Of those 15 trips, eight were flown with a fuel stop, (Port-Au-Prince or Nassau) and seven made the trip non-stop.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

The 2053 terminal weather observation for the FLL airport was, scattered clouds at 3,200 feet agl, scattered clouds at 14,000 feet agl, broken cloud layers at 25,000 feet agl, winds from 140 degrees at 5 knots, visibility 10 statute miles, a temperature of 84 degrees F, and an altimeter setting of 30.00 inches Hg.

According to radiosonde data for eastern North America and the Caribbean, a plot of contoured winds aloft at flight level 220, along the route of flight at about 2000 eastern daylight time, shows light cross winds from the east northeast during the first half of the flight, and light crosswinds from the southwest during the latter half of the flight. Analysis of the aloft wind's direction and speed with respect to the magnetic course of Amber 315 appeared to have contributed very little to the aircraft's ground speed.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The aircraft's first impact with the terrain was onto road pavement near the centerline of an off-ramp two lane road that runs parallel to north-south oriented Interstate 95 (I-95), on its west side, or about 1,700 feet from the threshold of runway 9R, and about 700 feet south of centerline of the runway. The wreckage path was perpendicular to I-95 , was 33 feet in length, and terminated at a 15-foot vertical concrete wall that elevates I-95. Scars on the road and wreckage examination revealed first impact was the landing gear on the road hard enough to collapse all three gear struts, as well as bending the empennage and both wing outer panels downward before impacting the wall. The aircraft was in a slight left bank and very near longitudinally level when the three landing gear struck the road top. The concrete wall bore distinct imprints of the nose and both propeller spinners, as well as a tire mark from the separated left main wheel. The nose structure had been uniformly accordioned and the crushing extended to the base of the windscreen. The radome was missing, and pieces lay scattered at the base of the wall. The weather radar's antenna had been flattened and its mounting assembly was fractured. Both engines had broken loose from their respective engine mounts, and the extent of the under cowl crushing was difficult to determine because the cowlings, themselves, were so heavily accordioned and unmovable. Neither propeller was feathered. Both propeller spinners exhibited heavy crushing and were uniformly accordioned, front to rear. Behind the propeller spinners, both propeller domes had impacted the concrete wall and were cracked. No evidence of spinner rotation at wall impact was evident. Both propellers exhibited rearward bending of all three blades. Two blades of the left propeller exhibited rearward curled tips. Chord wise scarring at the tips from road surface impact revealed the propellers were turning in a low energy condition when the tips collided with the road pavement. Additionally, some propeller span wise burnishing was revealed due to the slide through the roadside grass and sand.

Examination of the fuel system revealed no fuel observed through any of the four overwing fuel filler openings which represent the left and right nacelle tanks and leading edge tanks. The four fuel filler caps fit tightly to the filler neck flanges, and no stains of in-flight fuel leakage were noted anywhere on the wings or nacelles. Both nacelle fuel tanks were subsequently found breached from impingement with accessory gear box and accessories during the crash sequence. Fuel found in the fuel lines and fuel filter housings of both engines totaled less than a pint. The wreckage salvager who moved the wreckage from the site to a hangar on the FLL airport stated about 3 gallons of fluid smelling like jet fuel leaked from the vicinity of the lower midsection during transit. The wreckage had been hosed down with a foam mixture from FLL airport crash/fire rescue personnel. The flaps were found in the "up" position, although the cockpit selector was in the "approach flap" position. Both outboard cockpit walls had been cut open by rescue personnel to facilitate pilot extrication. The front seat occupant shoulder harnesses had not been cut, and appeared to be unused during the accident. Both cockpit flight control columns were broken, but flight control continuity in all three axes was confirmed from the control surface to a point under the floorboards of the cockpit. The flight control trim tabs were all found near neutral positions, both by cockpit indicators and measurement of actuator control rods. Lenses were removed from the warning/caution lights on the glare shield annunciator panel for the purpose of examining the individual light filaments. The following lights had stretched or broken filaments: (1) "Fault Warning"- two light bulbs, both filaments stretched, (2) "RH Fuel Press"- two light bulbs, both filaments stretched, (3) "LH Fuel Press"- two light bulbs, both filaments stretched, (4) "LH Bleed Air Line Failure", filaments stretched, (5) "RH Bleed Air Lin...