N814AW

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On November 2, 2001, at 0734 central standard time, an Airbus Industrie A319-132 transport airplane, N814AW, operating as America West Airlines flight 786, experienced an engine anomaly while in cruise flight and diverted to the Midland International Airport (MAF), Midland, Texas. The captain, who held an airline transport pilot certificate, the first officer, who also held an airline transport pilot certificate, three cabin attendants, and 84 passengers were not injured. The airplane was registered to International Lease Finance Corporation of Los Angeles, California, and operated by America West Airlines of Phoenix, Arizona. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 scheduled passenger flight. The flight originated from the George Bush Intercontinental Airport (IAH), Houston, Texas, at 0610, and was destined for the Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport (PHX), Phoenix.

According to the captain and first officer, the flight departed IAH and climbed to flight level 390. The flight had been in cruise at flight level 390 for 12 minutes when the flight crew received an "engine oil filter bypass" fault message on the electronic centralized aircraft monitoring (ECAM) system; however, all of the engine parameters remained within limits. The flight crew informed maintenance control of the indication, and decided that if the engine should develop further problems the flight would land at the nearest airport, which was MAF. As a precaution, the flight descended to flight level 350 and obtained the current ATIS (automated terminal information system) information at MAF. Subsequently, the oil pressure indication for the #1 (left) engine rose into the red band and a "high vibration and a thumping sound" was felt and heard. They stated that they did not detect any smoke or odor in the cockpit. The first officer referenced the quick reference handbook (QRH) and completed the "high engine vibration checklist." In accordance with the checklist, the captain moved the thrust lever for the #1 engine to the idle position.

The flight crew then declared an emergency and diverted to MAF. When the flight crew notified the cabin crew of their action to divert, the cabin crew reported that there was a "thin film" of visible, odorless smoke in the area of the forward galley between the first class cabin and the cockpit. The flight crew then donned their oxygen masks. The captain reported that during the landing roll, on runway 16R, he moved both throttle levers into reverse and, simultaneously, the cockpit and cabin began to fill with smoke. The cabin attendants reported that during the landing roll the cabin began to fill with a "heavier" white smoke. The MAF air traffic control tower personnel added that, during the landing roll they observed white smoke emanating from the #1 engine. The captain stopped the airplane on the high speed taxiway, shut-down both engines, and an emergency evacuation ensued.

According to the flight attendants (FA), the #1 and #2 FAs were seated on the forward jump seat (forward of the first class cabin). The captain signaled to evacuate, both FAs got up, and the #1 FA proceeded to the 1L door and the #2 FA proceeded to the 1R door. The 1L door opened and the slide deployed and inflated. The #2 FA reported that she pulled the 1R door handle up and felt the power assist begin to open the door. The slide cover opened and she could see the slide. The door opened approximately 12 inches and then stopped moving. The #2 FA then directed the passengers to exit through the 1L door. The #3 FA was seated on the aft jump seat. When the captain signaled the evacuation, she proceeded to the 2L door, pulled the door handle up, and the door began to open. The power assist was not as powerful as she expected, and she had to manually push the door open to engage the gust lock. The slide deployed and inflated, and passengers exited. The 2R door was not opened and the #3 FA reported that due to a low number of passengers, flow through the 2L door was good. There were no injuries during the evacuation.

Prior to vacating the airplane, the captain observed the 1R door 3/4 open and the slide "partially out of the bustle." He stated that he then pushed the door "pretty hard," and the door then moved to the fully open position. The evacuation slide deployed and inflated. Maintenance personnel removed the slides and the airplane was towed to a hangar at the airport.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The captain held an airline transport pilot certificate and was type rated in the Airbus 319/320, Boeing 737, and the Swearingen 227. According to the NTSB Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report Form, which was completed by America West Airlines, the captain had accumulated a total of 15,000 hours, of which 800 hours were in the A319. He held an FAA first-class medical certificate, with no limitations or waivers, which was issued on May 21, 2001.

The first officer held an airline transport pilot certificate and was type rated in the BA-3100. According to the NTSB Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report Form, the first officer had accumulated a total of 4,800 hours, of which 1,000 were in the A319.

The three cabin attendants were based in Phoenix.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The airplane was delivered to America West Airlines new, and was registered on July 27, 2000. It is equipped with two International Aero Engine Corporation (IAE) 2524-A5 engines, which are rated at 24,000lbs of thrust each. America West configured the airplane with 124 passenger seats and six crew seats. A review of maintenance records revealed no pertinent entries relating to the #1 engine's loss of power. On October 18th, 2001, the last "A" check was performed, during which all of the magnetic chip detectors (MCD) were reported to be clean.

The airframe and engines had accumulated a total of 4,798 hours. The #1 engine (serial number V10778) had accumulated a total of 1,916 cycles.

The IAE series of engines was developed through a consortium of four major engine manufacturers consisting of Pratt & Whitney, Rolls-Royce, Japanese Aero Engines Corporation, and MTU Aero Engines. The IAE 2524-A5 engine is an axial flow, two-shaft engine that incorporates a 4-stage low-pressure compressor (LPC), a 10-stage high-pressure compressor (HPC), a 2-stage high-pressure turbine (HPT), and a 5-stage low-pressure turbine (LPT).

AERODROME INFORMATION

MAF is located at 31 degrees 56.552 minutes north latitude and 102 degrees 12.115 minutes west longitude, at an elevation of 2,871 feet msl. The airport has two parallel runways oriented north-south, one runway oriented east-west, and one runway oriented northeast-southwest. Runway 16R (asphalt) is 9,501 feet long and 150 feet wide.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

At 0753, the weather observation facility at MAF reported the following weather conditions: clear skies, visibility 10 statute miles, wind from 230 degrees at 8 knots, temperature 17 degrees Celsius, dew point 12 degrees Celsius, and an altimeter setting of 30.06 inches of mercury.

FLIGHT RECORDER INFORMATION

The airplane was equipped with an Allied Signal Solid State Digital Flight Data Recorder (SSDFDR), serial number 5846. The recorder was sent to the NTSB's Vehicle Recorder Laboratory in Washington, DC, where it was found to be in good condition. The recorded data were extracted normally from the recorder and plotted for the entire engine event.

TESTS AND RESEARCH

Initial examination of the airplane and the #1 engine did not reveal evidence of an uncontained engine failure or fire; however, an oil film was observed on the exterior of the #1 engine cowling and along the fuselage. The scavenge oil filter and #1 engine's MCDs contained large quantities of metal particles. The oil pressure filter had been imploded and was covered with metal particles. The engine was then shipped to IAE's Pratt & Whitney facility located in Cheshire, Connecticut, for further examination.

The engine was disassembled by IAE/Pratt & Whitney personnel, under the supervision of the NTSB Investigator-In-Charge (IIC). The engine's nose cone fairing and fan blades were covered with a film of oil; however, displayed no damage. A boroscope was used to examine the front bearing compartment (FBC), and it was discovered that the #3 bearing was fractured. A section of the #3 bearing race was observed lying on the bottom of the FBC. The LPT shaft could not be removed, so the #1 bearing support housing was disassembled and the HPT stubshaft was removed to facilitate further examination.

Following disassembly, sections of the #3 bearing were observed in the #2 bearing support housing. The #2 bearing support housing was then disassembled and it was noted that the hydraulic seal runner had fused to the LPT shaft, therefore preventing its removal from the FBC. The HPC section's shrouds and inner seals displayed damage, consistent with secondary damage from a rearward shift of the HPC rotor. The rotor paths displayed evidence of contact with their respective HPC blades. The HPC contained metal particles, consistent with that from the FBC. The HPC vanes and rotor exhibited damage, typical of debris originating from the FBC. The nozzle guide vane (NGV) and diffuser did not exhibit any damage.

The HPT blade tips were melted and curled. The LPT section contained metal particles. The main oil pressure pump, scavenge pump and air cooled oil cooler were intact; however, displayed damage consistent with metal particles from the #3 bearing. The FBC parts, including the #3 bearing and HPC stubshaft were further examined by personnel at IAE's Pratt & Whitney Materials Laboratory.

The #3 bearing's outer race fractured into 14 pieces. The outer diameter surface contained a thumbnail appearance and major arrest lines, consiste...