N127WWCessna (Textron Aviation) 4142003-01-14 NTSB Accident Report

Substantial
Serious

Cessna (Textron Aviation) 414S/N: 414-0260

Summary

On January 14, 2003, a Cessna 414 (N127WW) was involved in an accident near Palm Springs, CA. The accident resulted in 1 serious injury, 2 minor injuries. The aircraft sustained substantial damage.

The National Transportation Safety Board determined the probable cause of this accident to be: The flight instructor's improper selection of the high boost position for the operating right engine while on base leg to land, which resulted in a loss of engine power of the right engine. Factors associated with the accident are the left engine's loss of power for an undetermined reason, the flight instructor's failure to feather the propellers of the affected engines, and his failure to maintain directional control, which resulted in an off-airport forced landing.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On January 14, 2003, at 1359 Pacific standard time, a Cessna 414, N127WW, lost engine power and made an off airport forced landing at Palm Springs, California. The owner operated the airplane under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91. The airplane sustained substantial damage. The commercial multiengine pilot undergoing instruction (PUI) was located in the left seat, and received serious injuries. The certified flight instructor (CFI) in the right seat, and a pilot rated passenger in the passenger compartment had minor injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the cross-country flight. An instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan had been filed. The flight departed Zamperini Field (TOA), Torrance, California, at 1145.

This accident is documented in NTSB report LAX03FA067. AviatorDB cross-references NTSB investigation data with FAA registry records to provide comprehensive safety information for aircraft N127WW.

Accident Details

Date
Tuesday, January 14, 2003
NTSB Number
LAX03FA067
Location
Palm Springs, CA
Event ID
20030124X00108
Coordinates
33.849998, -116.483329
Aircraft Damage
Substantial
Highest Injury
Serious
Fatalities
0
Serious Injuries
1
Minor Injuries
2
Uninjured
0
Total Aboard
3

Probable Cause and Findings

The flight instructor's improper selection of the high boost position for the operating right engine while on base leg to land, which resulted in a loss of engine power of the right engine. Factors associated with the accident are the left engine's loss of power for an undetermined reason, the flight instructor's failure to feather the propellers of the affected engines, and his failure to maintain directional control, which resulted in an off-airport forced landing.

Aircraft Information

Registration
Make
Cessna (Textron Aviation)
Serial Number
414-0260
Engine Type
Reciprocating
Year Built
1972
Model / ICAO
414C414
Aircraft Type
Fixed Wing Multi Engine
No. of Engines
2

Registered Owner (Historical)

Name
ALLIED EAGLES LLC
Address
723 S CASINO CENTER BLVD FL 2
Status
Deregistered
City
LAS VEGAS
State / Zip Code
NV 89101-6716
Country
United States

Analysis

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On January 14, 2003, at 1359 Pacific standard time, a Cessna 414, N127WW, lost engine power and made an off airport forced landing at Palm Springs, California. The owner operated the airplane under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91. The airplane sustained substantial damage. The commercial multiengine pilot undergoing instruction (PUI) was located in the left seat, and received serious injuries. The certified flight instructor (CFI) in the right seat, and a pilot rated passenger in the passenger compartment had minor injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the cross-country flight. An instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan had been filed. The flight departed Zamperini Field (TOA), Torrance, California, at 1145. The flight was destined for Palm Springs International Airport (PSP). The wreckage was at a global positioning system (GPS) coordinates of 33 degrees 51 minutes north latitude and 116 degrees 29 minutes west longitude.

Responding Palm Springs Police Department officers interviewed the pilots after the accident. The CFI reported that as they turned towards final, the left engine began to surge and the airplane yawed to the right. He went through the emergency procedures but the airplane continued to lose airspeed and altitude. While maneuvering to the landing spot, the CFI noted that the fuel selectors were positioned to the MAIN fuel tanks, and the gauges showed 25 gallons in each wing.

The responding officers verified that the master switch and the magnetos were in the OFF positions, the landing gear handle was in the retracted position, and the flaps were retracted. They also noted that the fuel boost pump switches were "fully on." The fuel selector handles were in the OFF position. The officers inspected the fuel tanks and noted that the left side fuel tanks were empty, with the odor of fuel present under the damaged wing. The two outer right wing fuel tanks each had fuel remaining in them.

CFI Statement (seated in the right seat)

The CFI reported that on the day prior to the accident, during the preflight inspection, he noted that the left alternator circuit breaker had been tripped to the OPEN position, and he reset it. They started the engines and cross-fed fuel from the opposite main fuel tanks priming the engine via the emergency fuel pump ON position. Normal fuel flow was established and the engines were operating normally. They tested the airplane system per the BEFORE TAKEOFF checklist, with no discrepancies noted. As they taxied to the fueling area there was a discussion about the left alternator, which had recently been replaced. They did not know if it was on line or not. The PUI had informed him that during the ferry flight to reposition the airplane from Palomar Airport, Carlsbad, California, to TOA, the pilot noted that the left alternator was inoperative. However, during the taxi, no discrepancies were noted with the left alternator. The airplane was fueled to capacity; 100 gallons in the main fuel tanks, and 40 gallons each in the auxiliary and nacelle locker fuel tanks for a total of 80 gallons. The airplane was taxied to the hangar where they adjourned to start the ground school portion of the training. They spent the next 6 hours reviewing airplane systems.

They met the next day to complete the ground school instruction. The pilots again performed the preflight inspection, which included sampling the fuel sumps, where about 1 quart of water was removed from the right wings' innermost rear sump. The water was not "clean; it was cloudy and contained sediment." They continued to sample the fuel until "clear fuel was detected."

The airplane was started normally and they received an IFR flight plan to PSP via Thermal, California, and Blythe, California, reaching an altitude of 25,000 feet (flight level - FL250) to conduct high altitude operations. After reaching FL250, the airplane was configured for 65-percent power and the air-to-fuel mixture was adjusted to the recommend values. At that point, the CFI switched from the main fuel tanks to the auxiliary fuel tanks. Moments later, the left engine "dropped off line," and no fuel flow was evident on the fuel gauge. He then moved the left fuel selector back to the left main fuel tank. He advised Southern California Air Route Traffic Control Center (SoCal ARTCC) of the situation, and initiated a slow right circling descent towards Blythe airport. The left engine did not immediately come back on line, and it took a few minutes before the engine regained power.

The CFI reported that they stabilized the airplane's altitude at 15,000 feet and elected to continue on towards Thermal. At that point both engines were operating normally. He stated that the left fuel selector was positioned to the MAIN fuel tank, and the right fuel selector was positioned to the AUXILIARY fuel tank. The CFI reported that because the engines were operating normally, he moved the left fuel selector from the MAIN fuel tank back to the AUXILIARY fuel tank. The left engine continued to operate normally. He stated that they performed flight maneuvers that included medium and steep bank turns, unusual attitudes, and various simulated emergency conditions. During the airwork, the fuel selectors were both positioned to the MAIN fuel tanks, and they initiated the fuel transfer process from the nacelle locker tanks to the main fuel tanks.

The CFI stated that the engines were operating normally, and they continued the flight towards PSP, their original destination so they could refuel and switch pilots. At 8,500 feet, he radioed the PSP approach controller with a request to circle PSP airport, and simulate single engine operations (an engine out condition). The PSP controller acknowledged and approved their request. The flight proceeded direct to PSP at 3,500 feet and was instructed to contact tower personnel; a tower controller cleared them to land on runway 31L.

The CFI then simulated a left engine failure by reducing the power with the throttle. The PUI initiated the emergency procedures by increasing mixture to rich, propellers to high rpm (revolutions per minute), and right throttle full forward. The PUI performed a "drag check" to ensure the landing gear and wing flaps were retracted. The PUI then identified the left engine as inoperative and verified by closing the left throttle. When the PUI went to feather the left propeller the CFI blocked him, and then set power on the left engine to simulate "zero thrust and trimmed for that condition." The PUI circled the airplane to the right, towards the operating engine, and during the descent, the power on the right engine was reduced to 29.5 inches manifold pressure (MAP) and 2,400 rpm.

The CFI reported that they orbited the airplane a couple of times before establishing the airplane on the right downwind leg for runway 31L. As they turned from base to final, left wing high, the left engine started to "surge wildly, rotating the [airplane] clockwise 180 degrees from our previous heading and outbound perpendicular from the runway." They arrested the turn by leveling the wings, lowering the pitch attitude, and "bringing power up on both throttles." The CFI reported at that point he took over the flight controls. The power increased on the left engine, which continued to surge "with a higher frequency," and power on the right engine began to drop off progressively.

They attempted to stabilize the power situation on the left engine and restore power to the right engine by placing the auxiliary fuel pump switches from the LOW position to the ON position. However, there was not a noticeable change in either engine. The airplane yawed to the right towards a housing development with surface streets and power lines in their route of flight. The airplane continued to lose altitude. He had the PUI inform PSP tower that they had an actual emergency condition. The CFI was able to regain directional control of the airplane by banking towards the left engine, but "felt the power dropping off there also." He reported that his main priority was clearing the housing development and obstacles in the area. He was able to maintain a minimal descent rate by reducing the airspeed. After the airplane cleared the obstacles, he then "gave up my altitude to preserve lift over the wings." He could feel the wings were just above a stall and pushed the nose down to maintain airplane control. The CFI stated that he made a forced landing in a sand covered ravine just west of the housing development.

After landing hard, he had the PUI switch off the magnetos, alternators, and battery. The CFI selected both fuel selectors to the OFF position. The CFI further reported that fuel was pouring out of the left main fuel tank, which had broken away from its attachment point.

PUI Statement (seated in the left seat)

The pilot reported that after completing their morning ground session, they conducted a preflight of the airplane in accordance with the manufacturer's pilot operating handbook (POH). All six fuel tanks had been "topped" off with 100 low-lead octane aviation fuel by the local fixed base operator (FBO), totaling 180 gallons of useable fuel. He drained fuel sampled from all 12 fuel valve drains. Water was evident from the innermost fuel valve under the right wing. He drained about 2 cups of water from the fuel valve drain.

After starting the airplane, he obtained Torrance's current Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS) information and taxied to the run-up area for runway 29R. In the run-up area he obtained the IFR clearance to PSP, with a requested altitude of FL 250. After takeoff, SoCal cleared them to the Seal Beach Very High Frequency Omni-directional Range (SLI VOR), where they began a series of climbs to FL250. The PUI indicated that the climbs were done using the cruise climb settings called out on the RAM series VI engine chart. The PUI reported that all systems were operating normally.

Once they reached FL250, he configured the airplane at a cruise power setting of 65 percent. Shortly after the CFI switched to the auxiliary fuel tanks the power for the left engine "dropped off," and the CFI switched back to the left main fuel tank. He notified SoCal of situation, and initiated a descent towards the Blythe airport. During the descent, the left engine came back online, and they elected to proceed towards Thermal. The pilot reported that the flight from Blythe to Thermal was normal, and the left engine was supplied fuel from the left main fuel tank and the right engine was supplied fuel from the right auxiliary fuel tank.

While en route to Thermal, the fuel selectors were placed on the main fuel tanks for both engines, and a fuel transfer from the nacelle locker tanks to the main fuel tanks was initiated. The pilot reported that 25 minutes later the fuel transfer was complete. He noted that the fuel quantities in the main and auxiliary tanks agreed with their planned fuel consumption calculations. During that portion of the flight, they performed airwork, which included medium and steep bank turns, and recovery from unusual attitudes. At that point, they were just west of Chiriaco Summit, California, at an altitude of 8,500 feet above ground level (agl).

Both engines were operating normally and they continued the flight towards PSP. They picked up ATIS information and advised PSP approach of their intent to circle over the airport, and perform a simulated single engine operation culminating in a full stop landing. PSP controllers approved the request and advised them to contact PSP tower. The PUI initiated a descent to 3,500; simultaneously a PSP tower controller cleared them to land on runway 31L.

At that point the CFI reduced the power on the left engine via the throttle. After recognizing the loss of power, he initiated the engine-out procedure by pushing the mixture levers forward to the rich position, propeller levers forward to high rpm, and right throttle full forward. He performed a "drag check" to ensure the flaps were UP and the gear was retracted. He then verified that the left engine was inoperative in response to my 'dead foot - dead engine' assessment. When he attempted to feather the left engine the propeller control was "blocked by the instructor." The CFI then configured power on the left engine for "zero thrust and we trimmed the aircraft for that condition."

The PUI stated that he made right-hand circles over the airport, towards the good engine, and established the power setting of the right engine at 29.5 inches MAP and 2,400 rpm. After a couple of turns he established the airplane on the downwind leg east of the airport and completed the before landing checklist using the POH. While on the base leg, the left engine began to surge and the airplane yawed "violently clockwise taking us away from the airport." At that point the CFI took the flight controls. The CFI then leveled the wings, lowered the nose, and pushed the power levers full forward. The PUI declared an emergency with PSP tower and assisted the CFI with emergency procedures while scanning the instruments in an attempt to identify the problem. The PUI stated that he did not believe that either engine was developing power, and the airplane could not maintain its altitude.

Passenger Statement

According to the passenger, the preflight inspection was completed utilizing the POH for the airplane. The airplane had full fuel tanks - 180 gallons. The PUI sampled the fuel from all 12 fuel drains, and the passenger stated that the fuel was blue in color. The right side rear interior fuel valve had water in the sample, and the PUI continued to drain fuel (about 2 cups worth) from it until it was "clear and clean."

The passenger reported that he sat behind the copilot seat to observe the flight. The PUI was in the left seat, and the CFI sat in the right seat. During climb out they checked the pressurization, heating, defrost, and air conditioning systems - with no discrepancies noted.

After reaching their assigned altitude, the PUI set cruise power at 65 percent. The CFI switched both main tanks to the auxiliary fuel tanks. The passenger stated that shortly after switching tanks, the left engine began to lose power. The CFI switched back to the left main tank, and the engine regained power.

The passenger stated that the pilots started to transfer fuel from the nacelle locker tanks to the main tanks. He saw the pilots switch both fuel transfer pumps to the ON position. The passenger stated that the PUI performed air work, which included steep and standard rate turns, and recovery from unusual attitudes. After about 25 minutes, he noticed the transfer pump annunciator lights on indicating the fuel transfer was complete. The right main tank gauge indicated nearly full, and the left main tank gauge showed about 40 gallons.

The flight continued normally to PSP, and clearance was obtained to circle the airport with the intent to conduct a simulated engine-out landing at PSP. A descent to 3,500 feet was started, and the CFI reduced the power on the left engine to simulate an engine failure. The PUI identified and verified the inoperative left engine, and during his attempt to feather the propeller the CFI stopped him. The CFI then configured the left engine "for zero thrust." At that point they were circling the airport to the right and performed the landing checklist.

The passenger reported that after turning right downwind to base for runway 31L at PSP, the left engine began to surge and the airplane yawed to the right. The CFI took the flight controls and attempted to identify the problem. The PUI contacted the tower and declared an emergency. The passenger noted that the CFI kept the airplane in controlled flight, but the airplane was drifting away from the airport, and was losing altitude, "it seemed we had very little power." From the passenger's position he was able to observe that the fuel selectors were selected to the main tanks, and the fuel gauges showed "an ample supply of fuel." He noted that the gear and flaps were in the UP positions.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

Certified Flight Instructor (CFI)

The CFI submitted the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report (Form 6120.1/2). He reported that he held commercial pilot certificate, with ratings for single and multiengine land airplanes, and instrument airplane. The pilot also held a certified flight instructor certificate with airplane single and multiengine land ratings and instrument airplane rating.

The pilot held a second-class medical certificate issued on April 4, 2002. It had the limitation that the pilot must have available glasses for near vision. His medical also held a waiver for color blindness.

The pilot reported an estimated total flight time of 10,043 hours. He logged 151 hours in the last 90 days, and 53 in the last 30 days. He reported a total time of 95 hours in the accident make and model.

Commercial Pilot - Pilot Under Instruction (PUI)

The PUI also submitted the Pilot/Operator report, in which he reported that he held a commercial pilot certificate, with ratings for single and multiengine land, and instrument airplane.

The pilot held a third-class medical certificate issued on November 6, 2001, with the limitation that the pilot must wear corrective lenses.

The pilot reported an estimated total flight time of 2,264 hours. He logged 57 hours in the last 90 days, and 2.5 in the last 30 days. He reported a total time of 2.5 hours in the accident make and model.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The airplane was a 1972 Cessna 414, serial number 414-0260. A review of the airplane's logbooks revealed a total airframe time of 7,676.7 hours recorded at the last maintenance entry dated January 10, 2003. At that time the right auxiliary fuel pump was removed and replaced with a new pump. An annual inspection was completed on March 18, 2002. An entry in the airframe logbooks regarding compliance of Cessna Service Bulletin MEB88-3 was recorded on February 13, 1991. Compliance with MEB88-3 was met by "modifying with new type switches for fuel pumps, and placarding as required." Additional paperwork indicated that on November 5, 1991, that MEB88-3 had been complied with. According to the Cessna Aircraft Company, MEB88-3 is a one-time compliance item, with an entry required in the aircraft logbook.

The airplane had a Teledyne Continental Motors TSIO-520-NB engine, serial number 266583-R, installed on the left side, and a Teledyne Continental Motors TSIO-520-NB, engine, serial number 521343, installed on the right side. Total time on both engines at the recorded maintenance inspection dated January 10, 2003, was 4,008.2 hours; 1,417.8 since major overhaul. At the last 100-hour inspection dated March 18, 2002, the entry indicated that the inspection had been completed per Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) 43 Appendix D.

Fueling records from South Bay Aviation, Inc., Torrance, established that the airplane was last fueled on January 13, 2003, with the addition of 72.0 gallons of 100LL octane aviation fuel. Examination of the maintenance records revealed no unresolved maintenance discrepancies against the airplane prior to departure.

COMMUNICATIONS

At 1306, while in contact with Los Angeles Center (ZLA), the pilot of N127WW declared an emergency due to an engine failure, and that they were descending. The controller asked if they wanted to land at Blythe, and the pilot replied in the affirmative.

At 1307, the controller (R-60) asked the pilot how much fuel remained on board. The pilot replied that there was 2 hours of fuel remaining. The pilot further reported that they had just switched tanks and maybe it was a fuel flow problem. At that point the controller asked if the pilot was able to switch to another sector (R-10), to which the pilot acknowledged.

At 1311, the pilot reported that power had been restored to the engine and they were going to proceed to Thermal (TRM). The controller asked if they were canceling the emergency and going to TRM under visual flight rules (VFR). The pilot replied that he was canceling IFR and the emergency and going VFR to Thermal. The controller requested that the pilot remain on the discrete code for advisories.

At 1321, the trainee controller informed the relieving controller that N127WW had had an emergency, "had lost an engine" and that everything was normal now, but that he may have problems later.

At 1328, the pilot cancelled the VFR advisories. The controller instructed him to squawk 1200.

At 1347, the pilot contacted PSP approach requesting airwork over Bermuda Dunes at 7,000 feet. PSP acknowledged the request and issued a discrete beacon code, along with the current altimeter. A few minutes later the pilot requested a return to PSP. They wanted to do an orbiting descent. The controller coordinated the orbiting descent with a PSP tower controller.

At 1354, the pilot established radio contact with the PSP tower controller and requested to conduct a simulated engine failure while orbiting over PSP. The controller approved their request and cleared them to land on runway 31L.

At 1359, the pilot declared an emergency indicating that both engines had failed.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The Safety Board IIC retained the services of L-08 Aircraft Maintenance located in Palm Springs to assess the damage to the airplane. Maintenance personnel reported that the right side propeller blades were all bent aft. The left-hand propeller separated from the crankshaft and was lying on the inboard section of the left wing. Two of the blades were bent aft. Maintenance personnel reported that neither propeller had been feathered.

The right wing had crumpled from the leading edge to the trailing edge between the engine nacelle and tip tank. The left wing separated 4 feet outboard of the engine nacelle.

Maintenance personnel reported that there was a minimal amount of fuel in the right auxiliary fuel tank; the right tip tank had slightly less than half a tank of fuel. There was a fuel stain on the ground underneath the left auxiliary wing tank, and the remaining fuel tanks were empty.

TESTS AND RESEARCH

Tests

Investigators from the Safety Board, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Cessna Aircraft Company, and Teledyne Continental Motors (TCM), parties to the investigation, examined the airframe and engines at Aviation Warehouse, El Mirage, California, on January 17-18, 2003.

There were no discrepancies noted with the airframe examination. Recovery personnel removed the wings during the recovery. The left wing tip tank had separated from the its respective wing, and had been breached. The left auxiliary fuel tank had also been breached. The left wing nacelle locker tank remained intact with a trace amount of a blue liquid drained from the tank. Investigators removed the left auxiliary fuel pump, and the left and right auxiliary in-line fuel pumps for further testing. Air was blown through the tip tank vent with no obstructions noted.

The right main tip tank remained intact, and attached to the outer portion of the right wing. About 3 quarts of a blue liquid was drained from the tip tank. The right auxiliary fuel tank remained intact, with about 4 gallons of blue liquid drained from the tank. The right wing nacelle locker tank appeared intact, with a trace amount of a blue liquid drained from the tank. Air was blown through the tip tank vent with no obstructions noted.

All of the fuel caps remained intact and secure on both wings. The left and right fuel valves were removed and determined to be in the OFF position. Inside the cockpit, the left fuel handle was selected to the LEFT AUX position, and the right fuel was selected to the RIGHT AUX position. Investigators removed the airplane fuel lines to the left and right engine pumps. No liquid was drained from the left fuel line; however, about 2.5 quarts of a blue colored liquid drained from the right fuel line. Both the left and right fuel bowls located under the fuel selectors were both full of a blue colored liquid. The left and right airplane fuel filters were removed and investigators noted no debris on the filters.

Investigators noted that the LEFT auxiliary fuel pump switch was selected to the HIGH position. The RIGHT auxiliary fuel pump switch was selected to the OFF position.

The left auxiliary fuel pump, right main engine-driven fuel pump, and the right auxiliary fuel pump were functionally tested at Aero Accessories, Van Nuys, California, on March 12, 2003, under the auspices of the Safety Board. The left auxiliary fuel pump was manufactured by Weldon, part number 8150-B, serial number 97690. A 28-volt direct current (VDC) power supply was connected to the fuel pump and turned on. Initially the fuel pump drew 6 amperages (amps), and continued to increase. Investigators noted that the fuel pump motor ran "noisily and then quit." After the fuel pump quit, the fuel pump motor continued to draw a current and started to heat up. The power supply was disconnected. The left main engine-driven fuel pump was not tested.

The right main engine-driven fuel pump manufactured by Cessna, serial number 8AT93 was connected to a 28VDC power supply and turned on. The fuel pump drew 2 amps of current and the fuel pump motor functioned normally. The right auxiliary fuel pump manufactured by Weldon, part number 8150-B, serial number 98351, was connected to a 28VDC power supply and turned on. The auxiliary fuel pump drew 2 amps of current and the fuel pump motor functioned normally.

The inspection of the engines revealed no obvious visual mechanical anomalies.

On-scene Inspection

Right Engine

Investigators removed the top right spark plugs. According to the Champion Aviation Check-A-Plug chart AV-27; the heavily sooted black appearance of the spark plugs was consistent with being carbon-fouled and operated with a rich mixture. A borescope inspection revealed no mechanical deformation of the valves, cylinder walls, or internal cylinder heads; however, the cylinder walls were also black. Thumb compression in firing order was obtained during manual rotation of the engine thus establishing mechanical and drive train continuity. Investigators manually rotated both magnetos. Both magnetos produced spark at all posts.

Two of the three propeller blades were bent aft about midspan, and exhibited S-bending. The third propeller blade was bent at the tip with chordwise scratches present.

Left Engine

Investigators removed the top left spark plugs. The white colored appearance of the spark plugs was consistent with being operated at too lean of a mixture setting. A borescope inspection revealed no mechanical deformation of the valves, cylinder walls, or internal cylinder heads. Thumb compression in firing order was obtained during manual rotation of the engine thus establishing mechanical and drive train continuity. Investigators manually rotated both magnetos. The right magneto did not produce spark at the posts; the left magneto produced spark at all posts.

All three of the left propeller blades showed varying degrees of S-bending. One blade was bent at the tip with chordwise scratching present.

Manufacturer Inspection

Both engines were shipped to Teledyne Continental Motors, in Mobile, Alabama, for further inspections.

Right Engine

Maintenance personnel from TCM removed the engine from its shipping container and placed it on an engine stand. They manually rotated the engine and inspected the propeller flange for damage. The induction system was not damaged. The oil pan magnetic drain plug was bent and the oil drained out during shipment. The magnetic plug was inspected and did not exhibit any metal debris or particles. Maintenance personnel removed the spark plugs. The gaps were all similar with no mechanical damage noted. All of the electrodes were black and sooted. The engine was placed in an engine test cell and run at 2,100 rpm. A magneto check was conducted and resulted in a 62 rpm drop in the right magneto, and a 44 rpm drop in the left magneto. Power was increased to 2,700 rpm for 5 minutes. There were no anomalies noted.

Left Engine

Maintenance personnel removed the engine from its shipping container and placed it on an engine stand. They manually rotated the engine and all valves moved in sequence with the same amount of lift. During the examination of the propeller flange, maintenance personnel noted damage that prohibited an engine run. The spark plugs were removed; the gaps were all similar with no mechanical damage noted. All of the electrodes were gray in color. The engine was disassembled and TCM reported normal operating signatures. The manufacturer further reported that there were no mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation of the engine.

Maintenance personnel functionally tested the magnetos. The left magneto produced spark at all 6 points when placed on the test stand. The right magneto did not produce any spark at 1,200 rpm. At 2,000 rpm, there was no spark at the number 1 point, intermittent at the number 4 point, and steady spark at all the other points. During the disassembly of the right magneto, maintenance personnel noted that a sticker was on the outside that indicated that the magneto be timed per TCM Service Bulletin SB94-8. The distributor block had rusty powder deposits and showed signs of distress, and a yellow putty substance was removed from the cover screw. There was also a red dust deposit aligned with the air inlet tube. Maintenance personnel determined that the points were separating at the neutral position.

Research

Approved Flight Manual Supplement

According to maintenance records, the airframe had been modified in accordance with Service Bulletin MEB88-3, regarding the auxiliary fuel pump switching system; with the addition of a three-position lever lock toggle-type auxiliary fuel pump switch and circuitry. The manufacturer issued an FAA approved flight manual supplement for the auxiliary fuel pump switching system. The modification allowed for direct pilot control of the output pressure of the two auxiliary fuel pumps. In the cockpit the switches are labeled AUX PUMP L (left engine), and R (right engine). The switch positions were: LOW, OFF, and HIGH.

According to the flight manual, the auxiliary fuel pumps, if needed, are to be operated on the LOW setting in all conditions except when an engine-driven fuel pump fails. The HIGH position supplies sufficient fuel flow to sustain partial engine power, and should be used solely in the event of an engine driven fuel pump failure to sustain the operation of the engine. The supplement indicated that a failure of an engine-driven fuel pump is evident by a sudden reduction in the fuel flow indication immediately prior to a loss of power while operating from a fuel tank containing adequate fuel. There is a CAUTION in the manual that states:

"If the auxiliary fuel pump switches are placed in the HIGH position with the engine-driven fuel pump(s) operating normally, total loss of engine power may occur."

The supplement further states that when "performing training in single engine operations, the auxiliary fuel pump of the engine to be shutdown should be turned OFF prior to any simulated engine failure or prior to any intentional engine shutdown to preclude fuel accumulation in the engine intake system."

The airplane is equipped with a placard identifying that the airplane has been modified and shows the proper switch positions for normal operation. It is located on the left cabin sidewall near the auxiliary fuel pump switches and must be installed when the airplane is modified in accordance with the Cessna multiengine Service Bulletin MEB88-3.

In section 4 under Normal Procedures the auxiliary fuel pumps are in the LOW setting during the following conditions:

Before Takeoff

Cruise (above 12,000 feet for 5 minutes after leveling off to suppress vapor tendencies)

Descent

Before Landing

Switching fuel tanks

The auxiliary fuel pumps are OFF during the following conditions:

After Takeoff, Climb, or Low Altitude Cruise

After Landing

Practice Single Engine Procedures

In section 3 under Emergency Procedures, during an engine failure during flight, before the pilot secures the inoperative engine a fuel flow check is initiated. If the fuel flow is deficient, the auxiliary fuel pump is selected to HIGH. If the engine does not start the LOW position is selected for the operative engine.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The IIC released the wreckage to the owner's representative on August 15, 2003.

Data Source

Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# LAX03FA067