Accident Details
Probable Cause and Findings
The pilot's unstabilized approach and his failure to maintain obstacle clearance. Contributing factors were the dark night light condition, and the static wires.
Aircraft Information
Registered Owner (Historical)
Analysis
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On March 7, 2003, at 1918 mountain standard time, a Piper PA-46-500TP, N522RF, was destroyed when it impacted terrain near Double Eagle II Airport (AEG), Albuquerque, New Mexico. The instrument rated private pilot and his two passengers were fatally injured. The pilot/owner was operating the airplane under the provisions of Title 14 CFR Part 91. Night, visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the personal, cross-country flight that originated from Scottsdale, Arizona, 1 hour, 12 minutes before the accident. The pilot canceled his IFR flight plan at 1911:31, and was flying a VFR traffic pattern for a full stop landing at a non-towered airport.
The pilot had his airplane topped-off with 120 gallons of Jet-A at Double Eagle II Airport, at 1400, on the day of the accident. His first flight plan indicated that he requested a departure time from Double Eagle II Airport, with a business associate, at 1615. He flew the 270 nautical miles (nm) to Scottsdale, Arizona, on an IFR flight plan; he had requested an altitude of 24,000 feet, and gave a time en route of 1 hour and 25 minutes. He picked up his son, and according to Scottsdale Airport Air Traffic Control (tower), he departed on his return trip at 1806.
Radar data from Albuquerque ARTCC (Air Route Traffic Control Center), indicates that the airplane began descending from 25,000 feet (cruise altitude) at 1900:18. At approximately 1911, the pilot canceled his IFR flight plan, and changed his transponder from a discrete code of 4271 to 1200, a non-discrete code. Witnesses said that they heard the pilot announce his position on CTAF (Common Traffic Advisory Frequency) as 8 miles south-west of the airport. He said that he was "entering an extended right downwind to runway 22, full stop at Double Eagle."
The two witnesses were in a Cessna 172, departing upwind from a touch-and-go landing. The witness who was flying radioed that he would extend his upwind to give the pilot pattern spacing. The pilot responded with, "that won't be necessary, I'm a lot faster." The witness-pilot said that the pilot told him to "go ahead and start your right crosswind." The witness-pilot said that as he leveled off on downwind, it appeared that the airplane was at the same pattern altitude, or 6,800 feet. He said that he continued on the downwind, and at about midfield, he heard the airplane call turning base leg, which was the last communication he heard from the pilot. Moments later, he observed a "bright blue flash." After that it was completely dark, no strobe light, and no fire.
The two witnesses and two maintenance men went to the accident scene to locate the missing airplane. One searcher said that he walked within 100 yards of the airplane's location, but could not see it. He said that it was a very dark night. A police helicopter came to assist in the search, and located the airplane at approximately 2115.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
The pilot held a private pilot certificate with airplane single engine land and instrument rating. He was issued a third class airman's medical certificate on February 25, 2002. The medical contained no waivers or limitations. According to the pilot's logbook, he had received his complex airplane and high performance airplane endorsements on March 29, 2000. In December of 2001, he completed his factory approved Malibu/Meridian initial training, and received his high altitude operations endorsement. On November 14, 2002, he successfully accomplished a flight review in the accident airplane.
In February 2003, the pilot requested that his factory approved Meridian annual review training, provided by Simcom International, Inc., be given to him at Double Eagle II Airport. The instructor came from Florida, and spent one day doing ground training and two days of flight training (approximately 5 hours). The flight instructor remarked that the pilot had good basic piloting skills, however, he had a tendency to push the envelope. He was also very resistant to guidance offered by the flight instructor and was not very "attentive to detail."
According to the pilot's logbook, he had logged approximately 1,221 hours total flight time when the accident occurred. He had logged approximately 142 of these hours during the previous six months.
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION
The airplane was a single engine, six seat, pressurized aircraft, which was manufactured by The New Piper Aircraft, Inc., in 2001. The airplane had a maximum takeoff gross weight of 4,850 pounds. A weight and balance data record, dated December 12, 2001, indicated that the airplane's basic empty weight was 3,445.4 pounds. With full fuel (1,139 pounds) the airplane had a useful load of 265.6 pounds. The airplane was powered by a Pratt & Whitney PT6A-42A, turboprop reverse-flow, annular engine with a four-bladed, constant-speed, full-feathering, reversible-pitch propeller, which was rated for 500 shaft horsepower. Maintenance records indicate an Event 1 Inspection was completed on December 31, 2002, and the airplane had flown 308.4 hours at that time. The pilot flew the airplane an additional 57 hours prior to the accident.
The airplane's six fuel tanks held 173 gallons of Jet A fuel, of which 170 gallons was usable. The airplane manufacturer's data sheet states it had 4.2 hours of endurance, if it was fully fueled, performed a full power climb to 30,000 feet, cruised at maximum power and descended, and it would have a 45 minute reserve remaining.
The airplane manufacturer's maintenance manual states, "the fuel system is designed to minimize complexities inherent to most aircraft fuel systems." The system is designed to draw fuel from both wings simultaneously, and keep each side balanced by weight. Each wing has an airframe mounted inline electric boost pump, to provide, in unison, emergency back up for the engine driven pump, boost pressure for starting, and vapor suppression at high altitudes. These pumps are controlled by a three-position switch located on the left overhead panel with selections: MAN, OFF, and AUTO. In cruise flight, the Pilot Operating Handbook indicates that the pumps should be in AUTO. A pressure switch would activate both pumps automatically if the fuel pressure from the engine driven pump drops below 9 psig, and they remain activated until the pressure increases to 12 psig. Additionally, the Pilot Operating Handbook indicates, in the BEFORE LANDING check list, that the fuel pump control switch should be put in the MAN position for landing. The airplane is equipped with a red "FUEL PRESSURE" enunciator light, which will illuminate and inform the pilot anytime fuel pressure drops below 9 psig.
The airplane's Pilot's Operating Handbook states that the airplane's Maximum Operating Speed [the speed limit that may not be exceeded at any time] was 187 knots calibrated airspeed.
METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
At 1905, the weather conditions at Double Eagle II Airport (elevation 5,837 feet), were as follow: wind 160 degrees, at 4 knots; visibility 10 statute miles; sky condition clear; temperature 4 degrees Celsius (C); dew point minus 7 degrees C; altimeter setting 29.91 inches. The official sunset on March 7, 2003, at Albuquerque, New Mexico, occurred at 1807, and the end of civil twilight occurred at 1832. The moon rose at 0855 on March 7th and set at 2233 the same day. It was a waxing crescent with 19% of the visible disk illuminated.
AIRPORT INFORMATION
The Double Eagle II Airport (elevation 5,837 feet), Albuquerque, New Mexico, is not serviced by a control tower. The airport has two runways: 22-04 which is 7,400 feet long, and 35-17 which is 5,999 feet long. Runway 22 has an Instrument Landing System (ILS; 110.1 MHz) with a Medium Intensity Approach Lighting System with Runway Alignment Indicator (MALSR). Runway 22 is not equipped with any visual glide slope indicators such as a Visual Approach Slope Indicator or a Precision Approach Path Indicator. The airport is serviced by a Unicom/CTAF (Common Traffic Advisory Frequency) of 122.8 MHz. The Double Eagle II Airport's manager said that local procedures recommend that airplanes fly a 1,000 foot above ground level (AGL) traffic pattern altitude and that large and turbine-powered airplanes should enter the traffic pattern at an altitude of 1,500 feet AGL.
The Double Eagle II Airport is located on flat, uninhabited, inactive volcano lava fields, approximately 4 miles west of Albuquerque, New Mexico, and 700 feet above it.
WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION
The airplane was found in the National Park Service's Petroglyphs National Monument, on gently rising terrain, partially covered by dry grass and occasional brush (N35 degrees, 09.974'; W106 degrees, 46.250'; elevation 5,834 feet). There were three sets of transmission lines approximately perpendicular to the runway 22 approach path. One static line was found broken and laying on the ground; another had black marks on it (elevation 5,840.0 feet, or approximately 63 to 64 feet above the ground). The distance from the static lines to the first ground scar (with right wing tip electrical lighting assembly) was approximately 477 feet, and was on an orientation of approximately 155 degrees. A large one-foot deep crater was found at 539 feet, and the airplane's right wing was found at approximately 545 feet. The main wreckage came to rest at 622 feet, with no congruity in its orientation. The propeller assembly was found to the right of the main energy path, at approximately 582 feet.
All of the airplane's major components were accounted for at the accident site. The right wing was separated from the fuselage at its root, and displayed impact compression damage to the tip area and its leading edge. The landing gear was down and locked. The left wing was found upright and attached to the central portion of the fuselage. Its tip area was impact damaged. The left wing flap was in position...
Data Source
Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# DEN03FA045