N15AH

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On July 12, 2003, about 1028 Pacific daylight time, a Sikorsky S-58ET, N15AH, experienced a loss of control while maneuvering over the Miraleste Intermediate School, Rancho Palos Verdes, California. The pilot made a forced landing, and during the descent the helicopter impacted school bungalows and touched down hard. The helicopter came to rest in a basketball court adjacent to the bungalows, both unoccupied. Aris Helicopters, Ltd., San Jose, California, owned and operated the helicopter. The external load operation was performed under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 133. The helicopter was destroyed, and the commercial certificated pilot was seriously injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time. The flight originated from the school property about 1015.

On June 9, 2003, Aris provided the contractor with its bid for the helicopter external load operation that involved removing and replacing several dozen air conditioner (AC) units located on top of various school buildings. In the bid, the maximum weight of an individual AC unit was indicated at 2,000 pounds. The following day, the contractor advised Aris that the maximum AC unit weight was 3,500 pounds.

On June 26, 2003, Aris provided the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) with the requisite "Congested Area Lift Plan" for the work project. In the plan, Aris informed the FAA that the maximum AC unit weight was 2,500 pounds, and the operational altitude during the lifts was within 200 feet above ground level. On June 30, the FAA approved the plan.

One of the Aris ground crewmembers reported to the National Transportation Safety Board investigator that the first portion of the July 12, 2003, external load operation was performed without incident. However, after a number of AC units were relocated, the pilot made a precautionary landing in an open field on school grounds. The landing was performed after the pilot observed the illumination of a tail rotor gearbox chip light.

The pilot landed and shut down the helicopter. Thereafter, the pilot removed the chip plug from the tail rotor drive shaft's intermediate gearbox (IGB) and examined it.

The ground crewmember, who reported that he was near the pilot, further indicated to the Safety Board investigator that the pilot stated he looked at the chip plug and did not observe any metal on it, but he did observe "lots of black carbon." After the pilot completed his examination, the chip plug was reinserted into its orifice.

Another of the operator's ground crewmembers, who reported that he was standing next to the pilot during the examination, provided the Safety Board investigator with the following (summarized) statement regarding the event:

I accompanied the pilot to the tail area of the helicopter where I observed him open an access door. The pilot removed an object that he indicated was, I think, the chip plug. It was connected to the helicopter with a wire. When the plug was removed, between 1 and 2 ounces of fluid dripped out of this area of the helicopter. I saw the pilot wipe off the plug. I went into the helicopter and obtained a piece of masking tape onto which 2 or 3 little chips were placed. The chips looked like metal objects. I do not know if the pilot actually touched the chips; I did. We both thought it might be metal. The chips had a dark color and definitely had some sort of rigidity to them. They were not sludge-like in feel. The pilot stated something like "this can be a problem."

The pilot did not make any entry into the helicopter's maintenance records regarding his observations of the chip light having illuminated. He did not make any entry into the records of having removed, cleaned, or reinserted the chip plug.

Witnesses reported that the pilot then resumed the external load operation. About five additional lifts were performed before the accident occurred.

The pilot reported to the Safety Board investigator that during flight, seconds before the accident, he had detected a high frequency vibration and the helicopter lost tail rotor thrust. His ground crewmembers reported that while the pilot was repositioning one of the larger sized AC units using the 100-foot-long line, the helicopter suddenly began rotating in a clockwise direction and descending.

During the Safety Board's on scene examination of the wreckage, the input portion of the tail rotor's drive shaft into the IGB was found disconnected from the corresponding output shaft. Metal particles were observed on the gearbox's chip plug, which was found dangling from an electrical connection wire in the tail boom housing adjacent to the IGB.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION:

The pilot held the following FAA airman certificates: airline transport pilot, rotorcraft-helicopters. He had commercial privileges for airplane single engine land and sea, and instrument airplane. The pilot also held a certified flight instructor certificate for rotorcraft-helicopters. The pilot held the following type ratings: BH-14ST, BH-206, and SK-58.

The pilot was hired by Aris Helicopters in 1995, and thereafter, was appointed to the position of chief pilot and check airman. In 2001, his employment with the company ceased, and the pilot acquired employment flying for a municipality. In January 2003, the pilot reacquired employment with Aris, on a part-time basis, and he performed flights under FAR Part 91 and 133.

The pilot reported that his total aircraft and rotorcraft flight times were approximately 14,500 and 13,600 hours, respectively. His total flight time in the accident model of helicopter was 1,500 hours, and he had flown the helicopter 50, 20, and 1.5 hours during the preceding 90-day, 30-day, and 24-hour period.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

Ownership and Model Change History.

The helicopter was manufactured in 1962, and it bore serial number 58-1563. The helicopter was sold to the German Army as a model H-34A. The German Army operated the helicopter until about 1975, when it was converted to an S-58ET and operated by the German Government, Geological Society.

Following an inspection by a team from Sikorsky Aircraft and maintenance, the helicopter was found to conform to FAA type certificate requirements. The FAA issued the helicopter a Standard Airworthiness Certificate after Aris purchased it in 1986.

On March 25, 1987, the FAA issued the helicopter (N15AH) an airworthiness certificate indicating that the helicopter, serial number 58-1563, was a model "S-58ET (H34A)." The following day, the FAA issued another airworthiness certificate indicating that the helicopter was a model "S-58JT."

By the accident date, the FAA's aircraft registry had classified the helicopter as being in the Standard Normal category, and as being a model S-58ET.

Authorized Operations and Maintenance.

In November 2002, the FAA authorized Aris to operate the helicopter for external load purposes under Part 133.

During this accident investigation, FAA flight standards personnel reviewed the helicopter's maintenance records. According to the FAA, no discrepancies were noted with airworthiness compliance, time life components, and required inspection intervals.

During external load operations, the helicopter's operating limitations indicated that its maximum sling load was either 4,000 or 5,000 pounds, depending upon the sling in use.

Aris management reported to the Safety Board investigator that it maintained the helicopter in accordance with Sikorsky's "S-58T Equalized Inspection and Maintenance Program, SA 4047-20." According to this program, the IGB chip detector and/or magnetic plug must be checked for metal every 500 hours.

According to the helicopter's aircraft maintenance logbook, as of the start of flight operations on July 12, 2003, the helicopter's total flight time was 7,878.1 hours, and the collective Hobbs meter registered 1,420.5 hours. Post crash, the collective Hobbs meter registered 1,421.5 hours.

A review of the logbook pages from the date of the last 100-hour inspection did not reveal any evidence of maintenance or inspection/removal of the IGB chip plug, or of illumination of the associated chip light.

Cargo Jettisoning and Helicopter Equipment.

To jettison cargo suspended from the attachment hook on the host line, the helicopter was equipped with an electric switch activated release system and an independent manual release pedal system. The "Operating Procedures" section of the Aris "Load Combination Flight Manual" states that the electric release and the manual release should be checked on the ground before flight. The manual further states that in the event of an electrical failure, the pilot should use the manual system to release the cargo load. If difficulties arise during the flight and an emergency landing is necessary, the pilot should be prepared to release the load immediately.

Autorotation Performance Data.

Sikorsky Aircraft provides operating parameter information in the helicopter's rotorcraft flight manual. In pertinent part, the manual's height-velocity curve indicates that an autorotative descent from, for example, 300 feet above ground level at 10 knots airspeed is not authorized. A successful outcome under this condition is not possible.

Aris personnel opined that during the accident host operation, the pilot was operating the helicopter at or less than 200 feet above the ground. The helicopter's airspeed was at or less than 10 knots.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION:

The closest aviation weather facility to the accident site was at the Torrance Municipal Airport, about 3 miles from the accident site. During the approximate 20-minute period before and after the accident, Torrance reported a variable surface wind between 5 and 8 knots, visibility between 4 and 7 miles, and temperature between 23 and 24 degrees Celsius.

COMMUNICATION

None of the operator's employees reported hearing any radio transmission from the ...