UNREG – Hawker T Mk 7A – 2003-07-22 NTSB Accident Report

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On July 22, 2003, at 0859 eastern daylight time, an unregistered Hawker Hunter T Mk. 7A, was destroyed when it struck terrain in Pittston, Pennsylvania, after it departed from Wilkes-Barre/Scranton International Airport (AVP), Avoca, Pennsylvania. The airplane was owned and operated by Northern Lights Aerobatic Team, Montreal, Quebec, Canada. The certificated commercial pilot was fatally injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the positioning flight. No flight plan had been filed for the flight that was destined for Burlington International Airport (BTV), Burlington, Vermont, and was conducted under 14 CFR Part 91.

The owner reported that the purpose of the flight was to position the airplane from Wilkes-Barre, to Burlington, where he planned to apply for an import certificate to bring the airplane into Canada. The owner further reported that he had not applied to Transport Canada, for a Canadian registration and airworthiness certificate.

The pilot had performed three aborted takeoffs in the 4 days that preceded the accident flight. The people on scene during the aborted takeoffs and accident flight were the owner, and two non-certificated mechanics.

The air/ground communication tapes received from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), control tower were reviewed, and transcripts prepared for each aborted takeoff. Each aborted takeoff was preceded by the departure of a Piper Navajo, PA-31-350, Canadian registration C-GULM, which was registered to the operator. The Navajo was piloted by the owner, and in addition carried the two non-certificated mechanics. Each flight was announced as a flight of two, proceeding to Burlington in visual meteorological conditions.

The first aborted takeoff occurred on July 18, with the airplane using runway 04. The pilot reported the engine was a little cool, but there were no problem with it. He did report that the brakes appeared to be dragging. Air was subsequently found in the brake lines, and they were bleed.

The second aborted takeoff occurred on July 19, 2004, with the airplane using runway 04. The pilot used the drag chute; however, the airplane overran the departure end of the runway. Again the pilot reported no problems with the engine, and that the brakes were dragging. A check of the airplane revealed the brake cables in the cockpit were out of adjustment, and they were adjusted.

The assistant airport director reported that after the second aborted takeoff, he was called to the airport due to an observed fuel leak on the Hawker Hunter. He stated:

"...[the pilot] stated that the anti-skid system, called the 'Maxarrets' system, had started to cycle or pulse at high speed giving him the feeling that the brakes were cycling 'on-off' at this higher speed without input from the pilot. At that time, I directly expressed my concern that this abort was a close call and I asked the pilot if he realized that we had very little RSA [runway safety area] and that even if he went over the end at 1 mph he was in trouble as it was a substantial drop off. His response was that he would worry about flying the aircraft, or 'I'll fly the aircraft...' and I[assistant airport director] should worry about, or be concerned about airport matters. The pilot said that the brake system was the problem and that his mechanics were coming back to address the problem that evening. He did express his frustration with the fact that he had apparently had several aborts or attempts to depart and that he had commercial tickets to get back home as he has other commitments and that this ferry flight was dragging out. He said he had rescheduled his commercial tickets at least twice and had current departure reservations in hand. He said he would have departed commercially except that the aircraft owner had asked that he stick with it and give it another try. He definitely was ready to leave one way or the other...."

The third aborted takeoff occurred on July 21, 2003, with the airplane using runway 22. The pilot reported the engine was OK, and the brakes were dragging. The airplane was examined, and nothing was found. No further maintenance was performed on the airplane. The pilot then performed a high speed taxi, and said that he would take the airplane the next morning.

On the day of the accident, a FAA operations inspector reported that he had a general conversation with the pilot earlier in the morning. At one point, the FAA inspector asked the pilot if he knew how long it had been since the airplane had flown. The pilot reported that he thought it was 2 or 3 months. The FAA inspector reported that he turned to a mechanic who was familiar with the airplane and the mechanic reported that it had been over a year. At that point, the pilot exhibited a facial expression that the FAA inspector interpreted as surprise. The conversation terminated shortly thereafter, and the two parted company. The FAA inspector reported that he was left with a feeling that the pilot was confident that the airplane was airworthy, and that he could handle any emergency, which might arise in the flight. The pilot added that he had made several high-speed aborts, the reason for which were not specified.

The airplane taxied to runway 22 for departure as the second airplane in a flight of two. The radio communications for both airplanes was being handled by the pilot of the Navajo, which was the lead airplane for the flight.

At 0856:46, the pilot of the Navajo reported that he was ready for departure, and that the Hawker Hunter would back taxi for departure. The flight was cleared for takeoff at 0856:48.

At 0859:54, the pilot of the Navajo transmitted:

"...scranton tower declaring an emergency, we have a hunter, it is down."

The pilot of the Navajo returned for landing. However, he was held until the runway was checked, after which he was cleared to land.

The takeoff on runway 22 was observed by several witnesses. They were consistent in reporting that the engine did not sound as loud as they expected; the airplane did not seem to be accelerating like they expected, and the airplane did not rotate until it was near the end of the runway. One witness, also a pilot, reported the nose of the Hawker Hunter came up abruptly to between 20 and 30 degrees, and the airplane became airborne. However, once airborne, the wings started to rock from side to side, and then the airplane disappeared from view as it descended below the level of the terrain, beyond the departure end of the runway.

Additional witnesses saw the airplane in a nose high pitch attitude as it descended toward terrain near the accident site. One witness described the pitch attitude of the airplane as near a normal take off when first observed. As he continued to watch, the pitch of the airplane continued to increase to about 30 degrees nose up as the airplane continued to descend. The witness said he could hear the engine running. The airplane descended below his view, and then he heard a loud bang, and saw smoke and flames rising from a wooded area.

A non-certificated mechanic onboard the Navajo reported that he observed the takeoff roll, and when the airplane was about halfway down the runway, it appeared to slow, as if the pilot was aborting the takeoff, and then as it moved further down the runway, the airplane appeared to be accelerating again. The airplane appeared slow as it approached the end of the runway, and then he saw the nose come up. As the airplane passed the departure end of the runway, he saw the pilot make a shallow left turn to avoid the opposite direction approach lights that were located beyond the departure end of the runway. He saw the airplane intact as it went into the woods except for the drop tanks, and then he saw a big ball of fire. He never observed the ejection seat come out the airplane.

An FAA airworthiness inspector reported that after the Navajo landed, he approached the occupants and asked who they were. After identifying themselves, he then asked if they owned the Hawker Hunter that just crashed, and the owner said yes he did. He then asked that individual if he knew where the maintenance records were for the airplane, and the owner reported that they were on the crashed airplane. The FAA inspector further reported that he asked the owner if he could remain in the area until the FAA had a chance to interview him, and he replied that he would.

The FAA inspectors then traveled to the accident site and were there about 1 to 2 hours. Upon returning to the airport, the Navajo, along with the owner and the two other people had departed.

The accident occurred during the hours of daylight at 41 degrees 18.949 minutes north latitude, and 75 degrees, 44.415 minutes west longitude.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with single engine and instrument airplane ratings. He was last issued a second class FAA airman medical certificate on September 4, 2002. He held a current Letter of Authority for the Hawker Hunter, which expired December 11, 2003. In his last request for renewal, the pilot reported that he was a Hawker Hunter demo instructor pilot for Aero Group, and F-104 demo/instructor pilot for Starfighters, Inc. The Letter of Authority required that the pilot have three takeoffs in the Hawker Hunter or comparable aircraft within the preceding 6 calendar months. In addition, it stated that after a 6 calendar month period of inactivity, the pilot was to obtain a flight review, including normal and emergency procedures and maneuvers in the Hawker Hunter and have his pilot logbook endorsed. At the time of the accident, the pilot was also flying a Lockheed F-104 in the air show circuit.

According to records from the pilot's electronic pilot logbook, which was current through March 10, 2003, the pilot's total flight experience was 6,574.2 hours, which included 235.2 hours in the Hawker Hunter. His total flight experience in single engine military type turbojet airplanes was 4,214.2 hours. The pilot's recency of experience in the Hawker Hunter and the date of his last flight review were not determined.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

Airplane Registration History

The accident airplane was a two-seat variant of a single engine, tactical air fighter used by the Royal Air Force (RAF), in the United Kingdom (UK). The airplane carried UK military registration XL 614, and was purchased from the UK government on February 13, 1996. It was then imported into the United States, and registered to Hunter One, with the registration number N614XL. The airplane was issued Phase I operations specifications on June 26, 1996, and Phase II operations specifications on October 26, 1996. In addition, maintenance specifications that were tied to the airplane, not the owner, were issued. The maintenance specifications referenced various manuals required to be available for reference, including, but not limited to the Hawker Hunter maintenance manuals, Rolls-Royce Avon engine maintenance manuals, and the Martin-Baker ejection seat manual. The engine was a Rolls-Royce Avon 122, which developed 7,575 pounds of thrust at takeoff.

The airplane was based at Wilkes-Barre, and was configured with two - 100 imperial gallon (120 US gallon) external fuel tanks, which were located under the wings, and outboard of the main landing gear.

The original owner reported that in September of 2001, the airplane had a total time of about 4,789 hours, and he did not fly the airplane after that. The last annual inspection was conducted in June 2002.

On June 21, 2002, the original owner sold the airplane to Aero Group, and turned over all maintenance records to them. The FAA Aircraft Bill Of Sale listed the new owner to be OneSource Financial Holdings, LLC.

On June 29, 2002, a pilot attempted to deliver the airplane to Aero Group/OneSource Financial Holding LLC; however, he experienced an engine fire warning light after takeoff, and retuned to Wilkes-Barre. The airplane was then placed in non-preserved storage until the engine change on June 11, 2003.

On June 13, 2003, the airplane was first sold to Resource Financial Holdings, LLC, where the same name and signature appeared as on the previous bill of sale. The airplane was then sold to Northern Lights Aerobatic Team on the same day. When interviewed, the owner, who was also the president of Northern Lights Aerobatic Team said he purchased the airplane from Aero Group.

No application for airplane registration had been made after the three transactions, and the FAA airplane registration still listed the owner as Hunter One.

On June 18, 2003, the owner sent a letter to the FAA, which stated in part:

"...Enclosed you will find four bill of sales. I would like you to remove these four aircraft from the FAA registry for exportation to Canada. Please advise Transport Canada in Ottawa once the de-registration is completed...."

Included in the list was N614XL.

On July 11, 2003, the FAA approved the de-registration, with a box checked, "Exported To Canada." The FAA then sent notification to Transport Canada that the airplane had been de-registered.

There was no information in the FAA registration file about the use of an alternate date for de-registration of the airplane.

Engine Change.

The current owner rented hanger space at Wilkes-Barre Scranton from June 11, through June 13, 2003, for the purpose of changing the engine. The existing Avon 122 engine was replaced with another Avon 122 engine. According to the FAA licensed A & P mechanic who oversaw and supervised the engine change, he did not sign off any maintenance records to return the airplane to an airworthy status. He said that he conducted the engine change in accordance with maintenance manuals for the airplane. He supplied a copy of the documentation used during the engine change and subsequent engine runs which showed what was conducted. He also reported that during engine runs, the engine was found to not meet two specific tests. The first test was engine acceleration from approach power (4,500 rpm) to maximum governed rpm (8,100 rpm). The specified time for the acceleration was 5 seconds, and he reported that it took the engine 9 seconds to complete the acceleration. The second test was engine acceleration from ground idle to the maximum governed rpm. The specified time for the acceleration was 7 to 9 seconds, and he reported that it took 14 seconds to complete the acceleration.

Use of the Ejection Seat

The airplane was equipped with an ejection seat. According to the aircrew manual, the recommended minimum height and speed for safe ejection in straight and level flight was ground level at 90 knots. If the aircraft was in a nose-down or banked attitude, additional height was required. If the aircraft was descending, the minimum safe height was about 100 feet AGL for every 1,000 feet/minute rate of descent.

The ejection seat was fired by either by pulling up on the "D" ring between the pilots leg, or pulling the face screen forward and down, from its location, above and behind the pilot's head. When either method was used, a timer started, and the canopy was immediately jettisoned. At 0.5 seconds, the cartridges in the ejection seat were fired, and the seat starts to move. The drogue chute extends, and then dependent upon airspeed and altitude pulls the main parachute out of the backpack and the three-point harness is released with pilot/seat separation. If the ejection was commenced when operating below 10,000 feet, the seat separation would take place 1.25 seconds after the seat had decelerated to a safe speed for parachute opening.

Flight Authorization

According to 14 CFR Part 91.203 Civil Aircraft Certifications Required, and 14 CFR Part 91.715, Special Flight Authorization For Foreign Civil Aircraft, the airplane was required to be registered either in the United States, or another country. In the case of a foreign registered airplane, a special flight permit issued by the FAA may be used in lieu of an airworthiness certificate.

The departure airport was supervised by the Allentown Flight Standards District Office. There was no record that the owner had applied to the FAA for a special flight permit to fly the airplane.

AIRPORT INFORMATION

The airport was built on top of a plateau. Drop-offs were present on the departure ends of both runway 04, and runway 22, which was 7,501 feet long, 150 feet wide, and had an asphalt surface. According to FAA data, the runway surface was grooved asphalt, and its condition was good. Under Operational Restrictions, the FAA data contained a note that reported runway 04/22 had a non-standard runway safety area, and that each end was less than 1,000 feet in length. The note further stated that there were precipitous drop-offs located 200 feet beyond the end of each runway.

The assistant airport director reported that in 1988, the FAA changed their rules for airports certificated under 14 CFR Part 139. Under the new rules, the airport did not meet certification standards, which called for a 1,000 foot overrun on the departure end of each runway. However, the airport was allowed to continue to operate, because that condition had existed before the change.

The assistant airport director also reported that runway remaining markers were located on both sides of the runway. They started with 5,000 feet of runway remaining (2,500 feet from start of takeoff roll), and continued down to 1,000 feet of runway remaining.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

The 0854 weather observation at the airport included winds from 230 degrees at 5 knots, visibility 10 statue miles, a few clouds at 800 feet, broken clouds at 10,000 feet, temperature 20 C, dewpoint 18 C, and altimeter 29.81 in/hg.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

Examination of the accident site revealed a debris trail on a heading of 230 degrees magnetic, for about 425 feet. Initial ground impact occurred in an open field; however, the airplane continued into a wooded area.

The first evidence of ground contact was a ground scar, which was about 50 feet in length, which started about 4,900 feet from the departure end of runway 22. Beyond the ground scar, the terrain was uneven. In this area, various items were identified as being from the airplane. They included the nose cone, and fragments of the two external drop tanks that were mounted on the wings. In addition, curved fragments of Plexiglas similar to the canopy were found scattered along the debris trail.

At the end of the uneven terrain, the terrain sloped down about 5 feet and was level again. A wooded area began approximately 300 feet from the initial ground contact.

In the wooded area, on the right side of the debris trail, radios and other items associated with the nose of the airplane were found.

The fuselage was broken into three sections. The aft section was found on the left side of the debris trail and consisted of the tail pipe for the jet engine, and the rudder and elevator. The left side of the fuselage was caved in, consistent with a hard body contact, and was adjacent to a tree with an estimated diameter of 18 inches. The registration number N614XL was visible on the vertical stabilizer.

A tree with an estimated diameter of 2 feet, was located on the ground in the middle of the debris trail. The cockpit was found on one side of the tree, and a section of fuselage that contained the engine and fuselage fuel tank was found on the other side of the tree. The fuselage section was consumed by fire, and the variable engine inlet guide vanes were not identified.

The outboard sections of both wings were identified and found in the debris field.

The landing gear, and the wing flaps were retracted.

The cockpit section was found on its right side, and the canopy ring was found nearby. The center metal band on the canopy ring that ran from forward to aft was intact. The glass was broken out of both sides of the canopy, and both ejection seats were found outside of the cockpit.

The aircrew manual recovered from the cockpit of the airplane was for a Hunter F Mk 6 & 6A, with a Avon 207 engine which developed 10,150 pounds of thrust at takeoff power.

The pilot had a personal checklist in the cockpit. A check of the pertinent pages with takeoff and aborted takeoff data revealed they were from a Mk 7 & 7A Aircrew manual based on the Avon 122 engine. Contained in the pilot's checklist were Exterior Inspection; Cockpit check (ejection Seat); Cockpit check (After Strapping In); Cockpit Checks (Prestart Left To Right); Starting Engine; Post Start Pre-Taxi Checks; Pre-Takeoff checks, Abort [Takeoff]; Ground Egress; Engine Failure on Takeoff Below 250 kts; Takeoff Area Engine Checks; Takeoff; and additional checks for en route, landing, and shutdown.

A search of the airplane, and ground track failed to find any evidence of maintenance records. No loose papers or burned papers were found at the accident site or in the airplane.

The pilot's parachute was found deployed with the top of the canopy on the right side of the debris trail, near items identified with the nose of the airplane. The canopy of the parachute was collapsed and its condition was consistent with a parachute canopy that had not inflated with air. The shroud lines draped across the cockpit of the airplane and continued forward about 40 feet where the pilot was located, still strapped in his harness. The seat was located nearby with the lower "D-ring" used to actuate the ejection seat, found extended from its stowed position.

A re-examination of the airplane took place on January 29, 2004, by FAA Inspectors, and a representative of Rolls-Royce, the manufacturer of the engine. The Rolls-Royce report stated in part:

"...The engine fuel filter housing contained a mixture of fuel and a liquid consistent with the feel and appearance of water. The liquid appearing to be water was separated from the fuel and settled in the lower part of the filter housing. The engine fuel filter housing is a closed unit and the only way water or any other foreign liquid could be introduced would be through the fuel supply system. The ratio was estimated to be approximately 75 % fuel to 25 % foreign liquid. The effect of pumping large amounts of water through the engine could result in engine pulsations...."

In addition, an FAA inspector who had flight experience with airplanes that were equipped with ejection seats, reported that three of the four canopy locks were still engaged. Only the left forward canopy lock had released.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

Toxicological testing conducted by the FAA Toxicology Accident Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, was negative for drugs and alcohol.

On July 22, 2003, an autopsy was conducted by the Luzerne County Coroner, Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Performance Data

According to the Aircrew manual for the Hunter T Mk 7 and 7A, with the Avon 122 engine installed, and with two-100 imperial gallon fuel tanks, plus internal fuel, the all up weight (AUW) would be approximately 19,250 pounds. The nosewheel unstick speed was listed as 125 to 130 knots, and the aircraft unstick speed was listed as 140 to 145 knots.

Under conditions listed above, and at sea level, zero wind, and 30 degrees C, the ground run was calculated to be 3,800 feet, and the distance to 50 feet was calculated to be 5,650 feet.

At the bottom of the page, a note stated:

"For every 1000 feet increase in pressure altitude, increase the ground run by 10% and the distance to 50 feet by 9%.

The Aircrew manual also contained stop speeds based of a runway length of 7,500 feet, zero wind, zero slope, and an AUW of 20,000 pounds. This was the maximum speed you could accelerate to, abort the takeoff, and stop on the remaining runway.

At 30 degrees C, on a dry runway the stop speed was 134 knots with a parachute, and 109 knots without a parachute.

Maximum braking speeds were also published. This was, "...the maximum indicated airspeed at which maximum continuous braking can be applied and the aircraft brought safely to rest without the risk of brake fade; it is possible that the brakes may be damaged."

At a temperature of 30 degrees C, AUW of 20,000 pounds, the speed for a dry runway was 112 knots.

Engine Handling at Take-Off

According to the aircrew manual:

"...The RPM are governed at 8,100 at which maximum thrust is obtained...Malfunctioning of the guide vane system allows the engine to reach maximum RPM without producing maximum thrust and the aircraft accelerates very slowly. Therefore, to verify that maximum thrust is being obtained, the following checks should be made:"

"(i) Maximum RPM are not obtained except at full throttle."

"(ii) The rate of acceleration is normal when the brakes are released."

"(iii) The JPT [Jet Pipe Temperature] is more than 580 degrees C."

Sales Contract

A review of the sales contract between Resource Financial Holdings and Northern Lights, revealed that Northern Lights was responsible for any repairs to the airplane. The contract further stated:

"...Resource Financial Holdings, LLC will be responsible for providing an Aircraft Mechanical Engineer for any repairs or maintenance needed to these aircraft who's wages will be paid by Northern Lights Aerobatic Team...."

The person supplied by Resource Financial Holdings did not possess a mechanics certificate.

Pilot Responsibility and Civil Aircraft Airworthiness

According to 14 CFR Part 91.3 Responsibility and authority of the pilot in command:

"(a) The pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsible for, and is the final authority as to, the operation of that aircraft."

According to 14 CFR Part 91.7 Civil Aircraft Airworthiness:

"(a) No person may operate a civil aircraft unless it is in an airworthy condition."

"(b) The pilot in command of a civil aircraft is responsible for determining whether that aircraft is in condition for safe flight. The pilot in command shall discontinue the flight when unairworthy mechanical, electrical, or structural conditions occur."

Northern Lights Aerobatic Team

The owner operated several Hawker Hunters, and the accident airplane was one of four that he recently purchased and planned to add to his fleet. He contracted with the Canadian Department of National Defense (DND) for use of the airplanes.

The insurance adjustor reported that he received maintenance records from the owner. However, when reviewed, the records were found to be several years out of date, and did not reflect any of the recent maintenance that had been performed on the airplane.

Although requested several times, the owner never supplied any documentation on the airworthiness of the airplane or its return to service after multiple aborted takeoffs. The NTSB Accident report was returned with no airworthiness information on the airplane.

Wreckage Release

The aircraft wreckage was released to the insurance adjustor on July 23, 2003.