D-AIGK

MINR
Serious

Airbus Industrie A340-300S/N: 056

Accident Details

Date
Wednesday, August 6, 2003
NTSB Number
FTW03LA195
Location
Walnut Ridge, AR
Event ID
20030820X01371
Coordinates
36.450000, -90.550003
Aircraft Damage
MINR
Highest Injury
Serious
Fatalities
0
Serious Injuries
2
Minor Injuries
43
Uninjured
213
Total Aboard
258

Probable Cause and Findings

The flight crew's inadequate evaluation of the weather and their decision to continue the along the route of flight resulting in an encouter with severe turbulence. Contributing factors were the captain's instructions to continue food servicing in the cabin, and the passenger's failure to obey the lighted "FASTEN SEAT BELT" sign.

Aircraft Information

Registration
D-AIGK
Make
AIRBUS INDUSTRIE
Serial Number
056
Engine Type
None
Model / ICAO
A340-300A340
No. of Engines
0

Analysis

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On August 6, 2003, approximately 2057 universal time coordinated (UTC), an Airbus A340-300 transport airplane, German registration D-AIGK, operating as Lufthansa Flight 440, sustained minor damage following an encounter with severe turbulence during cruise flight at flight level 310, approximately 029 DME, on the 040 degree radial from the Walnut Ridge Vortac (ARG). The airplane was registered to and operated by Deutsche Lufthansa AG, of Cologne, Germany. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and a instrument flight rules flight plan (IFR) was filed for the Code of Federal Regulations Part 129 scheduled international passenger transport flight. Three cabin crew members and 40 passengers received minor injuries, and two passengers received serious injuries. The three flight crew members, eight cabin crew members, and 202 passengers were not injured. The flight originated from Frankfurt (FRA), Germany, and was destined for the George Bush International Airport (IAH), near Houston, Texas.

According to company personnel and the flight crew, the captain was the non-flying pilot (PNF) during the event, the first officer was the pilot flying (PF), and the senior first officer was in the cockpit crew rest (CCR) area. The airplane was in and out of the clouds, seat belt signs were on, and the weather radar indicated there were several echoes to the southwest, ranging from 40-80 nautical miles. The flight crew considered deviating the flight to the west; however, there were no echoes along the route of flight and the route, and the flight crew elected to continue along the route. Subsequently, flying into a cloud what seemed to be several layers of thin clouds, the flight crew noticed "a chance in density, but did not get any radar echoes." A few seconds later, the flight encountered severe turbulence. The captain stated, "it felt like a hard upward movement, following an extreme downdraft throwing everything in the cockpit up into the air. It stopped abruptly." The flight crew reduced the speed of the aircraft, and assessed the cockpit situation. The senior first officer informed the captain that there were passenger injuries and damage to the cabin area.

At 2058;04, the captain informed the controller that the flight had encountered severe turbulence. The captain requested and was cleared to divert to the west for approximately 30 nautical miles. Subsequently, the controller cleared the flight direct to Little Rock, Arkansas, at flight level 200 (20,000 feet msl). At 2102:48, the captain informed the controller of the injuries on board the aircraft. Subsequently, the senior first officer informed the captain that the cabin attendants were assisting the passengers, and medical assistance was given by several physicians with no assessment of life-threatening injuries. The captain requested and was cleared by the controller to continue the flight to the IAH. At 2107;08, the controller cleared the airplane to climb to flight level 280 (28,000 feet msl), and issued a direct route via radar vectors for the ILS approach to runway 27 at IAH. At 2207, the airplane landed on runway 27 at IAH, and proceeded without delay to terminal D, gate 12. Immediate medical assistance was received by the injured, and they were transported to local area hospitals.

A review of the fight attendant (FA) statements, about the turbulence encounter, revealed the following: seven FA's hit the cabin ceiling and then the floor, one FA hit the ceiling then an armrest, and two FA's were tossed through a galley. The trolleys (food serving carts) were lifted from the floor. Numerous food service items were tossed and broken throughout the cabin.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The captain's last duty before the accident flight was a ground refresher, which ended at 1500, on August 5, 2003; therefore, the captain's rest time before the flight was 15:35 hours. The senior first officer's last duty before the flight was a duty/office day which ended at 1515 on August 4, 2003; therefore, the first officer's rest time before the flight was 39:20 hours. The first officer's last duty before the flight was a flight that ended at 0516 on July 30, 2003; therefore, the first officer's rest time before the flight was 169:19 hours. Review of the flight and duty time records and company interviews disclosed no evidence of any activities that would have prevented the flight crewmembers from obtaining sufficient rest in the 72-hours before the flight. However, according to company personnel, the original flight departed FRA at 0635, and returned to the ramp at 0839 following a maintenance discrepancy. Thus the FRA departure flight was delayed 4 hours 7 minutes resulting from the change of airplanes.

The captain's initial employment date with Lufthansa was May 1, 1967. The captain, an airline transport rated pilot, with an A340 type rating, who transitioned to the A340 on December 30, 1992, had accumulated a total flight time of 18,593.02 hours (4,093.39 hours as captain in the A340). The captain (check airman for the A340 since February 26, 1993) accumulated 120:48 hours in the A340 and 56:00 hours in the A340 simulator in the last 90 days prior to the flight, and 58:14 hours in the A340 and 4:00 hours in the A340 simulator in the last 30 days prior to the flight. The captain's last check was the operator proficiency check (OPC), satisfactorily performed on Jun 17, 2003. The captain's most recent first-class medical certificate was issued on August 5, 2003.

The senior first officer's (SFO) initial employment date was May 24, 1995. The SFO, an airline transport rated pilot with an A340 type rating who transitioned to the A340 on April 21, 2000, had accumulated a total flight time of 5,398.29 hours (1,843.33 hours as first officer and 459.27 as SO in the A340). The SFO accumulated 142.35 hours in the A340 and 4:00 hours in the A340 simulator in the last 90 days prior to the flight, and 75:46 hours in the A340 in the last 30 days prior to the flight. The SFO's last check was the Standard Refresher Session (REF) performed on June 10, 2003. The SFO's most recent first-class medial certificate was issued on November 7, 2002, with no limitations stated.

The first officer's (FO) initial employment date was December 1, 1998. The FO, an airline transport rated pilot with an A340 type rating, had accumulated a total flight time of 2,759.12-hours (47 hours as FO in the A340 simulator). The FO had accumulated 66.24 flight hours in the last 30 days prior to the flight. The FO's licensing flight check was satisfactorily completed on performed on Jun 6, 2003, in the A340 simulator, and the final check for the A340 airplane remained open at the time of the flight. The flight DLH 440 of August 8, 2003, was dedicated as the final line check for the FO after the transition to the A340, and the entitled check captain was the type rating instructor and type rating examiner for the FO. The FO's most recent medical certificate was issued on November 11, 2002, with the limitation "wear corrective lenses and bring an extra pair of glasses along."

The Lufthansa Operations Manual Part D Paragraph 2.12.5. Line Training and Checking states in part: Line flying under supervision may only take place after the type rating was issued. The list of topics for line training include: use of weather radar and high level cumulous (CB) scanning.

The 11 cabin FA's training for emergency first aid had been satisfactorily performed prior to the flight. Four of the FA's completed the training in October of 2002, two FA's completed the training in November of 2002, two FA's completed the training in January of 2003, two FA's completed the training in July of 2003, and one FA completed the training in May of 2003.

The flight crewmember Training Information Manual weather training (turbulence) includes in part: a review of previous events and turbulence accelerometer readings for moderate, severe, and extreme turbulence; turbulence reporting criteria (light, light chop, moderate, moderate chop, severe, and excessive), and turbulence intensity (ICAO definitions; very low, low, moderate, severe, very severe) and its effect on flight. Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) specific to a turbulence encounter is covered during the training. The training procedure for flight encounter of severe turbulence includes in part: AUTOPILOT KEEP ON; AUTOTHRUST OFF; THRUST SET N1 TARGET; and SIDESTICK INPUTS MINIMIZE.

The Flight Crew Manual (FCM) Part 2 Paragraph 2.2.80 Adverse Weather: FLIGHT IN SEVERE TURBULENCE states in part: Whenever possible plan to over fly or circumnavigate areas with known or forecast severe turbulence. If turbulence is unavoidable, aim to keep the speed in the region of the target speed given below, so as to provide the best protection against the effect of gust on structural limits, while maintaining an adequate margin above VLS. Cabin Signs ON, Before entering an area of known turbulence, secure all loose equipment and set cabin signs ON; Autopilot (if engaged) KEEP ON; Auto-Throttle Disengage auto-throttle when thrust changes become excessive; Turbulence Penetration Speed ESTABLISH according to target speed [per manual graph].

The FCM Part 3 Paragraph 3.10 THUNDERSTORMS in connection with the use of weather radar, it is important to consider several characteristics of thunderstorms, states in part: Thunderstorms with tops at FL350 or above can be considered very severe; below, within, and around thunderstorms: severe turbulence, up- and downdrafts...can occur; and every cloud related to a severe thunderstorm represents a serious danger.

The FMC Part 3 Paragraph 3.8 Summary stated in part: (1) Optimum use of the WXR (weather radar) System requires good coordination and communication between pilot flying and pilot non flying; (7) Weather radar is not a 'penetration tool' - weather analysis and avoidance are the functions ...

Data Source

Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# FTW03LA195