N627US

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On August 19, 2005, about 1419 local time, Northwest Airlines (NWA) flight 74, a Boeing 747-200, N627US, landed on runway 06L with its nose gear retracted at Guam-Antonio B. Won Pat International Airport (GUM) Agana, Guam. An emergency evacuation was initiated several minutes after the airplane came to a stop on the runway. Of the 16 crewmembers and 318 passengers onboard, 2 received minor injuries during the evacuation. The airplane was substantially damaged. The flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 and was en route from Tokyo-Narita International Airport, Narita, Japan. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.

The captain was the flying pilot. According to crewmember statements, the takeoff, climb, en route, descent, and initial approach phases of the flight were normal. According to the cockpit voice recorder (CVR), about 1403:28, the local controller (LC) cleared flight 74 for the visual approach to runway 6L and subsequently cleared the flight to land.

About 1405:56, the captain called for "gear down, flaps 20" and the first officer (FO) immediately responded "gear down." About 1406:36, the captain requested, "flaps 25, the landing check." Three seconds later, a sound similar to the landing gear warning horn started. The FO stated, "oh sorry," a crewmember stated, "we didn’t get a gear," and then the captain requested, "put it back to 20." About 1406:47, the second officer (SO) stated "red gear light," and the landing gear warning horn sound stopped.

About 1406:54, the captain stated, "uh, tell 'em we’re gonna have to go around. Hold out to the left here. Flaps ten." About 1407:02, the FO called the LC and advised, "tower, Northwest 74, we’re gonna uh, do a go-around. We’d like to hold out to the west while we work on a problem." The LC then cleared the flight to fly the runway heading and climb and maintain 2,600 feet.

About 1407:27, the captain asked the SO, "what do you have for the gear lights?" The SO responded, "four here." The LC then advised the flight crewmembers to contact Guam departure.

About 1407:57, the controller asked, "your intentions?" to which the FO responded, "uh, we’d just like to uh, go someplace sir we can delay for a few minutes while we work on some light problems." The flight was then cleared to remain VFR.

About 1409:01, the captain instructed the FO, "okay you’re gonna take the airplane here. I’m gonna work with him." The SO and the captain then started to complete the "Red Gear Light Remains On (After Gear Extension)" emergency/abnormal procedure in the cockpit operations manual. The SO began reading, "the landing gear lever is seated in the down detent," and the captain responded, "it is." Next, the SO stated, "okay press the landing gear annunciator gear primary switch," and the captain asked, "okay, you got all the gear … green down, right?" to which the SO responded, "all gear" and then "yeah. Right there. Okay, if uh, gear down not illuminated."

About 1410:02, the SO read out loud the note in the procedure that stated that the gear could be recycled depending on the flight crew’s assessment. The captain asked, "I think we’d cycle it one time, don’t you?" The SO responded, "yeah," and the captain continued, "you see any reason not to cycle it?" The SO further responded, "no, I don’t," and then the FO asked "what gear are down and what are up?" Both the captain and SO responded, "all of 'em are down."

The captain continued, "you’re getting green lights in primary. Hit alternate. You get green lights in alternate, all of 'em left … on the gear." About 1410:41, the FO asked, "so tell me what the red light’s for? Are your gear doors okay?" After a short discussion, the SO stated, "it’s all good? It looks good back here."

About 1410:52, the FO stated "this is just technique. This is not airplane, but if I got good gear, I won’t put 'em back up…. If I could determine, you know, why I’ve got a red light but is I’ve got gears down and green, I probably would take it that way," to which the captain responded, "okay." The SO read, "carrot here says if gear down annunciator light for any gear illuminates in either primary or alternate, that gear can be considered down and locked."

About 1411:26, the captain asked, "so it is down and locked?" to which the SO responded, "down and locked." The three flight crew continued to discuss the situation and then, according to postaccident crew statements, the SO handed the procedure to the captain.

About 1412:20, the captain read, "flybys are considered to be of no value. Okay, insure the landing gear lever is seated down, in the down detent. It is seated. All right, press the landing gear annunciator green primary. It’s all green." He then continued reading the last statement in the procedure, "if gear down annunciator light for any one of the five gear is not illuminated, press the alternate. Well we got 'em all. You don’t have to do that." The SO states, "we got 'em all. We don’t have to do that." The captain reread the last statement and concluded, "we’re down and locked," and the SO responded, "good to go."

About 1413:19, the captain called the controller and stated that the flight crewmembers had "sorted out the problem" and "we’re ready to return for runway 6L." The flight was then cleared for a visual approach.

While on the visual approach, the captain stated, about 1414:54, "you’re gonna have to pull the gear, the horn uh, indicator," and "you see any reason to declare or anything other than just normal here?" The SO responded, "not yet," and the captain agreed. The FO then stated, "you know we still don’t know why it’s that way, though, right?" and the captain responded, "no."

The FO continued, "okay, but we ran through it and it said gear’s down and everybody’s happy." The captain responded, "yeah, now if you want to read the thing, read it. We’ve got plenty of time. We’ve got 37 thousand pounds of gas. We’re indicating green on both primary and alternate on the gear."

About 1415:27, the FO radioed the LC, and the flight was subsequently cleared to land on runway 6L. As the flight continued the approach, the captain asked, about 1416:07, "did you find that horn?" and the SO responded, "yep." The captain then stated, "okay, you can pull it." The flight crew continued the approach and completed all of the before landing checklist items.

About 1418:17, the CVR recorded a sound similar to touchdown, and, about 1418:22, the SO stated, "reversers normal." Three seconds later, the LC radioed "Northwest 74, go around. Uh, negative, uh, nosewheel." About 1418:26, the CVR recorded a sound similar to increasing engine RPM and the SO stating, "seventy percent," and then the FO and SO both stated "go around" multiple times. About 1418:37 the LC queried "Northwest 74, tower," but the FO radioed "we’re unable."

About 1418:51, the CVR recorded the sound of impact, and then the captain stated "standby with the evacuation checklist." The FO then radioed the LC, asking if he could see any fire, and the LC responded, "negative." About 1419:56, the captain informed the passengers via the public address system that the nose gear had collapsed and that they were to remain seated. The CVR stopped recording about 1420:35.

According to postaccident interviews, a flight attendant notified the captain of smoke in the forward cabin area. The captain advised the FO and SO to secure the cockpit, and he went downstairs to assess the situation. The captain stated that he "saw smoke coming from an access hatch and told the flight attendants to move the passengers aft of door two." He also directed the upper deck flight attendant to move the passengers from the upper deck down to the main cabin deck and aft of door two. When he noticed that the smoke was getting worse, he ordered the flight attendants to "open the doors, inflate the slides, and evacuate the airplane." All passengers and crew evacuated the airplane on the runway. Two passengers received minor injuries during the evacuation.

DAMAGE TO THE AIRCRAFT

The airplane was substantially damaged. The nose gear was retracted, and the nose gear doors were closed.

The following structure was worn and abraded as a result of contact with the runway: skin panels and stringers from station (Sta) 400 to 700 and stringers (Str) 44L to 44R, frame assemblies from Sta 400 to 500 and Str 44L to 44R, and the nose landing gear doors (left forward, left aft, right forward, right aft). The equipment cooling duct was completely destroyed from contact with the runway. The line replaceable units common to the E-1, E-2, and E-3 racks sustained heat and soot damage. The E-2 inertial navigation system shelf sustained severe fire damage. Wire bundles running vertically between the E2 and E3 equipment centers sustained heat and fire damage.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The captain, age 51, held an airline transport pilot certificate with airplane multiengine land, B747, and DC9 ratings and a commercial pilot certificate with an airplane single-engine land rating. At the time of the accident, the captain held a first-class medical certificate dated February 1, 2005, with no restrictions.

According to NWA employment and flight records, the captain was hired on April 13, 1984, and had accumulated a total of 7,850 hours at NWA, of which 2,350 hours were as pilot-in-command. In the 24 hours, 30 days, and 12 months before the accident, the captain had accrued a total of 9, 86, and 450 hours, respectively. He received his most recent recurrent training on April 21, 2005, and his most recent proficiency check on June 25, 2005. On the day of the accident, the captain had been on duty for 5 hours 2 minutes and had accumulated a total duty time of 24 hours 36 minutes in the 3 days before the accident.

The first officer, age 46, held a commercial pilot certificate with airplane mu...