Accident Details
Probable Cause and Findings
The pilot's improper in-flight decision not to land at the departure runway or other available airports during the emergency descent, and his failure to maintain clearance from a vehicle and terrain. Contributing factors were a false engine fire warning light, inadequate maintenance by company personnel, a contaminated fire warning detection loop, and night conditions.
Aircraft Information
Registered Owner (Historical)
Analysis
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On September 22, 2005, at 1958 central daylight time, a Mitsubishi MU-2B-36, N103RC, operated by McNeely Charter Services, was destroyed when it impacted a 62,000-pound TS-14 earthmoving scrapper and terrain in a flat field near West Memphis, Arkansas. The airline transport pilot received fatal injuries. The 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 positioning flight departed the West Memphis Municipal Airport (AWM), West Memphis, Arkansas, about 1910. The intended destination airport was Lee Gilmer Memorial Airport (GVL), Gainesville, Georgia. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. An instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed at 1856 with the Jonesboro, Arkansas, Automated Flight Service Station (AFSS).
Radar track data indicated that the airplane departed AWM and proceeded eastward toward GVL. The airplane performed an en route climb to about 15,800 feet mean sea level (msl) before starting a descent. About 1932, about 62 nautical miles (nm) east of AWM, the pilot reported to Memphis Center that N103RC needed to change its destination airport. About 1933, the pilot reported that he needed to return to AWM. When Memphis Center questioned the pilot if N103RC was experiencing any problems, the pilot indicated that he was not, but that he needed to return to AWM to have something checked.
The dispatch operator for McNeely Charter Services reported that she had received a telephone notification from Wilson Air, a fixed base operator in Memphis, Tennessee that N103RC was returning to AWM and would be back in about 10 minutes. N103RC had not provided Wilson Air any reason for returning to AWM.
The radar track data indicated that N103RC turned back to the west and returned to AWM. The pilot did not indicate to Memphis Center or Memphis Approach Control that the airplane was experiencing any problems. Once clear of Memphis Approach Control's airspace, the pilot cancelled his IFR clearance and proceeded toward AWM under visual flight rules (VFR) rules.
A McNeely Charter Service pilot was sitting in the company's office and heard the accident pilot transmit over AWM's Unicom frequency of 123.05 Mhz that N103RC was 10 miles out for landing. The witness reported that the pilot's voice sounded "normal" and there was no indication of any problems.
Radar track data indicated that the airplane flew over the departure end of runway 35 (6,003 feet by 100 feet, concrete) at AWM about 1953:56 at an altitude of about 1,600 msl. The elevation at AWM is 212 feet. The airplane made a descending left turn. At 1956:15, N103RC's altitude was about 1,000 feet msl and was crossing the final approach course for runway 35.
The radar track data indicated that the airplane continued to make a descending left turn, but did not land on runway 35. The airplane flew a course that paralleled the runway about 0.8 nm to the right of runway 35. At 1957:19, the airplane was abeam the center of the runway at an altitude of about 600 feet msl.
The airplane continued to fly a northerly heading and continued to descend. At 1958, the airplane was crossing Interstate Highway 40 (I-40) and its altitude was about 500 feet msl. The airplane made a left turn to a northwesterly heading.
The radar track data indicated that the airplane's calibrated airspeed was decreasing from about 130 knots (kts) to about 110 kts during the last one minute and fifty seconds of flight. The airplane continued to fly a northwesterly heading. The last reinforced beacon return for the airplane was at 1958:32. The airplane's altitude was about 400 feet msl and the calibrated airspeed was about 107 kts. The airplane impacted the terrain about 0.75 nm from the last radar contact on a 338-degree magnetic heading.
Witnesses reported seeing an airplane flying to the northwest at a very low altitude. The witnesses reported seeing the strobe lights on the wingtips and tail.
One of the witnesses was a professional pilot who reported that he observed the airplane crossing I-40 going to the northwest. He reported the airplane was "way too low." He reported the airplane's wings were level and that the airspeed did not appear to be "excessively slow." He reported that the airplane's strobe lights and navigation lights were on, but he could not see the airplane's landing lights due to the angle from which he observed the airplane. He reported that it was dark when he observed the airplane, and he described the weather conditions as "beautiful."
Another witness was a police officer. He reported observing the airplane for about 45 to 60 seconds before it impacted the terrain. He reported seeing the airplane flying north and then banking to the left. He reported that it headed west for about 2,000 yards before it turned north again. He reported that the airplane was "going so slow I thought it was an ultralight." He reported that the airplane was "extremely low - two telephone poles high." He reported seeing the strobe lights on the wingtips and tail, but he did not observe the landing lights on. He reported that the airplane disappeared, and then there was an explosion and a fireball that went about 1,000 feet into the air. He reported that he arrived at the site of the accident about 30 seconds after the explosion. He reported that the nose of the airplane had impacted the scrapper between its pan and rear wheels. He reported that the fuselage and tail of the airplane fell back on its side during the post impact ground fire.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
The pilot held an airline transport pilot (ATP) certificate for multiengine land airplanes. Single-engine land operations were limited to commercial privileges. He also held a certified flight instructor certificate with single-engine airplane and multiengine airplane ratings. The pilot's second-class medical certificate issued on August 25, 2005, required that the pilot "must have available glasses for near vision."
According to the operator's records, the pilot had accumulated 12,600 total flight hours, including 1,900 hours in the same make and model airplane as the accident airplane. Operator records show that the pilot was hired on September 14, 1999. Training records indicate that the pilot's most recent Airman Competency/Proficiency Check required by FAR Part 135, was conducted on September 7, 2005, in a Cessna 208 Caravan. Training records indicate that the pilot's most recent Airman Competency/Proficiency Check, in the Mitsubishi MU-2 was on December 13, 2004.
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION
The airplane was a twin-engine Mitsubishi MU-2B-36, serial number 673, and was certified for single-pilot operations. The airplane was configured for cargo operations and seated two. Its maximum gross weight was 11,575 pounds. The Garrett TPE-331-6 engines were flat rated to 715 shaft horsepower. The airplane was maintained under an approved aircraft inspection program (AAIP) and was last inspected on September 22, 2005. The airplane had flown approximately 0.5 hours since the last inspection and had a total time of 10,892 hours.
The airplane is equipped with a fire detection system. The fire detection system is installed independently on both engines, and it consists of a thermistor type continuous temperature sensor, control unit, and warning lights. The system is powered by the battery through the emergency relay. When the resistance of the temperature sensor has decreased below 350 ohms due to fire, the relay in the control unit is actuated and the respective engine fire warning annunciator light illuminates. The fire warning annunciator lights are built in the fire extinguisher handles located in the cockpit instrument shroud, one for the left engine and one for the right engine. Both systems may be tested by depressing the fire detector test switch beside the fire extinguisher handle. If the fire extinguisher handle is pulled, the affected engine fuel shutoff valve is closed electrically and the fire extinguisher (if installed) is discharged.
The Airplane Flight Manual, Emergency Procedures, Section 3 provides the emergency checklist items to be performed if the fire warning annunciator light illuminates. The emergency procedures are:
ENGINE FIRE
If LH or RH ENGINE FIRE Annunciator Illuminates:
Affected Engine
1. Condition Lever Emergency Stop.
2. Power Lever Takeoff
WARNING
IDENTIFY FAILED ENGINE BY POWER ASSYMETRY AND ENGINE INSTRUMENTS. DO NOT RETARD FAILED ENGINE POWER LEVER, PLACE FAILED ENGINE POWER LEVER TO TAKEOFF POSITION DURING THE FEATHERING OF THE PROPELLER AND LEAVE THERE FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE FLIGHT.
CAUTION
3. Fire Handle Pull
4. Main Fuel Valve Switch Closed
5. DC Generator Switch Off (Affected Engine)
5A. Ignition Switch Off (Affected Engine)
6. Air Coditioning and Pressurization System SELECT OPERATING ENGINE BLEED AIR OR RAM AIR (IF THRUST IS CRITICAL)
NOTE
Ram Air Position will depressurize Cabin. Oxygen may be required.
7. Land As Soon As Possible Utilizing Single Engine Landing Procedures, Section 3.
METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
At 1953, the observed surface weather at AWM was: Winds 130 degrees at 7 kts; visibility 10 statute miles, sky clear, temperature 29 degrees Celsius (C), dew point 20 degrees C, altimeter 29.90 inches of mercury.
WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION
The airplane impacted the terrain at coordinates 35 degrees 10.902 minutes north, 090 degrees 14.954 minutes west, at an elevation of about 252 feet. The wreckage site was 2.8 nm from AWM on a heading of 350 degrees. The terrain was a flat open field that was being prepared as an industrial building site. The airplane impacted into the side of the TS-14 scrapper that was parked at the site in an approximately wings-level attitude. The southern-most line of a power transmission line was located about 30 feet overhead the scrapper. No damage was observed to the power line. T...
Data Source
Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# CHI05FA272