N431CA

Destroyed
Fatal

Bombardier, Inc. CRJ-100S/N: 7472

Accident Details

Date
Sunday, August 27, 2006
NTSB Number
DCA06MA064
Location
Lexington, KY
Event ID
20060828X01244
Coordinates
38.009849, -84.480377
Aircraft Damage
Destroyed
Highest Injury
Fatal
Fatalities
49
Serious Injuries
1
Minor Injuries
0
Uninjured
0
Total Aboard
50

Probable Cause and Findings

the flight crewmembers's failure to use available cues and aids to identify the airplane's location on the airport surface during taxi and their failure to cross-check and verify that the airplane was on the correct runway before takeoff. Contributing to the accident were the flight crew's nonpertinent conversation during taxi, which resulted in a loss of positional awareness, and the Federal Aviation Administration's failure to require that all runway crossings be authorized only by specific air traffic control clearances.

Aircraft Information

Registration
N431CA
Make
BOMBARDIER, INC.
Serial Number
7472
Engine Type
Turbo-jet
Year Built
2001
Model / ICAO
CRJ-100CRJX
Aircraft Type
Fixed Wing Multi Engine
No. of Engines
2

Registered Owner (Historical)

Name
WACHOVIA BANK NA TRUSTEE
Address
401 S TRYON ST FL NC1179
Status
Deregistered
City
CHARLOTTE
State / Zip Code
NC 28202-1934
Country
United States

Analysis

The Safety Board's full report is available at http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/A_Acc1.htm. The Aircraft Accident Report number is NTSB/AAR-07/05.

On August 27, 2006, about 0606:35 eastern daylight time, Comair flight 5191, a Bombardier CL-600-2B19, N431CA, crashed during takeoff from Blue Grass Airport, Lexington, Kentucky. The flight crew was instructed to take off from runway 22 but instead lined up the airplane on runway 26 and began the takeoff roll. The airplane ran off the end of the runway and impacted the airport perimeter fence, trees, and terrain. The captain, flight attendant, and 47 passengers were killed, and the first officer received serious injuries. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and postcrash fire. The flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 and was en route to Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport, Atlanta, Georgia. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.

According to a customer service agent working in the Comair operations area, the flight crew checked in for the flight at 0515. The agent indicated that the crewmembers were casually conversing and were not yawning or rubbing their eyes.

The flight crew collected the flight release paperwork, which included weather information, safety-of-flight notices to airmen (NOTAM), the tail number of the airplane to be used for the flight, and the flight plan. The flight crew then proceeded to an area on the air carrier ramp where two Comair Canadair regional jet (CRJ) airplanes were parked. A Comair ramp agent, who was performing the security check of the accident airplane, noticed that the accident flight crew had boarded the wrong airplane and started its auxiliary power unit (APU). Another company ramp agent notified the flight crewmembers that they had boarded the wrong airplane. The flight crew then shut down the APU and proceeded to the correct airplane.

The LEX air traffic control tower (ATCT) was staffed with one controller at the time of the accident airplane's preflight activities, taxi, and attempted takeoff. The controller was responsible for all tower and radar positions.

The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recording began about 0536:08. At that time, the flight crew was conducting standard preflight preparations. About 0548:24, the CVR recorded automatic terminal information service (ATIS) information "alpha," which indicated that runway 22 was in use. About 1 minute afterward, the first officer told the controller that he had received the ATIS information.

About 0549:49, the controller stated, "cleared to Atlanta Airport via Bowling Green, ERLIN TWO arrival. Maintain six thousand [feet mean sea level (msl)] .... Departure's [departure control radio frequency] one two zero point seven five. Squawk [transponder code] six six four one." The first officer replied, "okay, got uh, Bowling Green uh, missed the other part. Six thousand, twenty point seven five. Six six four one." The controller then repeated, "it's ERLIN TWO. Echo Romeo Lima India November Two arrival," and the first officer acknowledged the arrival information.

About 0552:04, the captain began a discussion with the first officer about which of them should be the flying pilot to ATL. The captain offered the flight to the first officer, and the first officer accepted. About 0556:14, the captain stated, "Comair standard," which is part of the taxi briefing, and "run the checklist at your leisure."

About 0556:34, the first officer began the takeoff briefing, which is part of the before starting engines checklist. During the briefing, he stated, "he said what runway ... two four," to which the captain replied, "it's two two." The first officer continued the takeoff briefing, which included three additional references to runway 22. After briefing that the runway end identifier lights were out, the first officer commented, "came in the other night it was like ... lights are out all over the place." The first officer also stated, "let's take it out and ... take ... [taxiway] Alpha. Two two's a short taxi." The captain called the takeoff briefing complete about 0557:40.

Starting about 0558:15, the first officer called for the first two items on the before starting engines checklist. When the captain pointed out that the before starting engines checklist had already been completed, the first officer questioned, "we did"? Afterward, the first officer briefed the takeoff decision speed (V1) as 137 knots and the rotation speed (VR) as 142 knots.

Flight data recorder (FDR) data for the accident flight started about 0558:50. The FDR showed that, at some point before the start of the accident flight recording, the pilots' heading bugs had been set to 227º, which corresponded to the magnetic heading for runway 22.

About 0559:14, the captain stated that the airplane was ready to push back from the gate. FDR data showed that, about 0600:08 and 0600:55, the left and right engines, respectively, were started.

About 0602:01, the first officer notified the controller that the airplane was ready to taxi. The controller then instructed the flight crew to taxi the airplane to runway 22. This instruction authorized the airplane to cross runway 26 (the intersecting runway) without stopping. The first officer responded, "taxi two two." FDR data showed that the captain began to taxi the airplane about 0602:17. About the same time, SkyWest flight 6819 departed from runway 22.

About 0602:19, the captain called for the taxi checklist. Beginning about 0603:02, the first officer made two consecutive statements, "radar terrain displays" and "taxi check's complete," that were spoken in a yawning voice. About 0603:38, American Eagle flight 882 departed from runway 22.

From about 0603:16 to about 0603:56, the flight crew engaged in conversation that was not pertinent to the operation of the flight. About 0604:01, the first officer began the before takeoff checklist and indicated again that the flight would be departing from runway 22.

FDR data showed that, about 0604:33, the captain stopped the airplane at the holding position, commonly referred to as the hold short line, for runway 26. Afterward, the first officer made an announcement over the public address system to welcome the passengers and completed the before takeoff checklist. About 0605:15, while the airplane was still at the hold short line for runway 26, the first officer told the controller that "Comair one twenty one" was ready to depart at his leisure; about 3 seconds later, the controller responded, "Comair one ninety one ... fly runway heading. Cleared for takeoff." Neither the first officer nor the controller stated the runway number during the request and clearance for takeoff. FDR data showed that, about 0605:24, the captain began to taxi the airplane across the runway 26 hold short line. The CVR recording showed that the captain called for the lineup checklist at the same time.

About 0605:40, the controller transferred responsibility for American Eagle flight 882 to the Indianapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC). FDR data showed that, about 1 second later, Comair flight 5191 began turning onto runway 26. About 0605:46, the first officer called the lineup checklist complete.

About 0605:58, the captain told the first officer, "all yours," and the first officer acknowledged, "my brakes, my controls." FDR data showed that the magnetic heading of the airplane at that time was about 266º, which corresponded to the magnetic heading for runway 26. About 0606:05, the CVR recorded a sound similar to an increase in engine rpm. Afterward, the first officer stated, "set thrust please," to which the captain responded, "thrust set." About 0606:16, the first officer stated, "[that] is weird with no lights," and the captain responded, "yeah," 2 seconds later.

About 0606:24, the captain called "one hundred knots," to which the first officer replied, "checks." At 0606:31.2, the captain called, "V one, rotate," and stated, "whoa," at 0606:31.8. FDR data showed that the callout for V1 occurred 6 knots early and that the callout for VR occurred 11 knots early; both callouts took place when the airplane was at an airspeed of 131 knots. FDR data also showed that the control columns reached their full aft position about 0606:32 and that the airplane rotated at a rate of about 10º per second.

The airplane impacted an earthen berm located about 265 feet from the end of runway 26, and the CVR recorded the sound of impact at 0606:33.0. FDR airspeed and altitude data showed that the airplane became temporarily airborne after impacting the berm but climbed less than 20 feet off the ground.

The CVR recorded an unintelligible exclamation by a flight crewmember at 0606:33.3. FDR data showed that the airplane reached its maximum airspeed of 137 knots about 0606:35. The aircraft performance study for this accident showed that, at that time, the airplane impacted a tree located about 900 feet from the end of runway 26. The CVR recorded an unintelligible exclamation by the captain at 0606:35.7, and the recording ended at 0606:36.2.

In a postaccident interview, the controller stated that he did not see the airplane take off. The controller also stated that, after hearing a sound, he saw a fire west of the airport and activated the crash phone (the direct communication to the airport's operations center and fire station) in response. The air traffic control (ATC) transcript showed that the crash phone was activated about 0607:17 and that the airport operations center dispatcher responded to the crash phone about 0607:22. According to the ATC transcript, the controller announced an "alert three" and indicated that a Comair jet taking off from runway 22 was located at the west side of the airport just off the approach end of runway 8 (which is also the departure end of runway 26). Section 1.15.1 discusses the emergency response.

FINDINGS

1) The captai...

Data Source

Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# DCA06MA064