N3887M

Substantial
Serious

Piper PA-32RT-300

Accident Details

Date
Tuesday, November 21, 2006
NTSB Number
NYC07LA033
Location
Bardstown, KY
Event ID
20061221X01828
Coordinates
37.814723, -85.466941
Aircraft Damage
Substantial
Highest Injury
Serious
Fatalities
0
Serious Injuries
2
Minor Injuries
0
Uninjured
0
Total Aboard
2

Probable Cause and Findings

The loss of engine power for undetermined reasons.

Aircraft Information

Registration
N3887M
Make
PIPER
Engine Type
Reciprocating
Year Built
1978
Model / ICAO
PA-32RT-300P32T
Aircraft Type
Fixed Wing Single Engine
No. of Engines
1

Registered Owner (Historical)

Name
SALE REPORTED
Address
7047 E GREENWAY PKWY STE 350
Status
Deregistered
City
SCOTTSDALE
State / Zip Code
AZ 85254-8117
Country
United States

Analysis

On November 21, 2006, at 1213 eastern standard time, a Piper PA-32RT-300, N3887M, was substantially damaged during a forced landing in Bardstown, Kentucky. The certificated private pilot and passenger received serious injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed for the flight which originated at Mayfield Graves County Airport (M25), Mayfield, Kentucky and was en route to Capital City Airport (FFT), Frankfort, Kentucky. The personal flight was conducted under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.

According to air traffic control (ATC) information provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), while the pilot was at an altitude of 5,000 feet, en route to his destination, he reported "engine fire...going in." The pilot was given vectors to Samuels Field Airport (BRY), Bardstown, Kentucky, which was the closest airport.

The pilot was unable to make it to the airport, and performed a forced landing to a field about 1 mile from the airport, during which the airplane impacted trees.

The pilot reported to an FAA inspector that he observed smoke coming from the front of the airplane when the engine lost power. He could not recall if the engine lost total power or continued to run at partial power. The pilot did recall that the propeller continued to turn, and he attempted to turn on the boost pump and switch tanks; but was unsuccessful in regaining engine power.

Preliminary examination of the engine by the FAA inspector revealed that the right forward cowling displayed fire damage near the number 1 cylinder exhaust, and soot damage under the number 1 cylinder. The exhaust stacks were impact damaged, and the vacuum pump and magneto had separated from the rear of the engine. The engine crankshaft was rotated by hand and thumb compression and valve train continuity was confirmed to all cylinders. Fuel was observed in the fuel lines and in the fuel tanks. The magneto switch, master switch and fuel boost pump switch were all observed in the "off" position.

The engine was removed from the accident site for further examination. The cowling was removed and burn damage was noted on the inside of the lower, right cowling. This damage was in the vicinity of the number 1 cylinder exhaust stack. The number 1 exhaust gasket was intact with no evidence of exhaust gas leakage observed. The number 1 cylinder lower spark plug wire also had evidence of black soot around it. Additionally, the number 1 exhaust gauge temperature (EGT) probe was backed out of the exhaust stack about 1/8 inch. Evidence of exhaust gas leakage was noted on the EGT probe. No indication of fuel leakage was observed on the engine cylinder inlet pipes, fuel injector nozzles, or the fuel distributor valves. Additionally, all of the fuel nozzle connections were secure.

The engine was equipped with an engine analyzer, which recorded engine data. The unit was sent to its manufacturer for download. According to the report prepared by the manufacturer, no anomalies were noted in the accident flight data. There was no indication of a fuel leak, or increase in engine temperature. At 1210, the last recorded data point indicated the fuel was cut off suddenly, to the engine.

The fuel servo was also sent to its manufacturer for examination, under the supervision of a National Transportation Safety Board investigator. The fuel servo was flow tested, and the testing revealed the fuel flow was within service limits. No mechanical anomalies were noted with the fuel servo.

Data Source

Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# NYC07LA033