N8001V

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On May 25, 2009, about 1146 eastern daylight time, a Beech C90A, N8001V, registered to Rockwood LLC, operated by Executive Airlink, Inc., was landed hard during a forced landing in a field near Yeehaw Junction, Florida. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed and activated for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135 non-scheduled, domestic, passenger flight from Ocean Reef Club Airport (07FA), Key Largo, Florida, to Orlando Executive Airport (ORL), Orlando, Florida. The airplane was substantially damaged and there was no injury to the certificated airline transport pilot and co-pilot, or two passengers. The flight originated from 07FA about 1104 hours.

Earlier on the day of the accident, the accident flightcrew flew the accident airplane to 07FA to pick up two passengers; the flight was uneventful. The flight departed 07FA for ORL with approximately 1,600 to 1,800 pounds of fuel on-board, and at approximately 1108, the flightcrew established contact with the Miami Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC), and advised the controller that the flight was climbing from 5,000 to 16,000 feet.

The flight continued towards the destination airport and the pilot-in-command (PIC) reported that while in the “Miami area”, he noticed the amber crossfeed light was illuminated on the annunciator panel. They looked at the emergency procedures checklist for boost pump failure but the PIC reported he did not comply with the checklist and did not change the fuel control configuration. At that time they were operating with the crossfeed and both transfer pump switches in “Auto”, and both boost pumps “On.” The PIC reported he did not see any urgency and elected to continue the flight, though he did not monitor the fuel quantity gauges.

The flight was cleared to climb to 17,000 feet, then later while continuing towards the destination airport was cleared to descend to 15,000 feet. Air traffic control communications were transferred to Orlando Approach Control and at 1137, the controller advised the flightcrew to cross the BAIRN intersection at 10,000 feet which they acknowledged. At 1145:37, the flightcrew advised air traffic control that the flight needed to divert to the nearest airport. The controller advised the flightcrew of 2 nearby airports and asked them which one they would like to proceed to. The flightcrew responded and the flight was vectored towards that airport. The controller asked the flightcrew the reason to divert but there was no response; there were no further radio communications received from the flightcrew.

The PIC further stated that while descending to the assigned altitude of 10,000 feet with the autopilot engaged, approximately 15 minutes from the destination airport, they both noticed the left and right red low fuel pressure annunciator warning lights illuminated, followed by loss of power from both engines. They looked for the nearest airport and the PIC was able to restart the left engine. While attempting to restart the right engine the left engine quit again. The PIC maneuvered the airplane for a forced landing in an open field and lowered the landing gear before touchdown. He reported landing hard, bouncing, and becoming airborne momentarily. After coming to rest they evacuated the airplane. The PIC further reported that at no time during the flight did either no fuel transfer warning annunciator lights illuminate.

The co-pilot stated that when the crossfeed light came on, they looked at the checklist but did not recall any checklist for that annunciation. He stated they normally don't do challenge response with respect to the checklist and they did not do a challenge response related to the crossfeed annunciation. When the PIC used the checklist he did not read it aloud. The PIC advised him the airplane was OK and elected to continue the flight. The flight continued and both fuel pressure annunciators came on within seconds of each other. The PIC advised him that they lost power in both engines. Every light on the annunciator panel was on. The PIC performed restart procedures and he asked air traffic control for vectors. They were able to restart but had no power.

The rest of the flight was spent getting the airplane on the ground safely. When close to the ground they had a high sink rate but the gear was put down. The airplane bounced, landed, then slid sideways. They came to a stop and the PIC began securing the airplane. They all exited the airplane; the PIC was the last person to leave. The fire department arrived 1.0 to 1.5 hours later. After they arrived, they heard a buzzing sound and the PIC said both boost pumps may be still on. He did not hear either boost pump running and went into the airplane and shutdown the entire fuel panel. He turned off the transfer, boost, and crossfeed switches. He estimated he secured the panel 2 hours after the accident.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The PIC, age 46, holds an airline transport pilot certificate with rating airplane multi-engine land rating, and commercial pilot certificate with single engine land rating. His latest first class medical certificate was issued on November 3, 2008, with a limitation to wear corrective lenses. He reported having a total flight time of 5,789 hours, and 725 hours in the accident make and model airplane. His total PIC time was 5,331 hours, of which 689 were in the accident make and model airplane. During the last 90 days he logged 111 hours in multi-engine airplanes, of which 27 were in the accident make and model airplane.

The PIC reported he was hired by Executive Airlink, Inc., in November 2004, and became chief pilot in July 2008. His last airman competency/proficiency check in accordance with 14 CFR Part 135.293 titled, “Initial and recurrent pilot testing requirements”, 14 CFR Part 135.297 titled, “Pilot in command: Instrument proficiency check requirements", and also 14 CFR 135.299 titled, “Pilot in command: Line checks: Routes and airports” was performed on February 17, 2009. The flight duration was recorded to be 1.5 hours and the results were listed as "Approved." The flight was in a Beech 200 airplane. He was qualified to act as PIC in Beech 200 and C90 airplanes.

The co-pilot, age 29, holds an airline transport pilot certificate with rating an airplane multi-engine land rating, and commercial pilot certificate with single engine land rating. His latest first class medical certificate was issued on January 20, 2009, with no limitations. He reported on the NTSB Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident/Incident Report having a total time of 2,500 hours, of which 690 were in the accident make and model airplane. He indicated having 2,160 hours as PIC in all type aircraft, of which 590 were in the accident make and model airplane. In the previous 90 days he reported accruing 25 hours, of which 1 were in the accident make and model airplane.

The co-pilot reported that he was hired by Executive Airlink, Inc., approximately 1 ½ years earlier, left the company, then returned to the company in March 2009. His last airman competency/proficiency check in accordance with 14 CFR Part 135.293 titled, “Initial and recurrent pilot testing requirements”, 14 CFR Part 135.297 titled, “Pilot in command: Instrument proficiency check requirements", and also 14 CFR 135.299 titled, “Pilot in command: Line checks: Routes and airports” was performed on March 23, 2009. The flight duration was recorded to be 1.2 hours and the results were listed as "Approved." The remarks section indicated, "[second-in-command] only check must fly with [pilot-in-command]." The flight was in a Beech 200 airplane. He was qualified to act as second-in-command in Beech 200 and C90 airplanes.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The airplane was manufactured in 1990 by Beech Aircraft Corporation as model C90A, and was designated serial number LJ-1265. It was powered by two 750 shaft horsepower Pratt & Whitney PT6A-35 engines installed in accordance with a supplemental type certificate (STC), and equipped with constant speed, feathering and reversible propellers.

The airplane was maintained in accordance with an FAA Approved Aircraft Inspection Program (AAIP), consisting of four inspections each performed at 200 hour intervals. A complete inspection of the airplane is performed every 800 hours, or every two calendar years.

Inspection of electrical wiring and equipment in the cockpit (which includes the fuel control panel) is specified to occur during a Phase 3 inspection or a Biennial (2 year) inspection, depending on the owner/operator utilization of the airplane. During either inspection, the fuel control panel is required to be lowered. The Phase 3 inspection does not specifically state to inspect the terminals of either relay or the condition of the wires at either relay; although, inspection of components and wiring of the panel would be considered an accepted maintenance practice whenever the panel is opened.

The maintenance records reflect that the left boost pump was removed from another airplane (N5MK), and installed in the accident airplane on December 8, 2006. The airframe total time at that time was 6,898.8 hours and total cycles were 8,107. The last Phase 3 inspection was performed on January 10, 2008, at aircraft total time 7,621.2 hours, and 8,921 cycles. There was no entry in the maintenance records documenting maintenance performed to either no fuel transfer time delay relay.

The airplane total time at the time of the accident was 8,252.3 hours, and the total cycles excluding the accident flight were 9,531.

Review of the airplane's flight pages which contains flight and maintenance malfunction information was performed for the period March 1, 2009, through the accident date. During that time excluding the accident flight, the airplane had been operated approximately 96 hours over the course of 92 flights, and there was no record of any entry related to ...