N4864S

Substantial
Minor

PIPER PA-32-260S/N: 32-1288

Accident Details

Date
Friday, September 25, 2009
NTSB Number
CEN09LA605
Location
Troy, MI
Event ID
20090925X64658
Coordinates
42.543056, -83.177780
Aircraft Damage
Substantial
Highest Injury
Minor
Fatalities
0
Serious Injuries
0
Minor Injuries
1
Uninjured
0
Total Aboard
1

Probable Cause and Findings

A loss of engine power during initial climb due to fuel starvation as a result of the pilot's selection of an empty or nearly empty main tank for takeoff.

Aircraft Information

Registration
N4864S
Make
PIPER
Serial Number
32-1288
Engine Type
Reciprocating
Year Built
1970
Model / ICAO
PA-32-260PA32
Aircraft Type
Fixed Wing Single Engine
No. of Engines
1

Registered Owner (Historical)

Name
GALT ZONE LLC
Address
1020 W READING RD
Status
Deregistered
City
HILLSDALE
State / Zip Code
MI 49242-9619
Country
United States

Analysis

***This report was modified on 5/3/2011 and 5/23/2011. Please see the docket for this accident for the original factual report and revision history.***

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On September 24, 2009, about 2044 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-32-260 (Cherokee Six), N4864S, was substantially damaged when it impacted terrain following a loss of engine power shortly after takeoff from Oakland/Troy Airport (KVLL), Troy, Michigan. The pilot sustained minor injuries. The flight was registered to Galt Zone, LLC, and operated by a private pilot under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which operated without a flight plan. The flight was originating at the time of the accident and was destined for Hillsdale Municipal Airport, Hillsdale, Michigan.

The pilot reported that he performed a preflight inspection of the airplane, during which he verified the fuel quantity and its distribution between the fuel tanks. He noted that the right and left inboard (main) tanks were nearly empty and that both outboard (tip) tanks were almost full. He stated that he had flown earlier in the day and that his last landing was completed using fuel from the left tip tank. The pilot reported that he did not reposition the fuel selector before the accident flight, and, as such, performed the takeoff using fuel from the left tip tank.

The pilot stated that he did not observe any anomalies with the engine operation during his pre-takeoff engine checks. After the engine checks, he positioned the airplane to the approach end of runway 9 (3,549 feet by 60 feet, dry asphalt) and configured for a short-field takeoff with 20 degrees of flaps. Before starting the takeoff roll, the pilot established takeoff engine power and reconfirmed that there were no issues with engine operation. Shortly after liftoff, as the airplane approached the departure end of the runway, the engine experienced a "quick loss of power," which was shortly followed by a total loss of engine power. The pilot noted that the airplane was too low to perform any emergency checklist items. He stated that, after seeing the stall light flicker momentarily, he focused exclusively on performing a forced landing in a parking lot located immediately north of the departure threshold. During the forced landing, the airplane impacted a shopping cart corral and a tree before sliding down an embankment into another parking lot and grassy area. A postimpact ground fire broke out at the right wingtip, which was quickly extinguished by first responders and the local fire department.

A witness reported hearing the airplane's engine momentarily "stall" after takeoff but then resume operation for a short period of time before it experienced a complete loss of power. Several witnesses saw the accident airplane impact a shopping cart corral and then descend an embankment into another parking lot and grassy area. The witnesses further noted that the pilot had already extracted himself from the airplane upon their arrival and that he did not appear to be seriously injured.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

After the accident, the pilot and the airport manager visually inspected the fuel tanks at the accident site. Both main tanks were visibly empty. The right tip tank had been destroyed during the impact and fire and contained no recoverable fuel. The left tip tank appeared to be "full of fuel," according to the pilot. A lieutenant with the local fire department reported that he did not observe any fuel leaking from the airplane and that there was no evidence of a fuel spill at the accident site. The airplane was subsequently recovered to a hangar at KVLL for storage and further examination. The hangar was locked, and the airport manager limited access to the hangar. He indicated that the FAA would define who would have access while the wreckage was in their custody (for example, FAA, NTSB, and possibly insurance representatives or the owner).

On September 28, 2009, FAA inspectors examined the accident airplane at KVLL. In the hangar, the airplane was resting on its fractured right wing and engine because the right main and nose landing gear had collapsed during the accident. In this right-wing-low, nose-low attitude, a visual inspection of the left tip tank showed that the tank appeared to contain between 1/2 and 3/4 of its total 17-gallon capacity. The left main tank contained no visible fuel. The right main tank was void of any visible fuel, but a damaged fuel drain port compromised the tank's integrity. The right tip tank was destroyed and contained no fuel. The cockpit fuel selector was observed positioned on the left tip tank.

On October 6, 2009, FAA inspectors reexamined the accident airplane and conducted an operational engine test run at the NTSB's request. The airplane was lifted to a slightly right-wing-down, near-level pitch attitude for the engine test run. There were no observed fuel leaks when the fuel system was pressurized with the electric fuel pump and using the left tip tank as the fuel source. After an uneventful startup, the engine was run at various engine speeds as the engine throttle was manipulated in the cockpit. Investigators did not note any engine system anomalies on the cockpit engine gauges during the operational test run. According to data downloaded from the accident airplane's engine monitoring system, the engine test run took about 1 minute 17 seconds. The left main tank was drained at the fuel drain port and contained about 1 cup of fuel. The wreckage was released by the FAA but remained in the locked hangar with limited access controlled by the airport manager.

On October 26, 2009, an NTSB investigator and two FAA airworthiness inspectors revisited the hangar. The airplane was still in the postaccident attitude. The investigators observed that the left tip tank appeared to be generally 1/2 to 3/4 full. The NTSB investigator had the airplane leveled and then observed that the left tip tank appeared to be generally 1/4 to 1/2 full. There was no loss of fuel between the two observations of "1/2 to 3/4 tank" and "1/4 to 1/2 tank," and there was no evidence of a fuel leak at the accident site or in the hangar where the airplane was stored. The left main and left tip tanks were drained using the airplane's electric fuel pump, and the fuel was collected from the carburetor inlet fuel line. The left main tank contained about 75 fluid ounces (0.6 gallons) of fuel. The left tip tank contained about 4.5 gallons of fuel. (All of the recovered fuel was blue in color, consistent with 100 low lead aviation fuel, and did not contain any water or particulate contamination.) The right main tank was reconfirmed empty of any fuel.

The left tip tank was removed, and the 4.5 gallons of fuel previously recovered was returned to the tank. The fuel outlet port was located near the aft, inboard corner of the fuel tank. The fuel tank was rotated about the longitudinal and lateral axes to determine if the position of the tank's outlet port could allow air to enter the outlet fuel line. With 4.5 gallons of fuel in the tank, the tank was rotated 7 degrees to the right to align the tank with the wing's dihedral of 7 degrees. Starting at the 7-degree attitude, the tank was rotated 20.5 degrees to the left until the tank's fuel outlet port became uncovered. The static test was not representative of an airplane that was banked 20.5 degrees while in coordinated flight; however, it provided a measure of the lateral acceleration necessary in uncoordinated flight or a turning takeoff to unport the tank. The position of the fuel outlet did not allow air to enter the outflow line when positioned at positive pitch angles or in a right-wing-low attitude.

Above the fuel selector assembly was a black placard with white lettering, part number 69192, which stated the following: "All Weight In Excess of 3112 Pounds Must Be Fuel Weight Only; Fill Tip Tanks First, Use Main Tanks First; Restrict Passenger Weights or Cargo Weight As Required For Compliance."

Both propeller blades had leading-edge damage, and their blade tips were curled aft. An inspection of the accident site revealed four distinct strike marks in the asphalt parking lot consistent with damage caused by a rotating propeller. The distance between the first two propeller slash marks was 41 inches. The distance between the second and third marks was 48.5 inches. The distance between the third and fourth marks was 72 inches.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

During a postaccident interview with an FAA inspector, the pilot stated that after the loss of engine power, he had reached for the fuel selector but was unsure of what he did because his attention was diverted by the stall warning light.

The pilot reported to the NTSB investigator that the loss of engine power during initial climb was likely due to fuel starvation, as a result of fuel sloshing in the left tip tank during rotation and initial climb. The pilot also contended that the left tip tank contained 1/2 to 3/4 of its 17-gallon capacity before the accident flight.

--- Fuel Consumption Calculations

According to the pilot's flight log and related email correspondence, the accident airplane was last fueled on September 2, 2009, after completing a cross-country trip from South Carolina to Michigan. According to the records obtained from the fuel vendor at KVLL, the airplane was fueled with 46.43 gallons. The pilot reported that the airplane's four fuel tanks were at their full capacity (84 gallons total) after being "topped-off" with the 46.43 gallons. The previous flight was 3.9 hours at 10,000 feet, according to engine monitor and global positioning system (GPS) data. The average rate of fuel use was calculated at 11.9 gallons per hour (gph). The 11.9-gph value assumes that the fuel tanks were topped off completely and consistently after the last two flights in which refueling occurred.

The pilot's flight lo...

Data Source

Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# CEN09LA605