Accident Details
Probable Cause and Findings
The pilot's inadequate preflight inspection to ensure that all tie-down straps were removed prior to flight. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's improper management of sleep opportunities during the preceding rest period, which likely contributed to the development of fatigue.
Aircraft Information
Registered Owner (Historical)
Analysis
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On April 9, 2010, about 0124 Pacific daylight time, a Bell 222U, N222UT, owned and operated by California Shock Trauma Air Rescue (dba CALSTAR), was substantially damaged while standing with its engines operating in preparation for takeoff from the company's emergency medical services (EMS) operations base at the Santa Maria Public Airport (SMX), Santa Maria, California. Neither the airline transport certificated pilot nor the two flight nurses were injured during the positioning flight that was performed under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the dark nighttime flight, and a company flight plan had been filed. The flight was originating at the time of the mishap.
CALSTAR personnel reported to the National Transportation Safety Board investigator that at SMX, prior to the pilot's 0110 flight assignment duty call, one of the tail rotor blades had been tied down to the helicopter's tail boom with a strap. It was the pilot's responsibility to preflight the helicopter prior to flight. Following the pilot's engine start operation, as the tail rotor blades began rotating in preparation for takeoff, the tie-down strap broke.
Unaware of the mishap, the pilot departed SMX and flew to the Marian Medical Center Heliport in Santa Maria (1CL8) and landed about 0131. Just prior to the pilot's 0242 departure for the EMS flight with a patient and passenger on board, one of the pilot's flight nurses who was standing outside the helicopter observed material attached to the helicopter's tail rotor area. The nurse brought the anomaly to the pilot's attention. The pilot shut down the engine and examined the helicopter. Nylon rotor blade tie-down webbing was found wrapped around the tail rotor's drive shaft. The pilot and flight nurse removed the webbing material, and the pilot inspected the helicopter. Believing that the helicopter was undamaged the pilot, along with the EMS crew, patient and family, departed 1CL8. The pilot flew under Part 135 to a medical facility in Madera, California, and landed about 0346.
Thereafter, with better illumination, the pilot performed a more detailed inspection of the helicopter during which he observed damage to one tail rotor blade and other anomalies. The pilot notified CALSTAR's management of his observations, and the helicopter was immediately taken out of service for repairs.
HELICOPTER DAMAGE
CALSTAR's director of maintenance (DM) assessed the damage to the helicopter's flight control system components, and he determined that the helicopter was not airworthy. The DM stated to the Safety Board investigator that he observed damage to one of the tail rotor blades. The blade was scratched and exhibited indentations in its skin (voids). An examination of the two pitch change links (one for each of the tail rotor blades) revealed that their four spherical bearings were seized, and the links were bent. The amount of deformation was visually apparent. In accordance with guidance provided by Bell Helicopter, damage to the composite material rotor blade and pitch change links was significant and not repairable. Accordingly, these components were discarded. No additional examination of these components was performed.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Evidence of Damage
According to CALSTAR's Director of Operations (DO), operation of the helicopter immediately prior to the accident flight occurred on April 7, 2010. This flight was not performed by the accident pilot. The pilot who flew the helicopter on this date did not report experiencing any flight anomalies or damage to the tail rotor blades or pitch change links. Also, just prior to the accident flight, when CALSTAR's maintenance personal performed their routine daily inspection of the helicopter, no damage was observed.
Fitness for Duty
The pilot's recent work shift schedule was reviewed during the Safety Board investigator's April 16, 2010, examination of company records and interview with the pilot. The records indicated that on April 5, the pilot began a daytime work shift at 0730. He completed work at 1930. The pilot reported that he was off work on April 6 and 7, having experienced back pain. The pilot stated that he went to bed at midnight on April 7.
According to the pilot, on April 8, he awoke at 0800, had a 0930 adjustment with a chiropractor, and felt fit for duty. The pilot stated that he remained awake the remainder of the day and evening, and he reported for work at 1930 to commence a nighttime duty shift. Upon arriving at work, he noted that one main rotor blade and the tail rotor had been tied down.
The pilot indicated that at 2300 when he retired for the evening, he promptly went to sleep. He had been awake about 15 hours. After sleeping soundly for about 2 hours, he was awakened at 0110 to respond to the subject flight duty call.
The pilot reported that he proceeded to the helicopter and placed his flight helmet on the seat. Thereafter, he performed a walk-around inspection. The helicopter was parked in a very dark area with little illumination. However, he had a flashlight available, in addition to light from a nearby trailer. The pilot stated that he observed a flight nurse proceed to the opposite side of the helicopter, and he assumed that the flight nurse had untied the tail rotor tie-down strap.
The flight nurse was not a pilot. The pilot untied the main rotor blade.
Pilot Responsibilities
CALSTAR's DO reported to the Safety Board investigator that due to the prevailing wind condition at SMX, one of the tail rotor blades had been secured using a strap. The DO stated it was the pilot's responsibility to have ensured that the rotor blades were no longer tied down during his preflight walk around inspection just prior to takeoff.
CALSTAR's "Policy & Procedures" directive, dated February 16, 2007, was issued by the company to address crew rest protocols. In pertinent part, it states that "all flight crewmembers are expected to arrive for duty in a well rested condition."
Data Source
Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# WPR10LA200