N1600W

HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn September 27, 2010, about 1054 mountain standard time, a Beechcraft F33A, N1600W, collided with a building during landing at the Phoenix Deer Valley Airport, Phoenix, Arizona. The pilot/owner was operating the airplane under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91. The private pilot sustained fatal injuries. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the wings, fuselage, and empennage from impact damage and a post-crash fire. The local personal flight departed Phoenix Deer Valley Airport about 0938. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan had been filed.

The pilot's family reported that he flew weekly to maintain proficiency, which was the purpose of this flight.

The airplane had a Garmin GPSMAP 196 portable global positioning satellite system (GPS) unit installed. A National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) specialist downloaded the recorded information and prepared a factual report, which is in the public docket for this accident. The data indicated that the flight lasted about 1 hour 16 minutes. The pilot departed to the east, turned north, and climbed to a peak recorded altitude of 8,123 feet mean sea level (msl) at 1020:34. He made a right turn to a southerly heading at 1021:13, and began descending. He turned to the southwest for a downwind entry to the north of runway 07L.

A review of recorded air traffic control tower (ATCT) transmissions revealed that the pilot reported inbound for landing at 4,000 feet. He was cleared into the traffic pattern for a left downwind for runway 07L. There were several airplanes ahead of him, and he asked the ATCT to call his turn to left base for him. After his traffic called a 3 mile final, the ATCT advised him to turn, and he acknowledged.

While on final, the ATCT advised the pilot that he appeared to be low. He responded that he was experiencing engine difficulties, and would try to make the runway. Witnesses reported that the airplane was very low, and the engine was sputtering and backfiring. Several witnesses, including a couple of certified flight instructors, stated that the airplane's wings were rocking, and the nose attitude was high. One witness looking head-on at the airplane noted that the nose pitched down just prior to the airplane colliding with a building. The airplane and building caught fire; one witness reported that the building's sprinkler system activated, and an alarm sounded. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONA review of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airman records revealed that the 72-year-old pilot possessed a private pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land, single-engine sea, multiengine land, and instrument airplane. The FAA issued the pilot a third-class medical certificate on February 24, 2010. It had the limitations that the pilot must wear and possess corrective lenses for near and distant vision.

On an insurance application dated September 3, 2010, the pilot reported that he had a total flight time of 1,872 hours as pilot-in-command. He had an estimated 647 hours in this make and model. He completed a biennial proficiency check in August 2009. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONThe airplane was a Beechcraft F33A, serial number CE-380. A review of the airplane's logbooks revealed that the airplane had an annual inspection on May 1, 2010, at a total airframe time of 6,950.4 hours. The tachometer read 702.9 at the last inspection.

The engine was a Continental Motors, Inc. (CMI), IO-520-BA(8), serial number 280845-R. Total time recorded on the factory remanufactured engine was 702.9 hours at the last annual inspection. AIRPORT INFORMATIONThe airplane was a Beechcraft F33A, serial number CE-380. A review of the airplane's logbooks revealed that the airplane had an annual inspection on May 1, 2010, at a total airframe time of 6,950.4 hours. The tachometer read 702.9 at the last inspection.

The engine was a Continental Motors, Inc. (CMI), IO-520-BA(8), serial number 280845-R. Total time recorded on the factory remanufactured engine was 702.9 hours at the last annual inspection. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONInvestigators from the NTSB, FAA, Beechcraft, and CMI, examined the wreckage at the accident scene. The first identified point of contact (FIPC) was a ground scar. The debris path was along a magnetic heading of 052 degrees; the orientation of the fuselage was 052 degrees. Detailed on-site examination notes are in the public docket.

The airplane came to rest inside an industrial building lobby. The fuselage, one propeller blade, empennage, most of the right wing, most of the left wing with the aileron attached, and landing gear were contained within the office space.

The engine with two of the three propeller blades attached was displaced from the airframe; it went through a steel door and frame into a second room.

The first identified point of contact was a ground scar along a 052-degrees magnetic bearing that headed toward the left front edge of the building when facing the entrance. The scar continued across a red curb that was 10 feet from the office's entry point; the red curb exhibited scuff marks.

There was a scrape mark that angled up 38 degrees along the right side of the building's entrance. The bottom of the scrape started about 8 feet high.

Above the center of the entrance were two areas that had chunks of concrete broken off, and emanating from these disturbed areas were two sets of paint transfer marks. One mark was at the 1 o'clock position, and was similar in appearance to a propeller blade. The paint was black from its base to the end except for a small outboard portion that was red. Another paint transfer mark was at the 11 o'clock position; it was red and about the same distance from the base as the other red mark.

The portion of the left wing outboard of the aileron actuating rod was along the outside of the north facing side of the building.

The fuel selector valve was selected to the left tank.

The ignition switch was in the BOTH position. The auxiliary fuel pump switch was not observed. The flap position switch was in the OFF position.

The control cables for the rudder and elevators remained attached, and control continuity was established from the control surfaces to the buckled center cabin area.

The forward seats were intact and remained attached to their respective seat rails. The forward seat stops were not visible. The seats contained lap belts; the shoulder harnesses were hanging from the headliner, above and aft of the forward seats. The seat belts were not buckled, and the FAA inspector reported that first responders did not have to disconnect them to extricate the pilot. ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONPilot's Operating Handbook (POH)

The POH states to enrich the mixture as required during descents. Before landing, the POH indicates that the pilot should select the full rich position.

The emergency procedures section discusses loss of engine power. The POH tells the pilot to check fuel flow; if it is abnormally low, turn the auxiliary fuel pump on and lean as required. It says to turn the auxiliary fuel pump off if there is no improvement.

CMI Service Bulletin SB08-03

On March 14, 2008, CMI issued service bulletin (SB) SB08-3 regarding throttle and mixture control levers. It noted that two types of throttle and mixture control levers were in use in the field. The original style control levers were manufactured from a bronze material, and featured a non-machined chamfer on one side, which mated to the machined chamfer on the throttle and mixture control shafts. Splines formed on the non-machined chamfer of the lever at installation. The control lever style in effect at the time of the SB were manufactured from stainless steel and featured a splined chamfer, which interlocked with the splined chamfer on the throttle and mixture control shafts. The SB provided inspection instructions at every 100-hour or annual inspection. The maintenance technician was to inspect the control lever for looseness, free play on the shaft, and proper installation.

On July 30, 2010, CMI issued revision A for SB08-03, which was effective at the time of the accident. This revision stated that all bronze material control levers must be replaced when removed for any reason. A review of the maintenance logbooks for the airframe and engine did not indicate that the levers had been removed. Part 91 operators are recommended, but not required, to implement service bulletins. COMMUNICATIONSThe pilot was in contact with the Phoenix Deer Valley airport traffic control tower (ATCT). MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATIONThe Maricopa County Medical Examiner completed an autopsy, and determined that the cause of death was smoke inhalation. The FAA Bioaeronautical Science Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, performed toxicological testing of specimens of the pilot.

Analysis of the specimens contained findings of 41 percent for carbon monoxide detected in blood, and no cyanide detected in blood. There was no ethanol detected in vitreous.

The report contained the following findings for tested drugs: 67.87 (ug/ml, ug/g) acetaminophen detected in urine. TESTS AND RESEARCHInvestigators examined the wreckage at Air Transport, Phoenix, on September 29, 2010. A complete report of the airframe and engine examination is in the public docket.

Engine

Investigators slung the engine from a hoist, and removed the top spark plugs. They rotated the crankshaft with a tool in an accessory drive gear. The crankshaft rotated freely through 360 degrees. The valves moved approximately the same amount of lift except for the exhaust valve for cylinder number two, which did not move at all. Cylinder number two sustained crush damage, had missing material, and a broken exhaust rocker arm. Investigators obtained thumb compression on all cylinders except cylinder number two. The fuel pump shaft rotated freely, and the gears in the accessory case turned freely.

A borescope inspec...