N50MC

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On March 20, 2011, about 1234 Pacific daylight time, a Cessna P210N Silver Eagle, N50MC, was substantially damaged when it departed from cruise flight and impacted rocky desert terrain about 2 miles south of Barstow-Daggett Airport (DAG), Daggett, California. The certificated private pilot/co-owner and her two passengers were fatally injured. The personal flight was operated under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91, and was operating on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan from John Wayne Airport-Orange County (SNA), Santa Ana, California, to Henderson Executive Airport (HND), Las Vegas, Nevada. Instrument meteorological conditions existed for portions of the flight route and altitudes.

According to the husband of the pilot, they co-owned the airplane, and they lived and based the airplane in Truckee, California. A few days before the accident, the pilot flew herself and their two children to SNA to visit friends. The accident flight was the first leg of the return trip to Truckee; the pilot had planned the stop at HND as another personal visit.

About 0700 on the morning of the accident, the fixed base operator (FBO) at SNA topped off the main fuel tanks of the airplane, in accordance with the pilot's request. Later that morning, the FBO shuttle van picked up the pilot and children at the main terminal of SNA, and stopped at a local fast food restaurant to obtain meals for the children, before continuing to the FBO. According to the driver of the shuttle, they arrived at the FBO about 1100. The pilot informed the FBO personnel that she had to "check the weather" and take care of other "paperwork" before she could be taken to the airplane, which was parked remotely from the FBO office. At least one FBO employee observed the pilot at the computer in the FBO pilot lounge/computer room. After that, the pilot, her children, and their luggage were driven to the airplane. The driver only observed the initial portion of the loading, and no one from the FBO observed the preflight inspection or departure of the airplane. The driver reported that the pilot was not talkative, and that she told her coworkers that the pilot seemed "kind of sad."

According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) air traffic control (ATC) information, the airplane departed SNA about noon. After departure from SNA, the flight was handled by five different SoCal TRACON (TRAffic CONtrol) sectors/controllers. While climbing through about 9,000 feet above mean sea level (msl) for 11,000 feet, the pilot was advised that there were reports of light rime icing at 11,000 feet, about 10 miles ahead of her. She then requested a higher altitude, and was advised that "the next sector" was "working" on it. About 1217, the flight was handed off to Joshua Approach, and was cleared from 11,000 feet to its cruise altitude of 15,000 feet. Shortly thereafter, the flight was handed off to Los Angeles Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC, referred to as "LA Center"). About 1219, while in communication with the first sector of LA Center, the pilot was advised that she was in an area of moderate precipitation that extended about 10 miles ahead of her. About 1224, the pilot advised that she "broke out" of the clouds at 13,300 feet. About 1229, after she was switched to the next LA Center sector, the pilot was advised that ATC had amended her route, and was asked whether she was ready to copy it. She acknowledged the transmission with "go ahead," and the controller issued the revised routing. After a silence of about 16 seconds, the controller asked if the pilot copied the transmission, and the pilot responded "stand by." About 45 seconds later, the pilot advised that she had encountered moderate turbulence, but was now ready to copy. The controller reissued the revised clearance, the pilot read it back, and that was followed by the controller's query to confirm that the pilot reported moderate turbulence, which she did. About 2 minutes 15 seconds after that, a partial and final transmission was received from the airplane, and ATC lost radar contact with the airplane shortly thereafter.

Several ground-based eyewitnesses in the vicinity of DAG reported that their attention was initially drawn to the airplane by the varying sound of the engine. They reported that they observed the airplane "spiraling" or "spinning" in a vertical trajectory towards the ground, and that they then observed the resulting explosion, fire, and smoke. The first 911 telephone call was received from an eyewitness at 1234. First responders were only able to access the accident site on foot or by all-terrain vehicles. Firefighting vehicles were unable to access the site due to the terrain.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

Pilot

FAA records indicated that the pilot held a private pilot certificate with airplane single-engine and instrument-airplane ratings. On her May 2006 application for an FAA first-class medical certificate, the pilot reported that her flight experience included 290 total hours, and 0 (zero) hours in the 6 months prior to the medical examination. On that application, she reported that she was not taking any medications, and had been hospitalized for two childbirths and one minor surgery. No significant pilot medical issues were identified by the aviation medical examiner (AME) who performed that examination.

In September 2010, the pilot reported a total flight experience of about 930 hours on her airplane insurance application form. Her most recent flight review was completed in the accident airplane in February 2011.

The pilot's personal flight logbook was not recovered; it was presumed lost in the post-impact fire. Her husband estimated that at the time of the accident, the pilot had about 1,000 hours of total flight experience, including about 400 hours in the accident airplane make and model, and about 450 hours of IFR experience. He did not estimate her IFR time in the accident airplane make and model. He stated that they were both pursuing their commercial pilot certificates, and that due to her recent training and flight activity, the pilot was "never more competent and comfortable in the airplane" than she was in the few weeks preceding the accident flight.

According to the husband, the pilot typically hand-flew the airplane for about 10 minutes on each trip; most of the time during any flight the autopilot would be engaged. He said she typically turned it on shortly after takeoff for the climb out, and typically before entering IMC. She was well versed in the programming and usage of the airplane's autoflight capabilities. Prior to departure, the pilot would program the Garmin 530 with the planned flight route, and the airplane would then fly the programmed route/profile. Any in-flight ATC-specified changes would be input into the Garmin 530 by the pilot as she became aware of them. She would hand fly the airplane in "heavy turbulence," and she took turbulence "very, very seriously." Both the pilot and her husband avoided icing conditions as much as possible, and she would not hesitate to mention icing if she was encountering it, and/or request ATC assistance/clearance to escape it.

The husband stated that 15,000 feet was a typical altitude for short trips. They typically seated the children in the aft (5 and 6) seats. They often removed one or both middle (3 and 4) seats; for this trip one of those seats was removed. The children did not use car seats in the airplane. He stated that the pilot was "very comfortable" flying with the children and no other pilot, since they complied with her need to have little or no interference when she requested or required it. The children did not like using headsets, but headsets were available for them, and the children occasionally used them.

The husband reported that neither the pilot nor the children had any known or recent medical issues that could have impacted the flight, and that they were all in "great health" for the trip. He stated that she was not on any medications prior to the flight, and that she rarely took any medications, except possibly an occasional over-the-counter pain reliever.

Prior to the weekend, and in the phone calls that they had over the weekend, the pilot was in a "great mood." However, particularly when flying or getting ready for a flight, she was "all business," which he said could be interpreted as a bad mood by some persons. Her normal radio communications bordered on terse.

Both the husband and the pilot's friend who spent the weekend with her reported that it was a relaxing time, with ample opportunity for rest. The friend, a non-pilot, reported that the pilot was aware that "a storm was coming in" to southern California on the day she was leaving, but the friend left the afternoon before, and therefore, was unaware of the pilot's specific pre-flight activities or preparations. The children's nanny, who accompanied the pilot and children on the flight to SNA, and who spent some of the weekend with the pilot, departed SNA separately from the pilot, and therefore, also was unaware of the pilot's specific pre-flight activities or preparations.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

The pilot was in the left front seat at the time of the accident. The San Bernardino County Medical Examiner’s autopsy report listed the cause of death as "massive blunt force trauma, instantaneous." The FAA Civil Aeronautical Medical Institute (CAMI) conducted toxicological testing on tissue samples (Heart, Kidney, Liver, Lung, Muscle, Spleen) from the pilot; no blood was collected or available for testing. No ethanol was detected in the muscle or liver. The following medications or metabolites were detected in the pilot's tissue samples:

- Dextromethorphan was detected in the liver and kidney. This is an over the counter cough suppressant (contained in Robitussin, Delsym, Sucrets, Bromfed-DM, Tylenol Cold) also found in prescription cough medications.

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