N5897

Substantial
Minor

ATKINS ACRO-SPORT IS/N: 356

Accident Details

Date
Friday, April 12, 2013
NTSB Number
CEN13LA225
Location
Midland, LA
Event ID
20130412X94025
Coordinates
30.150278, -92.483886
Aircraft Damage
Substantial
Highest Injury
Minor
Fatalities
0
Serious Injuries
0
Minor Injuries
1
Uninjured
0
Total Aboard
1

Probable Cause and Findings

The failure of the left elevator torque tube due to poor quality welds by the manufacturer, which resulted in the loss of pitch control.

Aircraft Information

Registration
N5897
Make
ATKINS
Serial Number
356
Engine Type
Reciprocating
Model / ICAO
ACRO-SPORT ISA02
Aircraft Type
Fixed Wing Single Engine
No. of Engines
1

Registered Owner (Historical)

Name
GROSS JAMES R
Address
107 RUE DES AMIS
Status
Deregistered
City
LAFAYETTE
State / Zip Code
LA 70507-2900
Country
United States

Analysis

On April 12, 2013, about 1500 central daylight time, an Atkins Acro-Sport 1 airplane, N5897, was substantially damaged when it impacted terrain 1 mile south of the Le Gros Memorial Airport (3R2), Crowley, Louisiana. The pilot had minor injuries. The airplane was registered to and operated by a private individual under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 without a flight plan. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the personal flight. The local flight originated from 3R2 approximately 1435.According to the pilot, he was practicing aerobatic maneuvers in an aerobatic box near 3R2. The airplane was at 3,000 feet mean sea level when the pilot "pulled aft control stick to start the vertical upline for the shark's tooth aerobatic maneuver." The pilot stated that something in the elevator control system broke and the nose started to fall. The pilot established that he still had aileron and rudder control; however, he was not able to control the pitch of the airplane.

The pilot elected to egress from the airplane, during which he injured his ankle. The pilot parachuted without further incident to a muddy rice field. The airplane crashed into a grass field south of the pilot's location and was substantially damaged during the impact.

A postaccident examination of the flight control system revealed several points of separation along the elevator control tube and elevator torque tube assembly. An examination of the remaining systems revealed no anomalies.

The separated portions of the elevator control tube and elevator torque tube with horns were sent to the Materials Laboratory in Washington, D.C., for further examination. The control tube was fractured through the threaded shank of the rod end fitting. The torque tube components were separated at three locations. The control tube fitting fracture and two of the three fractures in the torque tube exhibited features and deformation patterns consistent with overstress and no evidence of preexisting cracking or corrosion were noted on these fractures.

The remaining fracture in the torque tube was completely contained within the weld bead between the left side tube and the left elevator horn. Magnified examinations of these fracture surfaces, showed large areas of pre-existing weld anomalies including lack of fusion and incomplete joint penetration. Lack of fusion and incomplete joint penetration accounted for large portions of the tube separation area. The remaining separation was consistent with overstress separation except in areas displaying post fracture mechanical damage.

Further examination of the microstructures of the tube and horn were both fine pearlite, typical of normalized alloy steel. The weld fusion zone had a microstructure of predominately ferrite with a small amount of pearlite consistent with a very low carbon steel. The metallographic section also highlighted the lack of fusion and incomplete joint penetration. A metallographic section cut through a random location on the right side elevator horn to torque tube weld also showed incomplete penetration and lack of fusion. Similar to the left side, the microstructure of the tube and horn were fine pearlite consistent with normalized alloy steels while the weld fusion zone was ferrite plus pearlite consistent with low carbon steel.

Data Source

Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# CEN13LA225