N934HA

On May 18, 2013, about 0104 eastern daylight time, a Piedmont Airlines Bombardier DHC-8-102, N934HA, operating as US Airways Express flight 4560, landed with all gear retracted on runway 4L at Newark Liberty International Airport (EWR), Newark, New Jersey. During the initial approach, the left main landing gear (MLG) failed to lower and lock . The flight crew's attempts to lower the left MLG were unsuccessful, and they intentionally landed the airplane with all landing gear retracted. There were no injuries to the 2 pilots, 1 flight attendant, and 31 passengers onboard, and the airplane sustained substantial damage during landing. The flight was operating under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 and originated from Philadelphia International Airport (PHL), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

The flight was the crew's sixth flight on the third day of a planned 4-day trip. The airplane departed PHL at 2252 with the first officer (FO) as the pilot flying (PF). About 2325, the flight was cleared for an instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 4R at EWR. When the crew attempted to lower the landing gear, the left MLG showed a red unsafe indication in the cockpit. The captain received approval from an EWR air traffic control tower controller to perform a "fly-by"; the tower confirmed that the left MLG appeared to be partially extended.

The flight was then issued vectors and cleared to maintain 3,000 ft mean sea level in order to troubleshoot the issue. The captain initiated the alternate landing gear extension checklist but took over as the PF and allowed the FO to run the checklist. The FO read, and the captain confirmed, the steps in the checklist as the FO performed them. The FO stated that when he pulled the main gear release handle, the gear did not extend. When asked by the captain if the checklist was complete, the FO said it was. However, he had not read the notes at the bottom of the checklist, which discussed the use of a hydraulic pump handle and the high force that might be needed on the alternate gear extension handle.

After giving PF duties back to the FO, the captain called company operations and spoke to a maintenance control supervisor, who advised using the hand pump to extend the MLG. The captain and FO again transferred control so the captain was PF, and the FO left his seat to get better leverage on the pump handle and repeatedly attempted to pump the gear down without success. The pilots again transferred control, and the captain left his seat and attempted to operate the pump, also without success. The captain stated he left the cockpit to inspect the MLG from the cabin and observed that the gear doors were open but that the left MLG was not extended.

After a second tower fly-by, the tower again confirmed that the left MLG was not down. At the suggestion of the maintenance control supervisor who was on the radio, the crew reconfigured the alternate gear system to normal, raised all the landing gear, and then re-extended them using the normal system. The left MLG again showed a red unsafe indication. The crew again retracted the landing gear using the normal system. The captain asked the maintenance supervisor to contact the flight duty officer and was told that a company management conference call was in progress and they were discussing the best landing configuration.

At the suggestion of the company maintenance control supervisor, the crew again attempted to lower the gear while applying a positive G force to the airplane. This maneuver was not successful. The captain again asked the supervisor for advice regarding the best emergency landing configuration. The crew made a final attempt to extend the gear normally without success, then retracted the gear and left it retracted for the reminder of the flight.

When the fuel remaining was 900 lbs, the captain decided to make an emergency landing with all landing gear retracted, and the maintenance personnel agreed. The captain made a passenger address announcement, briefed the FO on the planned landing, and called for the emergency landing checklist. In accordance with the checklist, he pulled the B3 GPWS circuit breaker (CB). The captain flew the ILS approach to runway 4L. The FO stated that, during the approach, the landing gear warning horn sounded when the airplane slowed below 130 kts, and the captain maintained a speed above 130 kts to prevent the horn from sounding until the airplane was "close to the runway." After the captain called for the flaps to be selected to 35, the landing gear warning horn continued to sound until after landing. The airplane landed about 3,000 ft down the runway and slid about 2,000 ft, stopping on the runway centerline in a wings-level attitude.

The captain stated that after landing, he observed smoke on the right side of the airplane. He notified the tower they were evacuating and gave a verbal command to the FO and the flight attendant to evacuate using the left main cabin door. The passengers and crew assembled in a grassy area, and no one reported any injuries.

DAMAGE TO AIRPLANE

Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed substantial damage to the underside of the airplane, including fuselage skin abraded in several areas.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The Captain

The captain held an airline transport pilot certificate for airplane multiengine land with type ratings in the BE-1900, BE-300, and DHC-8 and airplane single-engine land with a type rating in the SD-3. He also held commercial pilot certificates for rotorcraft-helicopter and airplane multiengine land with instrument ratings and a private pilot certificate for airplane single-engine land. He was issued a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) first-class medical certificate, dated December 28, 2012, with the limitation that he must have glasses available for near vision. He was wearing his glasses during the event. FAA records indicate that he had no prior accidents, incidents, or enforcements. The captain had been continuously employed by Piedmont (or its predecessor) since June 1988.

According to company records, the captain began a 4-day trip on May 15. The incident took place on the sixth and final leg of the third duty day. On the day of the incident, he began duty at 1255. The captain stated he had received good rest and was not affected by fatigue or other personal issues.

First Officer

The FO held commercial pilot certificates for airplane single-engine and multiengine land with instrument ratings, airplane single-engine sea, and airplane single-engine land and sea with ratings for airplane multiengine land and instrument airplane, and a DHC-8 type rating with second-in-command privileges only. He also held private pilot certificates for airplane single-engine land and airplane single-engine land with an instrument rating. He was issued an FAA first-class medical certificate, dated February 18, 2013, with the limitation that he must wear corrective lenses. At the time of the accident, he was wearing his corrective lenses. FAA records indicate that he had no prior accidents, incidents, or enforcements. The FO stated he had been in his current position as a DHC-8 FO since he was hired by Piedmont in April 2011.

On the day of the accident, he started his duty day at 1255. He had been on duty about 12 hours at the time of the accident. He felt rested when he reported for duty and did not feel that fatigue or other personal issues affected him during the accident flight.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

Airplane Systems

Landing Gear

The DHC-8-100 has a tricycle landing gear normally operated by the No. 2 hydraulic system. The two MLG retract rearward into the respective engine nacelles, and the nose landing gear (NLG) retracts forward into an NLG well. The NLG has two landing gear doors, and each MLG has three landing gear doors that are automatically sequenced during extension and retraction of the gear. Proximity sensors and a proximity switch electronics unit (PSEU) control the sequencing of the gear and gear doors during extension and retraction and provide signals to the gear and gear door advisory lights.

Landing Gear Indication

A landing gear actuation and indication panel is located on the forward engine indication panel. In addition to the landing gear selector lever, the panel has nine landing gear advisory lights, three for each gear. The top three lights are door open advisory lights and illuminate amber when the respective gear door remains open after extension or retraction. The center three lights illuminate green when the respective gear is down and locked. The bottom three lights are gear unsafe advisory lights and illuminate red when the respective gear is not locked up or down. An amber light in the landing gear selector lever illuminates concurrent with red unsafe lights to indicate gear in transit.

Landing Gear Warning Horn

When the airplane is in flight, a landing gear warning horn sounds and cannot be silenced when airspeed is less than 130 kts, power levers are near flight idle, and the gear is not down and locked. If only one power lever is near flight idle, the horn can be silenced by a mute button on the gear actuation panel.

Alternate Gear Extension System

An alternate gear extension system provides for mechanical extension of the landing gear and is intended for in-flight use when hydraulic power from the No. 2 hydraulic system is not available. The alternate system is designed so that the system will always release the gear; there is no back-up system to the alternate release/emergency release system. The system relies on gravity to extend the gear; a hydraulic hand pump is provided to help the MLG fully extend, if necessary. The alternate gear extension controls consist of an alternate release door, MLG extension T-handle, and landing gear down select inhibit switch located in the cockpit ceiling above the FO; an alternate extension panel in the cockpit floor behind...