N715CD

HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn May 16, 2013, about 1120 central daylight time, a Cirrus Design Corp (CDC) SR22, N715CD, airplane ballistic parachute was activated by the pilot during flight near Dallas, Texas, following a loss of control in cruise flight. The parachute pack remained in its compartment, its rocket was deployed, and the rocket propellant was expended. The airplane received no damage. The private pilot was uninjured. The airplane was registered to Jeramiah 2911 Inc and operated by the pilot under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91. Marginal visual flight rules conditions prevailed and the flight was operating on instrument flight rules (IFR) plan for the flight that originated from Addison Airport (ADS), Dallas, Texas, about 1055 and was destined for Independence Municipal Airport (IDP), Independence, Kansas. The flight returned to ADS and landed without further incident.

The pilot said that he did not have any pressure that resulted from any need to arrive at IDP. He said that he received a weather briefing in the morning of the incident day. He delayed his original planned departure time of 1000 for about 45 minutes because he waited for a weather cell to move.

He said that the cloud ceilings were 1,200 feet and he did not remember and did not know the height of the cloud tops. Shortly after takeoff from ADS, he encountered IFR weather conditions. He received radar vectors around the back of a thunderstorm, flying direct to IDP at a cruise altitude of 7,000 feet mean sea level, which was beneath the cloud tops.

He said that he did not remember the altitude at which he engaged the autopilot (AP). He said that the AP was set to the heading mode (HDG), and he switched over to navigation (NAV) mode. The autopilot was not selected to track airspeed and was not selected to GPS steering mode (GPSS). The airplane encountered moderate turbulence, which he said was not unusual, while it was in dark clouds. He said that he felt like he and the airplane were "porpoising"/"bouncing." He was using his seat belt and was not being thrown around in the cockpit, but the airplane was going up and down. He said he experienced a loss of control of the airplane based upon instrument indications, the airplane bouncing, and the horizontal situation indicator (HSI) was spinning in circles. He said there was a horizontal situation indicator (HSI) flux gate excitation failure message, the HSI turned red, the HSI card started turning in circles, and there was an "X" at the bottom of the HSI, which he said meant that heading information was not being received. There were no annunciations, cautions, or warnings, only the flux gate excitation message. There were no problems with the multi-function display (MFD).

The attitude indicator (AI) appeared as if it was caged or stuck and was not moving around as the airplane porpoised. He said that the blue and brown colored segments of the AI formed an "X." The brown portion of the AI was on the bottom, and the blue portion of the AI was on the top. He said that he knew that the airplane was in level flight at the time of this AI indication. The airplane's wet compass was not spinning. When the pilot was asked how he knew that the airplane attitude was not being displayed correctly on the AI, he said that he does not know and it was based on his memory. The pilot did not know whether the AI was electrically or pneumatically powered.

The pilot said he realized that he was "fighting spatial disorientation, he was in over his head and pulled the chute" after he turned the airplane away from a red weather cell off the airplane's right wing because he did not want the airplane to float into that cell. He slowed the airplane from 167 knot to about 120-127 knots by pulling back on the control yoke to pitch up using the altimeter and vertical speed indicators, which were working, as speed/pitch references. He was asked what he used for bank attitude reference so that he would not pitch into a turn; he said he did not know. He had taken his hands off the controls when he activated the parachute. He said that he did not know the pitch attitude because he did not have an instrument to indicate pitch nor did he know the bank attitude of the airplane. The airspeed decreased to 120 knots "pretty quick". He heard the rocket motor fire, but the parachute did not deploy.

He then nosed over the airplane to descend below the cloud ceiling, which he did not know the height of. He was in "hard IMC," getting "knocked around," and was extremely nauseous and sweating profusely. He said he did not trust himself and did not know if he was going to have a heart attack. He preferred to descend the airplane below the cloud ceilings rather than be in this situation. He reduced throttle and lowered pitch to descend below the overcast layer to visual meteorological conditions, which he encountered about 800 feet above ground level. He said that the HSI started working after the airplane exited instrument meteorological conditions. He said that the HSI and AI started working again "shortly" after that exit. He had not reset any of the airplane circuit breakers. He did not climb back into the clouds since he did not trust the airplane instruments. He requested a visual approach to runway 15 at ADS for the flights return because he had not previously flown into Denton Municipal Airport (DTO), Denton, Texas. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONPilot Information

The pilot, age 50, held a private pilot certificate with airplane single-engine and instrument airplane ratings.

The pilot did not have a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) record of previous accidents, incidents, or enforcement actions.

The pilot stated that his total flight experience in N715CD was about 1,425 hours, of which about 136 hours were in actual instrument conditions, and 44 hours were in simulated instrument conditions. He said that he had flown about 400 hours a year, mostly from the Dallas area.

The pilot said that he has used Cirrus Standardized Instructor Pilots for his pilot training and had practiced flying partial panel and using various AP configurations. He said that they would cover up his AI, and have him look away and recover the airplane from unusual attitudes. He was not required by his aircraft insurer to receive annual pilot training due to the number of hours he flies.

Private Pilot Certificate

On November 28, 2001, he passed the private pilot airplane airman knowledge test on his third attempt with a score of 77 percent. The subject matter knowledge codes in which questions were incorrectly answered were:

G11 - Initial Notification of Aircraft Accidents, Incidents, and Overdue Aircraft

H300 - Forces Acting on the Airplane in Flight

H307 - Engine Operation

H308 - Propeller

H312 - The Pitot-Static System and Associated Instruments

H348 - Radio Navigation

I22 - Atmospheric Pressure and Altimetry

I56 - Pilot and Radar Reports, Satellite Pictures, and Radiosonde Additional Data (RADATs)

J08 - Controlled Airspace

J13 - Airport Operations

J27 - Wake Turbulence

J37 - Sectional Chart

On February, 28, 2002, he was issued a private pilot certificate with a single-engine land rating, after passing the practical test for the certificate on his first attempt using a Cessna 150. At the time of the test, the pilot reported a total time of 66 hours, all of which were in Cessna 150 airplanes.

Instrument Airplane Rating

The pilot said that he received instrument training that was 5 ½ - 6 weeks in duration at ATA Flight School, Miami, Florida. He said they attempted to fly IFR [IMC], if it was available, during training. He flew with his primary instrument instructor about two years ago using the incident airplane. During that training, they had an emergency while 13,000 feet and 100 miles from shore over the Atlantic where they lost the alternator and later landed without incident. The pilot said that his primary instrument flight instructor told him that he was cool under pressure, and the instructor also said that he knew guys in the military that would have not been that cool under pressure.

The pilot's primary instrument instructor stated that the pilot's instrument training began January 7, 2011 and was about a month in duration. Training consisted of about 30-40 hours of ground instruction and about 24 flights. He said the training was not "quick and dirty," and the flights were in excess of one hour. He said the pilot received partial panel instrument instruction, which he had to demonstrate during his instrument check ride. The flight instructor's flight experience in Cirrus airplanes was a "couple of hours" and "not many." The flight instructor did not have any experience in the Sandel avionics system, and he had another instructor, who was Cirrus certified, come in to provide instruction on the Sandel system for several hours to the pilot. The pilot's instrument instructor said that the pilot was a "good" and "cautious" instrument pilot and "very confident."

On January 30, 2011, the pilot passed the instrument airplane rating airman knowledge test on his first attempt with a score of 73 percent. The subject matter knowledge codes in which questions were incorrectly answered were:

PLT052 - Interpret information on a Departure Procedure Chart

PLT058 - Interpret information on a Low Altitude Chart

PLT083 - Interpret information on an Instrument Approach Procedures

PLT088 - Interpret speed indicator readings

PLT091 - Interpret VOR / ADF / NDB / CDI / RMI - illustrations / indications / procedures,

PLT102 - Recall aeronautical charts - terminal procedures

PLT128 - Recall aircraft performance - effects of icing

PLT141 - Recall airport operations - markings/signs/lighting

PLT161 - Recall airspace classes - limits/requirements/restrictions/airspeeds/equipment

PLT274 - Recall icing - formation / characteristics

PLT296 - Recall instrument procedures – holding/circling

PLT300 - Recall i...