N59JK

Substantial
Minor

CESSNA 188BS/N: 18801041

Accident Details

Date
Wednesday, September 4, 2013
NTSB Number
ERA13LA410
Location
Woodrow, SC
Event ID
20130910X93340
Coordinates
34.094722, -80.377777
Aircraft Damage
Substantial
Highest Injury
Minor
Fatalities
0
Serious Injuries
0
Minor Injuries
1
Uninjured
0
Total Aboard
1

Probable Cause and Findings

A failure of the right rudder pedal arm due to corrosion as a result of inadequate maintenance and inspection of the rudder pedal assembly.

Aircraft Information

Registration
N59JK
Make
CESSNA
Serial Number
18801041
Engine Type
Reciprocating
Year Built
1973
Model / ICAO
188BC188
Aircraft Type
Fixed Wing Single Engine
No. of Engines
1

Registered Owner (Historical)

Name
SALE REPORTED
Address
ROD.GO-070 KM 03 LT 118
Status
Deregistered
City
GOIANIA GO
Country
United States

Analysis

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On September 4, 2013, about 1835 eastern daylight time, a Cessna 188B, N59JK, operated by Hopkins Flying Service was substantially damaged during landing roll, after a flight control malfunction, at a private airport in Woodrow, South Carolina. The commercial pilot received minor injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the aerial application flight conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 137.

According to the pilot, he was spraying a cotton field near Lydia, South Carolina when he completed a pass and at the end of the field, pulled up to turn to the right. During the climb he applied right rudder as usual but this time, the right rudder pedal assembly broke off, and went up against the back of the hopper tank.

The pilot then decided to return to a private airport where the airplane was based in Woodrow, South Carolina as it was larger than the other spray strips in the area. Upon arrival at the airport, he flew over the top and used his cell phone to call and let personnel at the field know he would be landing without rudder control.

The landing was uneventful, but during the landing roll, the airplane began to turn left. The pilot however had no way to correct for the left turn. The airplane then exited the left side of the runway and entered a soybean field. The right main landing gear then collapsed, and the the right wing impacted the ground.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and pilot records, the pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with a rating for airplane single-engine land. His most recent FAA second-class medical certificate was issued on January 30, 2013. He reported that he had accrued 2,249 total hours of flight experience, of which, 1,392 hours were in the accident airplane make and model.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The accident aircraft was a single seat, strut braced, low wing monoplane specifically designed by the manufacturer for aerial application use. The tail cone and empennage assemblies were of semi-monocoque construction. From the tailcone forward, a welded, tubular-steel structure was incorporated, which was covered with aluminum skin panels. It was equipped with a liquid dispersal system, which included a fiber glass reinforced plastic hopper which was located immediately forward of the cockpit, and a conventionally configured heavy duty landing gear system, which consisted of chrome-vanadium steel main landing gear springs, and a spring-steel tubular tail wheel spring, with a steerable tailwheel. It was powered by a normal aspirated, 230 horsepower, six-cylinder, horizontally opposed, air cooled, engine.

The interior of the airplane was internally corrosion-proofed, and the external finish was acid resistant.

According to FAA and maintenance records the airplane was manufactured in 1973.

On April 27, 1973, the airplane was sold by the Cessna Aircraft Company to an operator in Montana and was registered as N21796.

On July 24 1973, the airplane was sold to an operator in Canada, and was removed from the United States Civil Aircraft Registry and registered in Canada as C-FFZI.

On July 12, 1982 the airplane was involved in an accident during landing which damaged the landing gear, one of the wings, and the vertical stabilizer.

On March 24, 1994 it was sold to an operator in Colorado, and reinstated on the United States Civil Registry as N59JK.

On July 16, 1997, the airplane was modified by the installation of Aeronautical Testing Service, Inc. vortex generators on the wings and "Split Flaps" on the lower trailing edge of the inboard stub wing.

On April 2, 2008, it was sold by the operator in Colorado and over the next year was operated by a succession of operators.

On September 14, 2009, it was purchased by Hopkins Flying Service.

On April 7, 2013 a Knisley Welding aftermarket modified exhaust system was installed.

On April 7, 2013, the airplane received its most recent annual inspection.

At the time of the accident, the airplane had accrued 5,393.2 total hours of operation.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

The recorded weather at Shaw Air Force Base (SSC), Sumter, South Carolina, located 8 nautical miles southwest of the accident site, at 1858, included: winds 330 at 4 knots, 10 miles visibility, few clouds at 5,500 feet, broken clouds at 10,000 feet, temperature 31 degrees C, dew point 19 degrees C, and an altimeter setting of 29.99 inches of mercury.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

Examination of the wreckage revealed that the right wing and landing gear structure was substantially damaged.

Examination of the right rudder pedal arm and right rudder bar were constructed of steel tubing. Further examination revealed the presence of a plug in the top of the tubing which made up the right rudder pedal arm. This plug appeared to be made of a flexible material similar to silicone sealant. The left rudder pedal arm also contained a plug of this same silicone like material. Both the right rudder pedal arm, and the right rudder bar exhibited significant amounts of corrosion, and it was discovered that, the right rudder pedal arm had fractured just above its mounting location on the right rudder bar.

SURVIVAL FACTORS

The pilot who was not wearing a helmet received minor injuries during the accident when his shoulder came into contact with the right side of the cockpit.

The cockpit was surrounded by a welded tubular steel structure and featured an emergency door release system to aid in egress, and a fire extinguisher. Cockpit seals and two cockpit pressurization scoops helped to lessen the possibility of contamination of the pilot by chemicals. The instrument panel crash pad was covered in ¼ inch black Ensolite, and urethane bumper pads were bonded to the tubular steel structure above the cockpit door, down the corner doorposts, across the tubular structure behind the pilots head, and across the lower door seal.

Wire cutter blades were installed on the landing gear struts and in front of the cockpit windshield. A steel deflector cable was installed between the top of the cockpit canopy and the top of the vertical tail.

The pilot restraint system consisted of seat belts and a double-strap shoulder harness. The lower ends of the harness were permanently attached to the seatbelt.

According to Cessna Single Engine Service Bulletin SEB96-9, Service experience indicated that the seat belt and shoulder harness assembly could become worn, frayed and/or deteriorated. To assist in maintaining optimum seat belt and shoulder harness performance and to minimize the potential for failure of the pilot restraint system, the service bulletin required that the seat belt and shoulder harness assembly should be inspected and replaced at specific intervals.

This service bulletin required that some seat belt and shoulder harnesses be replaced before flight and some within 100 hours or six months, however, ultimately all the existing seat belt and shoulder harness restraint systems should have been replaced within one year.

For airplanes equipped with a four point seat belt and shoulder harness restraint system such as the accident airplane, an initial inspection was required and then an operational inspection was to be accomplished within the next 50 hours of operation or 3 months whichever occurred first.

Repetitive inspections were then required which included an operational inspection 50 hours of operation after the initial inspection or a seat belt and shoulder harness replacement.

The replacement of the seat belt and shoulder harness with a five point restraint system was then required before the next flight, for harnesses that failed an operational inspection, or within the next 12 months, for seat belt and shoulder harnesses that passed the initial operational inspection.

Examination of the seat belts and double strap shoulder harness in the airplane revealed however, that they were manufactured in 1972. They displayed areas of broken stitching, wear, fading, and furthermore, graying, which indicated that they were also deteriorating due to exposure to sunlight and ultra violet rays.

TESTS AND RESEARCH

Rudder, Brakes, and Tail Wheel

The primary flight control surfaces (ailerons, elevator, and rudder) were controlled by a conventional control stick and rudder pedal arrangement.

The rudder system consisted of individual rudder pedal assemblies, with return springs, rudder, rudder bellcrank, cables, and pulleys.

The hydraulic brakes on the main wheels were conventionally operated by applying toe pressure to the top of the rudder pedals, with the rotation of the pedals actuating the brake master cylinders, which would result in braking action on the main wheels.

The tailwheel steering was controlled through the tailwheel steering arms by cables and bellcranks attached to the rudder control cables. Tailwheel steering of 24 degrees left and right was available, and for tighter turns, application of toe pressure on either rudder pedal would cause the tailwheel to free swivel, enabling the airplane to be pivoted around the wheel being braked. The tailwheel was also equipped with an anti-swivel locking system which could be engaged by the pilot to limit steering to 2.5 degrees left and right.

Examination of the rudder system, brake system, and tailwheel steering systems revealed that with the right rudder pedal arm separated from the right rudder pedal bar, that right rudder, right brake, and right tailwheel steering, would not have been available.

Interior Care

According to the Cessna 188 Owner's Manual, care of the interior of the airplane was as important as the care of the exterior. The primary factors to be considered being cleanliness of the cockpit area and freedom from dirt and corrosion throughout the entire airframe, advising that "Some dirt and toxic chemicals will find its way into the fuselage through long periods of use; these hazards must b...

Data Source

Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# ERA13LA410