UNREG

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On September 29, 2013, at 1109 eastern daylight time, an unregistered Mosquito XEL Helicopter was substantially damaged during landing at Lazy Springs Recreation Park, Felda, Florida. The non-certificated pilot was seriously injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the local personal flight, which was operated under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91.

According to a witness, the pilot liked to fly the helicopter whenever he had a chance. On the day of the accident, the pilot had trailered the helicopter into the park to do some flying in the local area. The takeoff was uneventful, but instead of the pilot going out, and flying around the area for 30 to 45 minutes which was his usual habit, approximately 10 minutes later he returned and attempted to land. As the helicopter was approximately 30 feet from touchdown it seemed to be "unstable" and began to oscillate from side to side. The pilot then aborted the landing and flew off for a few minutes, and then returned. This time as the helicopter was once again about 30 feet from touchdown, it began spinning to the left and impacted the ground. A postcrash fire then ensued. The pilot was pulled out of the wreckage by the witness and another person, and was later airlifted to a hospital.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The pilot did not hold any type of pilot certificate or rating for rotor wing aircraft. He had attended a basic helicopter orientation course which consisted of 24 hours of ground instruction and 10 hours of flight instruction in a Schweizer 300C which was designed to familiarize the course attendees with safety procedures, guidelines, aerodynamic forces, forces in flight, flight control systems, safety of flight, hazards of helicopter flight, basic navigation, aviation physiology, federal aviation regulations, aeronautical decision making, and pilot judgment.

Review of pilot records also revealed that he had received instruction prior to the course in a Robinson R22, and that he had received 14 CFR Part 61, Special Federal Aviation Regulation Number 73 (SFAR 73) required ground training which required that before a pilot could manipulate the flight controls of a Robinson R22 or R44 Helicopter, they must be trained in energy management, low rotor rpm which could lead to a low rotor rpm stall, and low or negative G, which could lead to mast bumping.

Further review of pilot records also indicated that he had received approximately 20 hours of dual instruction and at the time of the accident, he had accrued approximately 40 total hours of flight time.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The helicopter was of conventional composite and metal construction. The airframe was made of fiberglass in a vinylester matrix. It was powered by a 60 horsepower, two cycle, two cylinder engine, equipped with a 180-watt alternator which provided power to run the helicopters electrical system.

The drive train's primary reduction was bolted directly to the engine. A centrifugal clutch on the engine crankshaft permitted startup of the engine without a load from the rotor system. Power was transmitted from the clutch to the driven pulley of the reduction through a cogged belt. The driven pulley housed a sprag clutch which would permit the rotor to overspeed the engine during autorotation.

Review of the helicopter manufacturer's records revealed that the helicopter was manufactured in 2012 and had been equipped with floats. It weighed 314 pounds which would allow it to be operated under 14 CFR Part 103 ultralight regulations however, the pilot had changed the configuration of the helicopter by removing the floats, and adding an engine governor which rendered it ineligible for operation under Part 103 and placed it into the experimental category. This would have required the pilot to possess a private pilot certificate, the helicopter to be registered with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and an airworthiness inspection to be performed by an FAA designated airworthiness representative prior to the first flight, as described in FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 20-27F, "Certification and Operation of Amateur Built Aircraft."

At the time of the accident the helicopter and engine had accrued approximately 20 hours of total operating time.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

The recorded weather at Southwest Florida International Airport (RSW), located approximately 17 nautical miles west of the accident site, at 1053, included: winds from 070 degrees at 10 knots, 10 miles visibility, sky clear, temperature 28 degrees C, dew point 21 degrees C, and an altimeter setting of 29.98 inches of mercury.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

Examination of the accident site and wreckage revealed that the helicopter came to rest on a 15- degree embankment on the edge of a 27 acre lake, on a magnetic heading of 095 degrees. The majority of the helicopter including the cabin, seat, floor panel, and tail boom sections were consumed by the postcrash fire.

The rotor head showed marks consistent with mast bumping. The control mechanism was connected and moved freely. The swash plate was consumed by post-crash fire.

Rotor blade "A" was delaminated and thermal damaged from the blade root to 5 feet outboard. The rotor blade was still connected to the rotor hub. There was no chord or span wise scratching on the blade. The pitch change rod was connected and the pitch change horn was bent about 15- degrees upward. The spindle moved freely.

Rotor blade" B" was consumed by post-crash fire, delaminated, and was separated from the spar 13 inches outboard the blade root. There was no chord or span wise scratching. The blade root was still connected to the spindle, which moved freely. The pitch horn was bent about 45- degrees upward and the pitch rod connector was fractured in a manner consistent with tension overload.

The No. 3 sprocket was connected to the secondary drive system. The coupler connecting the lower shaft to the splitter gear box was consumed by post-crash fire. There was drive belt residue on the main rotor No. 3 and No.4 sprockets.

Engine continuity was not verified due to thermal damage to the engine accessories and the main engine casing. Three motor mounts were present, with the fourth motor mount retaining bolt having been sheared off. Two motor mount retaining bolts on the torque side of the engine were also bent. Both engine carburetors were consumed by the post-crash fire, and were unrecognizable. The muffler was attached to the engine and was unremarkable. The primary drive belt was attached to the No. 1 and No. 2 sprockets, and was thermal damaged.

Control continuity from the flight control pedals to the tail rotor pitch links was verified. Control continuity from the cyclic and collective control was not verified due to consumption of the mechanisms from the post-crash fire.

The tail rotor blades were connected to their respective pitch links, and were moved freely through their range of travel. The tail rotor gear box, pitch links, and control rods were thermal damaged. The tail rotor blades were free of chord or span wise scratching.

The splitter gear box was thermal damaged and the jaw couplers were unremarkable. The dampener in between the couplers was consumed by the post-crash fire. From the splitter gear box to six feet aft of the splitter gear box, the tail rotor drive shaft was either melted or thermal damaged. The three internal carrier bearings were present and thermal damaged. From the tail rotor gear box to a point located 22 ½ inches forward, a fracture of the tail rotor drive shaft, consistent with bending overload and thermal damage was present.

The right landing skid was thermal damaged, and otherwise unremarkable. The left landing skid was thermal damaged on the rear left side. The forward cross bow was thermal damaged but remained connected to the "T" fittings. The forward cross cable was thermal damaged and connected to the cross bow. The rear cross bow was thermal damaged and fractured 14 inches upward from the left side of the "T" fitting. The fracture was consistent with bending overload. The rear cross cable was connected to the left side and disconnected on the right side due to thermal damage. The left, right, front, and rear cables, were thermal damaged, and connected to the rear cross bow. Both cables were disconnected from their respective front mounts as a result of the post-crash fire.

SURVIVAL FACTORS INFORMATION

The occupant restraint system consisted of a lap belt only. Examination of the restraint system revealed that the lap belt was latched. No shoulder harness or anti-dive strap was installed. Review of the seat design also indicated that it was not of an energy absorbing design.

TESTS AND RESEARCH

During an interview with a friend of the pilot the friend advised that approximately 2 months prior to the accident flight, he observed the pilot have a loss of control with the helicopter similar to what happened on the accident flight when after lifting off and flying around for about 15 minutes he came back in to land. At approximately 30 feet above ground level, the helicopter rapidly spun three times to the left. The pilot then gained altitude, regained control, and flew away from the landing site for a few minutes. The pilot then checked the controls and then came in and landed without incident. When the pilot's friend asked him what happened, the pilot advised him that after the helicopter started spinning to the left, he shut off the automatic throttle governor and was able to recover.

Engine Governor and Engine Management System

Examination the engine governor and engine management system could not be accomplished as the majority of the system had been consumed by the postcrash fire.

Review of information provided by the manufacturer of the engine governor and engine management system revealed that it was composed of a servo module, a sy...