Accident Details
Probable Cause and Findings
The pilot's failure to properly set the left engine fuel selector before takeoff and to recognize the incorrect setting during the flight, which resulted in fuel starvation and a loss of engine power on both engines.
Aircraft Information
Registered Owner (Historical)
Analysis
HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn January 2, 2015, about 1755 central standard time, a Piper PA-34-200T, N81291, was substantially damaged when it impacted trees and terrain during a forced landing near Kuttawa, Kentucky. The commercial pilot, and three passengers were fatally injured, and another passenger was seriously injured. Night instrument meteorological conditions prevailed and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed for the personal flight which was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. The flight departed Tallahassee Regional Airport (TLH), Tallahassee, Florida, around 1500, with the intended destination of Mount Vernon Airport (MVN), Mount Vernon, Illinois.
According to the flight plan filed by the pilot, the proposed departure time was 1500, the estimated time en route was 3 hours and 12 minutes, and the airplane's estimated fuel endurance was 4 hours and 50 minutes.
According to global positioning system (GPS) data, earlier in the day, the pilot performed a flight in the accident airplane that originated from Key West International Airport (EYW), Key West, Florida, around 1145 and terminated at TLH at 1425. According to a fuel receipt from EYW, the pilot had the airport linemen "top all tanks," prior to the departure at 1145. Then, according to a fuel receipt from TLH, the airplane received 67.7 gallons of 100LL aviation fuel prior to departing on the accident flight. In addition, an airport lineman stated that the airplane fuel tanks were "top[ped] off" at that time.
According to air traffic control information provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the airplane was about 6,000 feet mean sea level (msl) when the pilot contacted air traffic control at 1750, and requested vectors to the nearest airport reporting visual flight rules (VFR) weather conditions due to "problems" with both engines. The controller advised him that Kentucky Dam State Park Airport (M34) was 11 miles west of his position, at 349 feet elevation. The pilot announced he had the airport in sight, and that the airplane's right engine had stopped producing power. The controller then cleared the airplane for a visual approach. The pilot acknowledged the clearance, advised that he had lost sight of the airport, asked for the airport common traffic advisory frequency, and then stated both engines were malfunctioning. There were no further radio communications from the airplane.
At 1755, after several attempts to contact the airplane, the controller advised that radar contact was lost. The airplane was last observed descending through 2,700 feet msl approximately 10 miles east of M34. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONAccording to FAA records, the pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land, multiengine land, and instrument airplane. In addition, the pilot held a flight instructor certificate for airplane single-engine land, multiengine land, and instrument airplane. His most recent third-class medical certificate was issued on February 4, 2014. At that time, the pilot reported 2,300 hours of total flight experience, which included 50 hours during the previous 6 months. His personal flight logbook was not located.
According to a flight log found at the accident scene, the pilot recorded approximately 14.5 total hours of flight time in the accident airplane since April 10, 2014, which did not include the flights on the day of the accident.
In an interview with local law enforcement, the surviving passenger mentioned that the airplane she customarily rode in with the pilot was in maintenance, and that the accident airplane was not the airplane typically flown by the pilot. The pilot owned and operated a PA-31-350, which was the airplane he "primarily flew." In addition, a local mechanic stated that the pilot only flew the accident airplane a "handful of times" prior to the accident flight. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONAccording to FAA records, the airplane was manufactured in 1979 and was registered to a corporation on October 29, 2012. It was powered by two Continental Motors Inc. TSIO-360-series, 210- horsepower engines, that were each equipped with a two-bladed Hartzell controllable pitch propeller. The airplane's most recent annual inspection was performed on March 16, 2014, at 7573.4 total aircraft hours.
According to the airplane pilot operating handbook (POH), the airplane was equipped with a total fuel capacity of 128 gallons, of which 5 gallons were unusable. Each wing had two fuel tanks that were interconnected and functioned as a single tank. The fuel tanks on each side were filled through a single filler port in the outboard wing tank. As fuel was consumed from the inboard tank, it was replenished by fuel from the outboard tank.
Fuel management controls were located on the console between the front seats. There was a control lever for each engine that was placarded "ON"-"OFF"-"X FEED." During normal operation, the levers were placed in the "ON" position, and each engine drew fuel from the tanks on the same side as the engine. The two fuel systems were interconnected by crossfeed lines. When the "X FEED" (crossfeed) position was selected, the engine would draw fuel from the tanks on the opposite side in order to extend range and keep fuel weight balanced during single-engine operation. The "OFF" position shut off the fuel flow from the selected side.
Section 4 "Normal Procedures" of the POH stated that during taxi, the pilot was to "check the operation of the fuel management controls by moving each fuel selector to CROSSFEED for a short time, while the other selector is in the ON position. Return the selectors to the ON position. DO NOT attempt a takeoff with the fuel selector on CROSSFEED."
A note in the fuel system description section of the POH stated, "Do not take off with a selector in 'X FEED.'" METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONAccording to Lockheed-Martin Flight Service, no services were provided to the airplane on the day of the accident. The pilot filed his IFR flight plan with an online commercial vendor prior to departure, but there was no evidence that he obtained a weather briefing at that time.
Review of weather data revealed IFR conditions were forecast along the entire route of flight. In addition, airman's meteorological information (AIRMET) advisories for IFR, icing, and mountain obscuration conditions were in effect around the time of the accident. There were several pilot reports of in-flight icing conditions above 14,500 feet with no significant reports of turbulence or icing conditions below that level.
At 1753, the weather conditions reported at Barkley Regional Airport (PAH), 29 miles west of the accident site, at 410 feet elevation included an overcast ceiling at 600 feet and 6 statute miles visibility in mist. The wind was from 060 degrees at 6 knots, the temperature and dew point were 3 degrees C, and the altimeter setting was 30.22 inches of mercury. Rain began at 1725 and ended at 1747.
At 1755, the weather reported at Kyle-Oakley Field Airport (CEY), Murray, Kentucky, 21 nautical miles south of the accident site, at 576 feet elevation included broken ceilings at 600 feet, 5,000 feet and 10,000 feet with 7statute miles visibility. The temperature was 3 degrees C, the dew point was 3 degrees C, and the altimeter setting was 30.21 inches of mercury. AIRPORT INFORMATIONAccording to FAA records, the airplane was manufactured in 1979 and was registered to a corporation on October 29, 2012. It was powered by two Continental Motors Inc. TSIO-360-series, 210- horsepower engines, that were each equipped with a two-bladed Hartzell controllable pitch propeller. The airplane's most recent annual inspection was performed on March 16, 2014, at 7573.4 total aircraft hours.
According to the airplane pilot operating handbook (POH), the airplane was equipped with a total fuel capacity of 128 gallons, of which 5 gallons were unusable. Each wing had two fuel tanks that were interconnected and functioned as a single tank. The fuel tanks on each side were filled through a single filler port in the outboard wing tank. As fuel was consumed from the inboard tank, it was replenished by fuel from the outboard tank.
Fuel management controls were located on the console between the front seats. There was a control lever for each engine that was placarded "ON"-"OFF"-"X FEED." During normal operation, the levers were placed in the "ON" position, and each engine drew fuel from the tanks on the same side as the engine. The two fuel systems were interconnected by crossfeed lines. When the "X FEED" (crossfeed) position was selected, the engine would draw fuel from the tanks on the opposite side in order to extend range and keep fuel weight balanced during single-engine operation. The "OFF" position shut off the fuel flow from the selected side.
Section 4 "Normal Procedures" of the POH stated that during taxi, the pilot was to "check the operation of the fuel management controls by moving each fuel selector to CROSSFEED for a short time, while the other selector is in the ON position. Return the selectors to the ON position. DO NOT attempt a takeoff with the fuel selector on CROSSFEED."
A note in the fuel system description section of the POH stated, "Do not take off with a selector in 'X FEED.'" WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONThe wreckage was examined at the accident site on January 4, 2015. The airplane impacted trees in a wooded area, about 8 miles east of M34. There was a strong odor of fuel, and all major components of the airplane were accounted for at the scene. The wreckage path was oriented 228 degrees, was approximately 300 feet in length, and at an elevation of 480 feet.
The airplane came to rest inverted with the landing gear retracted. The fuselage and empennage were largely intact, but heavily damaged by impact. All fuel tanks were compromised during the accident and evidence of a small postcrash fire was observed at the right wing out...
Data Source
Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# ERA15FA088