N221LM

Substantial
None

SHORT BROS SD3 60S/N: SH3722

Accident Details

Date
Tuesday, June 30, 2015
NTSB Number
WPR15LA202
Location
Kapolei, HI
Event ID
20150630X71019
Coordinates
21.307222, -158.070281
Aircraft Damage
Substantial
Highest Injury
None
Fatalities
0
Serious Injuries
0
Minor Injuries
0
Uninjured
2
Total Aboard
2

Probable Cause and Findings

The pilots’ failure to extend the landing gear before landing. Contributing to the accident was the pilots’ failure to complete the Before Landing checklist.

Aircraft Information

Registration
Make
SHORT BROS
Serial Number
SH3722
Engine Type
Turbo-prop
Year Built
1987
Model / ICAO
SD3 60SH36
Aircraft Type
Fixed Wing Multi Engine
No. of Engines
2
Seats
39
FAA Model
SD3-60

Registered Owner (Current)

Name
TRANS EXECUTIVE AIRLINES OF HAWAII INC
Address
PO BOX 29239
City
HONOLULU
State / Zip Code
HI 96820-1639
Country
United States

Analysis

On June 29, 2015, about 1944 Hawaiian standard time, a Short Bros SD3-60, N221LM, sustained substantial damage following a gear up landing at the Kalaeloa Airport [John Rogers Field] (JRK) Kapolei, Hawaii. The airplane was registered to and operated by Trans Executive Airlines of Hawaii Inc., under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. The airline transport pilot and commercial pilot, the only occupants of the airplane, were not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed for the flight check flight which originated from Honolulu International Airport, Honolulu, Hawaii at about 1850.

The flight was a scheduled flight check for the first officer. The crew reported that prior to landing, they thought they had completed the Before Landing checklist. One of the checklist items was to extend the landing gear and ensure it was down. During the landing roll, about a few hundred feet after touchdown, and as the airplane's nose was lowered, the forward bottom section of the fuselage, made contact with the runway surface. The airplane had a tricycle landing gear that used a fully retractable nose gear and a partially retractable main gear. Once the airplane came to a stop, the crew safely egressed.

Examination of the airplane wreckage by a Federal Aviation Administration Inspector revealed that the underside of the fuselage, near the nose wheel, sustained damage. Further assessment of the damage by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), determined that there was structural damage. An operation check of the airplane's landing gear revealed no anomalies.

The captain completed his flight review on November 11, 2014 and had logged 20,230 hours of total flight time. 6,011 hours were logged in the accident make and model of airplane. The first officer completed his flight review on May 16, 2015 and had reported that he had 272 hours of total flight time. 29 hours were logged in the accident make and model of airplane.

During interviews with the NTSB, investigator-in-charge, the flight crew reported that they flew several approaches and landings at JRK. When the accident occurred, it was during their last approach and landing, which upon completion, they had intended on departing JRK. During this approach and landing, the flight crew stated that they landed with the landing gear inadvertently retracted.

According to the flight crew, the warning horn to advise them that the landing gear was not extended, did not activate on final, since they were flying a partial flap approach. According to the airplane's technical information, during a partial flap approach, the airplane's warning horn is designed to activate only when either power lever is pulled back to the flight idle position. The power required to maintain airspeed on the partial flap approach can be more than flight idle position and therefore the landing gear warning horn would not activate.

The flight crew reported no major distractions during the approach and said that they were not rushed. During their last traffic pattern at JRK, the captain communicated with the Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT) on downwind, to receive their clearance back to their originating airport.

Data Source

Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# WPR15LA202