N11VQ

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On January 17, 2016, about 1432 Hawaii standard time (HST), an Airbus EC130 T2, N11VQ, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Hanalei, Hawaii. The commercial pilot and six passengers were seriously injured. The helicopter was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 air tour flight.

The pilot reported that, about 25 minutes after departure for the sightseeing flight, the helicopter was about 1/4-mile offshore northwest of the Honopu Sea Arch between 1,300 ft and 1,400 ft mean sea level (msl) when he heard the low rotor rpm aural warning horn. He immediately entered an autorotation, turned toward the beach, and transmitted over the radio that he had an engine failure. As the helicopter approached the shoreline, he made a sharp, low-level right turn to the south to avoid large boulders in his intended landing area and subsequently landed hard on the beach. He applied the rotor brake to slow the rotor and noted that the engine was not running. The passengers began to exit the helicopter and he pulled the engine fuel cutoff.

The first indication of an inflight loss of power was an uncommanded right yaw that occurred at 14:31:31. The first limit indicator (FLI) on the instrument console started to drop rapidly, followed by the GENE (generator) annunciator light illumination. The helicopter entered a 20° right turn toward the coastline. Five seconds later, the ENG P (engine oil pressure) annunciator light illuminated, followed by the FUEL P (fuel pressure) light and the helicopter returned to a nearly-level flight attitude. About 10 seconds later, the helicopter was passing through 600 ft at 85 knots. Rotor rpm had increased to 430. After about 11 seconds, the coastline became discernable and revealed a rocky, unsuitable landing area. The helicopter's altitude was about 350 ft and the rotor speed was 364 rpm. At 14:32:08, the helicopter had entered a 45° right bank, altitude was 275 ft, airspeed was zero, and the helicopter was maneuvering toward a sandy beach area. About 3 seconds later, the LIMIT (servo limit) light illuminated, the helicopter entered a near-level pitch attitude, airspeed was near zero, and rotor speed was around 200 rpm. Initial ground impact was at 14:32:13 and the rotorcraft was at rest at 14:32:15.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The single-engine helicopter was configured for air tours with 6 passenger seats and a single pilot seat, and equipped with a skid mounted emergency flotation system. The pilot occupied the left front seat. Review of maintenance records showed that the helicopter was maintained in accordance with an FAA-approved aircraft inspection program (AAIP) which can differ from the maintenance program recommended by the manufacturer. The Hobbs meter read 692.7 hours immediately after the accident. The helicopter was equipped with an Appareo Vision 1000 flight data recorder and a Datatoys AirKnight HD4s video recorder system that had hard-mounted internal and external cameras for recording the tour for the customer.

The rotorcraft flight manual listed the maximum gross weight of the helicopter as 5,512 lbs. Information provided by the operator indicated that the helicopter departed on the accident flight with a takeoff weight of 5,284 lbs. The helicopter would have consumed about 170 lbs (26 gal) of fuel during the flight.

FLIGHT RECORDERS

The helicopter had two flight recorder systems installed, an Appareo Vision 1000 small self-contained image, audio, and data recorder, and a Datatoys AirKnight HD4s airborne video recorder designed for helicopter tour applications.

Data from both systems was recovered and reviewed by the NTSB Vehicle Recorders Laboratory.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The helicopter landed hard onto Kalalau Beach, along the north shore of Kauai. While on the beach, sea water washed over the landing skids and cabin deck of the helicopter. The operator transported the helicopter from the landing site to their maintenance hangar in Lihue, Kauai. On January 25, 2016, technical representatives from Safran Helicopter Engines (Safran HE) and Airbus Helicopters under the oversight of an FAA inspector examined the helicopter at the hangar. During the examination, the engine's main fuel injection pipe between the fuel valve assembly and the injection union was found cracked and broken at the B-nut connection. A black, oily substance was observed around the interface between the engine magnetic seal and the starter-generator. The airframe sustained structural damage to the tail boom and cockpit floor. The engine, starter-generator, vehicle and engine management display (VEMD), digital engine condrol unit (DECU), and engine data recorder (EDR) were removed for further examination at the manufacturer's facility. The fractured fuel pipe was sent to the NTSB Materials Laboratory.

On May 11, 2016, the NTSB investigator-in-charge (IIC) and technical representatives from Blue Hawaiian Helicopters, Air Methods Corporation (DBA Blue Hawaiian Helicopters), Airbus Helicopter and Zodiac Aerospace, examined the helicopter wreckage at the Lihue hangar. The tail skid was bent up into bottom of the fenestron and the bottom of the fairing displayed a 20-inch crack in the longitudinal direction. The tail boom was symmetrically buckled on the left and right sides at the intermediate structure attach point and had significant buckling at the bottom. The rear fenestron drive shaft support bracket displayed a slight buckle. The engine deck was slightly buckled aft of the rear engine support. Plastic deformation of the engine support in the aft direction was observed. The right transmission bay, transmission support rod, and lower rod end rivets had sheared along the support tube axis. The main gear box (MGB) right support rod was deflected 24 mm at the largest point (mid span). The right cargo bay had no noticeable buckling of the X-wall. The crashworthy fuel tank displayed no deformation or leaking of fuel. The cockpit center console's forward upper mount plate was buckled on the right side. The left MGB support rod rivet heads were sheared. The left cargo bay displayed buckling of the X-wall at the lower aft corner. The left firewall had buckled along the lower edge. There were two areas of slightly buckled skin indentations on the fuselage transition area. The helicopter sat with a 5° list to the right.

The seats were documented and then removed from the helicopter. The seats were manufactured by Zodiac Seats France (ZSFR), part numbers 19820-02-00 (front, referred to as T198) and 28410-0400 (rear, referred to as T284). The helicopter cabin was scanned using a 3D handheld laser, and all the seats were laser scanned. Pitch & roll angles were similar for all the seats. Seat foam and upholstery had manufacturing labels from Aero Comfort Company, the seat labels did not display a technical standard order (TSO) compliance number. No external impacts to any of the seats was observed. All seat equipment was installed correctly, according to Airbus and Zodiac technical representatives.

The following table documents the postaccident configuration of each seat. The stroke is the measured downward displacement of the seat as a result of vertical accelerations, and the fuses are metal links that release once a specified amount vertical force is experienced allowing the seat to stroke downwards (Note: Seat No. 3 is used in some configurations, but was not installed in the accident helicopter).

Table 1 - Seat displacement measurements.

SURVIVAL FACTORS

Injuries

Six of the seven helicopter occupants were diagnosed on the day of the accident with thoracolumbar compression fractures. The seventh was diagnosed several weeks later. With the exception of the occupant of seat No. 1 (who became paraplegic), the occupants remained neurologically intact. The occupants in seat Nos. 2 and 7 had fractures at multiple vertebral levels. The occupants in seat Nos. 1 and 2 both had sternal fractures.

Helicopter Seat Design

Both T198 and T284 seats consisted of a composite bucket affixed to a structural frame composing both the seat legs and seatback supports. The seatback supports contained energy absorbing features in order to meet the requirements referred to in 14 CFR sections 27.785, 27.561, and 27.562. Corrugated absorption devices and fuses were built into either side of seatback supports (total of two in each seat) to absorb energy in event of high vertical loading. The composite seat bucket was affixed to the seat frame on a set of tracks via two "bucket fixings" and plastic bushings (rollers). When subjected to high vertical loads, these features allowed the bucket to move downwards while the absorption devices deformed (i.e. stretched) and absorbed vertical energy. The undeformed dimension of the absorption devices was 10.7cm. Additionally, the seat foam and upholstery are considered part of the seat design and certification (SFR ETSO C127a).

Zodiac Seats France reported to the BEA (Bureau d'Enquetes et d'Analyses pour la securitie de l'aviation civile) that the two models of seats installed in the helicopter were certified to Europe TSO C127a for dynamic conditions of a 30g downward test with the seat pitched upwards at 60°, and an 18.4g forward dynamic test both using a 170-pound anthropomorphic test device .

Immediately before takeoff, the internal camera video recorded the passengers' seating position and the visible harness buckle location on those individuals. The helicopter seat designated numbers are as follows; the pilot seat in the front left, seat Nos. 1 and 2 were front center and right, respectively; seat Nos. 4, 5, 6, and 7 were the rear seats numbered right to left, sequentially. The pilot's harness lap belt was positioned below his waist and low across his hips. The harness buckle position on the passenger in seat No. 1 was positioned about mid abdomen. The seat No. ...