N107SB

Substantial
Fatal

Evolution RevoS/N: 000608

Accident Details

Date
Tuesday, February 16, 2016
NTSB Number
WPR16LA071
Location
Buckeye, AZ
Event ID
20160216X81446
Coordinates
33.420555, -112.686111
Aircraft Damage
Substantial
Highest Injury
Fatal
Fatalities
1
Serious Injuries
0
Minor Injuries
0
Uninjured
0
Total Aboard
1

Probable Cause and Findings

The pilot's improper decision to operate the high-performance aircraft despite warnings from a flight instructor that he did not have the experience to operate the aircraft that had different and more sensitive handling characteristics than the low-performance weight-shift-control aircraft that he was used to flying, which led to his improper control inputs and resulted in his loss of aircraft control and ground impact immediately after takeoff.

Aircraft Information

Registration
N107SB
Make
EVOLUTION
Serial Number
000608
Engine Type
Reciprocating
Year Built
2015
Model / ICAO
RevoVM1
Aircraft Type
Fixed Wing Single Engine
No. of Engines
1

Registered Owner (Historical)

Name
BOHUS STEVE JR
Address
3563 N 296TH DR
Status
Deregistered
City
BUCKEYE
State / Zip Code
AZ 85396-3113
Country
United States

Analysis

HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn February 16, 2016, about 1452 Mountain standard time, an Evolution Revo special light sport weight-shift control "trike," N107SB, impacted terrain shortly after takeoff from Buckeye Municipal airport (BXK), Buckeye, Arizona. The pilot, who was the sole person on board, received fatal injuries, and the aircraft was substantially damaged. The personal flight was conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) flight plan was filed for the flight.

According to the owner of the aircraft, the pilot was referred to him by the Evolution president, because the pilot was interested in purchasing a Revo, and he was planning a trip to the Phoenix area. The pilot made contact with the owner, and appealed to him to be allowed to fly the aircraft. Based on the pilot's credentials, the owner eventually agreed to let the pilot fly the aircraft. The evening prior to the accident, the owner (acting as pilot in command) took the accident pilot (as a passenger) on an uneventful flight in the aircraft. On the day of the accident, both individuals conducted the preflight inspection, with no anomalies noted.

The pilot reportedly planned to conduct a solo flight, and then return for an unspecified passenger. According to the owner, the takeoff roll on runway 17 was normal, but shortly after breaking ground, the wing went to the "full flare" position, which he explained to mean that the wing was at the full wing leading edge up position. The wing remained in that position, and the aircraft climbed rapidly and steeply, but then appeared to stall, at an altitude estimated by witnesses to be less than about 100 above ground level. The aircraft then turned, rolled, to the right, and descended rapidly to the ground in a nose-down attitude. The aircraft was equipped with a Ballistic Recovery System brand rocket propelled parachute, but the device was not activated by the pilot.

The wreckage was examined on site by FAA inspectors, and was recovered to a secure location for subsequent examination. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONCertificate Information

According to FAA records, the pilot held a commercial certificate with airplane single engine land, multi-engine land, and instrument airplane ratings, and "sport endorsements" for gyroplane and powered parachutes. He also held flight instructor certificate with airplane single- and multi-engine land, and instrument airplane ratings, and "sport endorsements" for gyroplane and powered parachutes. The pilot's most recent valid FAA medical certificate was obtained in 2004. On that medical certificate application, the pilot reported a total flight experience of 4,500 hours.

Weight Shift Control (WSC) Aircraft Experience

The pilot obtained all of his weight shift control (WSC) experience and instruction in the two weeks prior to the accident. According to the certified flight instructor (CFI) who provided nearly all that instruction, the pilot was referred to him by the owner of the accident aircraft. The pilot first met and flew with the CFI on February 6, 2016 at BXK; the CFI had flown his Northwing Navajo WSC aircraft to BXK for an airshow/exhibit there. The following week, the pilot traveled to Boulder City, Nevada to complete his training, and obtain his WSC pilot- and instructor- certificates.

The pilot accrued a total time of 9.5 hours with that CFI, and then 2 hours with another CFI, before taking his flight checks with the original CFI on February 12, 2016. At the completion of his WSC pilot and instructor flight checks, the pilot had accrued a total WSC aircraft flight experience time of 13.5 hours. All flights were conducted in the Navajo, and none of the flights were solo. Both CFIs were complementary regarding the pilot's skills.

Because the pilot was interested in purchasing a Revo, on multiple occasions he asked the CFI about the Revo. The CFI strongly discouraged the pilot from flying a Revo until he had more WSC aircraft experience, and then also obtained specific instruction in that aircraft. The CFI advised the pilot that he (the pilot) was "not qualified" to fly the Revo at this point in his experience/training level – his primary reason was that the Revo was a much more "sensitive" aircraft than the Navajo. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONFAA information indicated that the aircraft was manufactured in 2015, and was equipped with a Rotax 912-IS series engine. The aircraft was purchased new by the current owner in early 2015. He reported that the airframe and engine had each accumulated a total time in service of about 69 hours.

The two primary elements of the aircraft were the carriage and the wing. The carriage was a steel tube assembly with composite fairings. The instrument panel, tandem seats, landing gear and engine were all integral to the carriage. The primary pilot station was the front seat; the rear seat had no instruments and access to only a few controls. The primary flight controls consisted of horizontal, transversely-mounted control bar situated just ahead of the pilot, and attached to the wing. The pitch and roll/yaw control inputs were exactly the reverse of those of conventional airplanes; pushing the control bar forward would climb the WSC aircraft (and vice versa) while moving the control bar left would result in the WSC aircraft turning to the right (and vice versa).

The engine was situated behind the rear seat in a pusher-type arrangement. The engine was electronically controlled and fuel-injected. The installed electronic engine control unit (ECU) was equipped to record certain engine parameters during operation. The engine drove a 2 blade composite propeller, and its rated output was 100 hp.

The wing was a fabric-covered aluminum tube assembly which attached to the carriage by a mast. The mast attached behind the rear seat into a "pivot block" which allowed the wing to change its pitch orientation with regard to the carriage. On the ground, the wing was free to move through a range of pitch and roll attitudes, while the carriage remained in a stationary attitude. In flight, the carriage was suspended by the mast, and stabilized at an attitude determined by center of gravity and airloads. The wing attitude and angle of attack could be varied by the pilot's inputs on the control bar.

The aircraft was equipped with a pitch trim system which was used for cruise flight, in order to neutralize the forces required by the pilot on the control bar. There was no means to visually detect the trim setting, and there was no specific trim setting or range for takeoff or landing. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONThe BXK 1455 automated weather observation included winds from 130 degrees at 8 knots, visibility 10 miles, clear skies, temperature 27 degrees C, dew point minus 2 degrees C, and an altimeter setting of 29.93 inches of mercury. AIRPORT INFORMATIONFAA information indicated that the aircraft was manufactured in 2015, and was equipped with a Rotax 912-IS series engine. The aircraft was purchased new by the current owner in early 2015. He reported that the airframe and engine had each accumulated a total time in service of about 69 hours.

The two primary elements of the aircraft were the carriage and the wing. The carriage was a steel tube assembly with composite fairings. The instrument panel, tandem seats, landing gear and engine were all integral to the carriage. The primary pilot station was the front seat; the rear seat had no instruments and access to only a few controls. The primary flight controls consisted of horizontal, transversely-mounted control bar situated just ahead of the pilot, and attached to the wing. The pitch and roll/yaw control inputs were exactly the reverse of those of conventional airplanes; pushing the control bar forward would climb the WSC aircraft (and vice versa) while moving the control bar left would result in the WSC aircraft turning to the right (and vice versa).

The engine was situated behind the rear seat in a pusher-type arrangement. The engine was electronically controlled and fuel-injected. The installed electronic engine control unit (ECU) was equipped to record certain engine parameters during operation. The engine drove a 2 blade composite propeller, and its rated output was 100 hp.

The wing was a fabric-covered aluminum tube assembly which attached to the carriage by a mast. The mast attached behind the rear seat into a "pivot block" which allowed the wing to change its pitch orientation with regard to the carriage. On the ground, the wing was free to move through a range of pitch and roll attitudes, while the carriage remained in a stationary attitude. In flight, the carriage was suspended by the mast, and stabilized at an attitude determined by center of gravity and airloads. The wing attitude and angle of attack could be varied by the pilot's inputs on the control bar.

The aircraft was equipped with a pitch trim system which was used for cruise flight, in order to neutralize the forces required by the pilot on the control bar. There was no means to visually detect the trim setting, and there was no specific trim setting or range for takeoff or landing. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONOn-scene documentation provided by the Buckeye Police Department and the airport manager indicated that the aircraft left a series of near-continuous ground scars, first in the form of a tire skid mark on the runway, followed by earth-scoring and gouging, to the final location of the wreckage. The overall length of these ground scars was about 340 feet, and their track was oriented approximately 20 degrees divergent right (west) from the runway 17 alignment.

The first tire skid mark began about 25 feet west of the runway centerline, and terminated near the runway edge. Ground scars, at first consistent with the aircraft wingtips, and further along the path, consistent with other portions of the aircraft, continu...

Data Source

Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# WPR16LA071