Accident Details
Probable Cause and Findings
A hard landing on rough terrain due to a faulty deployment of the airplane’s airframe parachute system following a partial loss of engine power for reasons that could not be determined, because postaccident examination revealed no malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Contributing to the accident was the low altitude deployment of the parachute system.
Aircraft Information
Registered Owner (Current)
Analysis
HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn June 18, 2016, about 1411 mountain daylight time, a Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 airplane, N678Z, descended under the canopy of the cirrus airframe parachute system (CAPS) and impacted terrain near Colorado Springs, Colorado, following an inflight loss of engine power. The pilot, a safety pilot in the right seat, and a pilot rated rear-seated passenger sustained minor injuries. The airplane sustained substantial damage during the impact. The airplane was registered to N678Z LLC and was operated by the pilot under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as an instructional flight. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed in the area of the accident and the flight was not operated on a flight plan. The local flight originated about 1345 from the City of Colorado Springs Municipal Airport (COS), near Colorado Springs, Colorado.
The pilot of the accident airplane reported that he was participating in a Cirrus Owners and Pilots Association flying clinic. He departed from COS with two passengers to conduct training in a local practice area located about 15 miles east of COS. The pilot stated that after 20 minutes of air work, at approximately 8,500 feet above mean sea level (msl), he noticed a roughness in the engine and that the oil pressure reading indicated within the green arc but lower than normal. The engine continued to run rough and lose power. Air traffic controllers were advised that the flight was headed back to COS with an engine problem. He said that with the reduced engine power available, the airplane began losing altitude and airspeed. The pilot determined the flight could not make a landing at COS, which was about 11 nautical miles west of the airplane's position, or Meadow Lake Airport, which was about 6 nautical miles north. He indicated that no suitable landing areas were identified and he pulled the CAPS handle. The CAPS rocket fired and separated from its lanyard. The parachute subsequently deployed. The airplane impacted the ground in a nose down attitude. The impact occurred with the aft harness in a snubbed position, prior to tail drop. The airplane subsequently stabilized upright on its main landing gear.
The safety pilot seated in the front right seat of the accident airplane, reported that he flew the accident airplane earlier in the morning during the demonstration phase of training and noted no issues or anomalies with the accident airplane. He indicated that his purpose during the flight was to demonstrate and teach formation-flying techniques. He reported that after a preflight brief he held an additional briefing emphasizing that the airplane owner would be the pilot-in-command and is responsible for all emergencies as he, as a safety pilot, was not familiar with the owner's equipment.
According to the safety pilot, the rear seated passenger noticed the oil light illuminated before the takeoff run when the engine was at idle. However, the light went off during the engine run up so he did not think it was a problem. The safety pilot related that he had observed his oil pressure light illuminated while at idle numerous times with a warm engine.
The safety pilot indicated that the takeoff, rendezvous, and initial formation training were normal. As a wingman, the pilot is usually unaware of the flight's location, altitude, or airspeed. Additionally, he said that a wingman's attention revolves around the lead airplane where you do not have time to monitor engine instrumentation. The safety pilot said, "If you have never flown as a wingman you just don't understand how much you have to trust your plane while keeping your eyes on lead AT ALL TIMES. I even commented on this during the initial 4-hour brief - if you have a weak engine don't fly. When there is a lead change it takes a moment for you to figure out where you are."
The safety pilot reported that this loss of engine power during the flight was extremely subtle. At no time did he notice any indications out of normal parameters. The pilot mentioned his oil pressure looked low at 27 psi. The safety pilot asked what was normal but the pilot did not know. The safety pilot stated that the oil pressure and all other engine indications were within their respective green arcs, showing normal engine parameters. The accident airplane had fallen behind the lead airplane and was five plane lengths away on his right wing. The safety pilot said that a slow "pinging" about every 10 - 15 seconds started and that is when the pilot elected to return to the airport. The formation flew as briefed where the accident airplane took over as the lead airplane. The pilot informed air traffic control of engine problem. An intermediate engine power setting was set and all of the engine indications remained within their green arcs. The safety pilot reported that the pinging interval started to decrease and that the engine did not sputter.
An air traffic controller advised the flight of bearings and distances to three nearby airfields. The safety pilot stated that with the remaining altitude, they immediately knew they could not reach any of them. He noticed and told the pilot the airspeed was low with an indication of 100 knots while the airplane was at 7,100 feet msl. The pilot told him that the throttle was full forward. The safety pilot immediately transmitted a Mayday call and advised the pilot to deploy the CAPS.
The safety pilot reported that the pilot in command would pull the CAPS unless incapacitated, as briefed during preflight briefing. According to the safety pilot, the pilot's previous and overriding training habit kicked as he looked for a place to land. The pilot verified with the safety pilot that he intended to deploy the CAPS and pulled the CAPS handle at the safety pilot's second request. The airplane's altitude was 7,000 feet msl and its indicated airspeed was 80 knots. The handle came out and down. However, it took a strong second pull to get the rocket to fire. The safety pilot estimated that the CAPS deployment occurred about 800 feet above ground level (agl).
The safety pilot said that there was a huge deceleration after the CAPS deployment. There was a moment of weightlessness and then the airplane pitched nose down. The safety pilot, in part, said:
All I saw was the ground rushing up rapidly. ... We violently impacted
nose down. I screamed in pain. It felt as if I was stabbed in my neck
and lower back, all on the left side. It took a few seconds to access my
condition. Wiggle fingers and toes, move head, etc. When I realized I
was alive I looked over at [the pilot]. It initially looked like he was
slumped over to the left but then observed him move with purpose. He
stated his door was jammed, grabbed the hammer and started
whacking away at the forward part of his door window. [The rear
seated passenger] ... told me to try my door. It opened, I crawled out
and went to move the seat forward but [the rear seated passenger] had
already slithered out so I went down the wing.
The safety pilot flying in the other formation airplane, in part, said:
I observed N678Z deploy CAPS, and informed Approach that I saw a
"good chute". I did not look at the altimeter, but I recall thinking that
we were very low. N678Z struck the ground within just a few seconds,
in a nose-low attitude that I estimate at about 80 degrees. A large dust
cloud was raised; the impact appeared violent to me, and I was not
sure that it was survivable by any of the occupants.
The passenger in the rear seat of the accident airplane helped the accident pilot egress out of the right-side door. The safety pilot in the accident airplane reported that first responders helped deflate and wrap up the chute. After that, his neck started hurting again. The three occupants were subsequently transported to a hospital to be evaluated. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONThe 64-year-old pilot held a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) commercial pilot certificate with an airplane single engine land and instrument ratings. He held a flight instructor certificate for single engine airplanes. He also held a third-class medical certificate that was issued on June 1, 2016, with a limitation that he must wear corrective lenses. The pilot reported that he had accumulated 1,289 hours of total flight time and accumulated 30 hours in the same make and model as the accident airplane. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONN678Z, a 2002 model Cirrus Design Corporation SR22, serial number 0311, was a four-place single engine low-wing airplane powered by a six-cylinder, Continental Motors model IO-550-N engine with serial number 686307, that drove a three-bladed Hartzell constant speed propeller. According to airplane logbook entries, an annual inspection was completed on November 13, 2015. The airplane accumulated 787.9 hours of total flight time at the time of that inspection. Another entry indicated that a Forced Aeromotive Technologies, Inc. (FAT) supercharger was installed on the engine on June 11, 2016, and the airplane accumulated 817.6 hours of total flight time at the time of that installation.
According to technical information from the supercharger manufacturer's website, the supercharger is belt driven off the accessory drive, similar to the alternator. The supercharger will run much cooler than a turbocharger and should result in much lower maintenance costs. It will add 7 to 8,000 feet of altitude performance to the Cirrus SR-22. The supercharger's impeller speed is a function of engine RPM and therefore over-speed and bootstrapping are not operational considerations. There are no manifold pressure fluctuations while adjusting the throttle, or mixture. Additionally, according to the manufacturer, after landing idle cool down periods are not necessary and the manifold pressure is limited to 29.60 inches at full engine power.
Engine manifold pressure is maintained automatically by an electronic boost controller designed for the SR22 by FAT. The controller reacts to ...
Data Source
Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# CEN16LA223