N155CL

HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn April 4, 2017, about 0908 eastern daylight time, an experimental Pipistrel Virus SW motorglider, N155CL, was destroyed when it impacted terrain in Micanopy, Florida. The airline transport pilot was fatally injured. The motorglider was privately owned and operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed for the flight, which departed Sebring Regional Airport (SEF), Sebring, Florida, at 0800, destined for Oconee County Regional Airport (CEU), Clemson, South Carolina.

Radar data provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) revealed that the motorglider was on a northerly track from SEF about 8,000 ft mean sea level (msl). At 0842, the pilot contacted the Jacksonville approach control facility and asked for pilot reports and information about the line of weather about 60 nautical miles to the north along his route. The controller described the location and movement of areas of "heavy to extreme precipitation" and offered to provide vectors through the area of least precipitation when the pilot neared the line of weather. The pilot inquired about the height of the cloud bases in the area of the weather, and the controller advised of a pilot report about 30 minutes old that indicated cloud bases at 10,000 ft. The pilot acknowledged, and said, "if things turn south I'll just go to Ocala." The controller confirmed that Ocala International Airport (OCF), located about 20 miles south of the line of weather, would be the pilot's alternate destination.

About 10 minutes later, the controller provided a heading of 320° to avoid an area of extreme precipitation about 30 miles ahead of the motorglider and advised the pilot to expect that heading for about 35 miles before proceeding back on course, which the pilot acknowledged. About 5 minutes later, at 0857, as the motorglider was passing OCF, the pilot asked the controller if the weather around which he was currently deviating was south of OCF. The controller stated that the "heavy and extreme precipitation" was over and extending south of Gainesville Regional Airport (GNV, about 31 nautical miles north of OCF), was moving east and that there was "a hole" behind it about 25 miles west of GNV, which she was vectoring the pilot toward. She then provided a new heading of 310° and advised the pilot to expect to remain on that heading for about 25 miles, then to expect a northeast turn "through the precip." The pilot acknowledged.

At 0902, the controller issued the pilot a 10° left turn to avoid an area of "heavy to extreme precipitation." The pilot asked the controller to confirm that the turn was to the left, and advised that he saw an area about 40° to the right that looked like he get could get "through there." The controller asked the pilot if he would like to remain on radar vectors or to deviate as necessary on his own to navigate around the weather. After the controller explained that her display did not present the altitude of the precipitation or any "buildups," the pilot chose to navigate on his own.

At 0906, the controller asked the pilot, "how's it looking?" The pilot responded, "so far its uh, its pretty much smooth, there's some lightning off to my right and uh [unintelligible] it's gonna be okay." The controller acknowledged, and the pilot continued, "I did just go into the clouds though, so I can't pick anymore." The controller acknowledged. There were no further radio transmissions from the pilot. At 0907:28, the controller began a series of attempts to contact the pilot but was unsuccessful. At 0908:36, she advised that radar contact was lost.

A witness located at his residence about 200 yards from the accident site reported that he had been outside in the pasture when it started to rain. He went inside his house and 3 to 5 minutes later, he heard an airplane engine. He indicated that the engine sound was smooth and continuous and sounded as though the aircraft flew over his house. The engine noise abruptly stopped, followed by "a loud pop sound, similar to a lightning crack." He looked outside and saw the motorglider in the pasture and asked his wife to call 911.

Radar returns from the motorglider ended at the edge of an east-west oriented line of severe thunderstorms, rain showers, and lightning that extended about 100 nautical miles to either side of the motorglider's radar flight track, according to National Weather Service (NWS) weather radar data. (See figure 1.)

Figure 1 - KJAX WSR-88D reflectivity for the 0.5° elevation scan initiated at 0911 EDT PERSONNEL INFORMATIONAccording FAA records, the pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate with a rating for multiengine land, with private pilot privileges for airplane single-engine land, airplane single-engine sea, and glider. His most recent FAA third-class medical certificate was issued October 28, 2013; on the application for that certificate, he reported 12,100 total hours of flight experience. A review of the pilot's logbook revealed that he had accrued 92 total hours of flight experience in the accident aircraft as of April 2, 2017. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONThe accident aircraft was a two-seat, high-wing motorglider with a T-tail empennage and fixed, tricycle landing gear configuration. It was powered by a 100-horsepower Rotax 912 ULS engine driving a three-bladed composite propeller.

The flight manual stated:

Due to flight safety reasons, it is forbidden to:

fly according to instrument flight rules or in instrument meteorological conditions

fly in heavy rainfalls

fly during thunderstorm activity

According to the flight manual, the Virus SW was certified as a "Microlight/Ultralight aircraft." According to an FAA Advisory Circular, this model met criteria to be registered as a "glider" (which includes powered gliders) based on its maximum weight, seating capacity, and wing loading; because it was registered as a glider, the pilot was not required to have a valid medical certificate. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONAt 0853, the reported weather at GNV, about 15 nautical miles north of the accident site, included thunderstorms, moderate rain, mist, and wind from 100° at 10 knots gusting to 18 knots. The ceiling was broken at 4,300 ft above ground level (agl) and overcast at 7,500 ft agl. Visibility was 5 statute miles, the temperature was 19°C, and the dew point was 18°C. A peak wind gust to 30 knots was observed at 0803.

Weather radar imagery and lightning data depicted heavy to extreme echoes (precipitation) at the accident location with convective cells and lightning. The echoes were consistent with the possibility of hail, extreme turbulence, and strong surface wind gusts. Radar velocity data indicated winds conducive to rotation above the accident site at the time of the accident, with the potential for tornadic activity at the surface. The area of heavy to extreme precipitation stretched across the entire width of northern Florida between 0845 and 0915.

The National Weather Service (NWS) Aviation Weather Center issued convective SIGMETs for the accident site and surrounding area as early as 0555. One SIGMET issued at 0755 warned of severe thunderstorms with tops above 45,000 ft msl and wind gusts up to 50 knots. The NWS also issued a severe thunderstorm warning at 0900 and a tornado warning at 0910 for areas including the accident location.

A post-accident upper air model sounding was created for the accident site. The model indicated a conditionally unstable environment that would have been supportive of cloud formation, rain showers, and thunderstorms.

The pilot received several official weather briefings in text format from Lockheed Martin Flight Service, the Direct Access User Terminal Service, and Leidos on the day before and the morning of the accident. These materials included the standard weather conditions and forecasts as well as the active SIGMETS and severe thunderstorm warnings valid along the route of flight.

The motorglider was equipped with an electronic display that had the capability to receive and display NEXRAD radar images through the Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B) radio system. Whether the pilot had activated or was using this feature could not be determined.

A detailed Meteorology Factual Report is available in the public docket. AIRPORT INFORMATIONThe accident aircraft was a two-seat, high-wing motorglider with a T-tail empennage and fixed, tricycle landing gear configuration. It was powered by a 100-horsepower Rotax 912 ULS engine driving a three-bladed composite propeller.

The flight manual stated:

Due to flight safety reasons, it is forbidden to:

fly according to instrument flight rules or in instrument meteorological conditions

fly in heavy rainfalls

fly during thunderstorm activity

According to the flight manual, the Virus SW was certified as a "Microlight/Ultralight aircraft." According to an FAA Advisory Circular, this model met criteria to be registered as a "glider" (which includes powered gliders) based on its maximum weight, seating capacity, and wing loading; because it was registered as a glider, the pilot was not required to have a valid medical certificate. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONThe motorglider impacted a grass pasture in an approximate 90° nose-down attitude. All major components were accounted for at the scene, except the left wing and flaperon and one of the propeller blades. The main wreckage was fragmented and confined to an area about 75 ft in diameter, a majority of which was within a wingspan to either side of the engine. The empennage was separated from the aft fuselage. The rudder and horizontal stabilizer were separated from the vertical stabilizer. Flight control continuity was established from the rudder pedals to the rudder control horn, which was separated from the rudder. Flaperon and elevator control continuity could not be confirmed due to...