N334AC

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On May 5, 2017, about 0651 eastern daylight time (EDT), Air Cargo Carriers (ACC) flight 1260, a Shorts SD3-30, N334AC, crashed during an attempt to land on runway 5 at Charleston Yeager International Airport (CRW), Charleston, West Virginia. The captain and first officer died, and the airplane was destroyed. The flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135 as a scheduled cargo flight from Louisville International Airport (SDF), Louisville, Kentucky. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.

The accident flight departed SDF about 0541 on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan and climbed to the assigned en route altitude of 9,000 ft. No irregularities or operational issues were reported during the takeoff and en route portion of the flight. The flight crew had received automatic terminal information service (ATIS) information "November," which broadcast the 0554 weather observation for CRW, indicating a wind from 080° at 11 knots, 10 miles visibility, scattered clouds at 700 ft above ground level (agl), and a broken ceiling at 1,300 ft agl. A special weather observation was issued about 0630 indicating, among other information, an overcast layer at 500 ft and a remark of valley fog; however, the ATIS wasn't updated to include the new weather observation, and the CRW approach controller did not provide the 0630 special weather observation to the flight crew after the first officer made initial contact about 0637 (see Meteorological Information for more information about the weather observations).

About 0637, the first officer contacted the CRW approach controller who provided the altimeter setting and told the flight crew to expect the localizer approach to runway 5 (which has a minimum descent altitude [MDA] of 1,320 ft mean sea level [msl] or about 373 ft above airport elevation with a minimum visibility of 5,500 ft runway visual range). The first officer acknowledged the instruction and requested the VOR-A circling instrument approach (which has an MDA of 1,600 ft msl and minimum visibility of 1 mile). The approach controller approved the first officer's request. The approach controller then cleared the flight direct to the first waypoint (HVQ) of CRW's very-high frequency omnidirectional radio range/distance measuring equipment (VOR/DME) navigation aid and to descend to 4,000 ft. At this time, the airplane was at 9,000 ft about 38 miles west of CRW and approximately aligned with the VOR-A approach course.

About 0642, the approach controller advised the flight crew that the airplane was 12 miles from HVQ and issued an instruction to cross the VOR at or above 3,000 ft (the minimum crossing altitude), then stated "cleared VOR-A approach runway 5." The first officer acknowledged this instruction. About 0646, the approach controller instructed the flight crew to contact the CRW tower controller, which the first officer acknowledged.

About 0646, the first officer contacted the CRW tower, initially stating that the flight was on a visual approach then corrected herself to indicate the VOR-A approach. The CRW tower controller acknowledged this transmission and provided wind information based on his direct readout display, indicating wind from 200º and speed of 5 knots, then cleared the flight to land on runway 5. At 0646:55, the airplane crossed HVQ at an altitude of 2,900 feet msl and continued to descend.

At 0647:29, when the airplane was at 2,200 ft and about 11 miles from the runway, the CRW tower controller issued a low-altitude alert to the flight crew in response to an automated visual and aural alarm in the tower. The first officer responded that the airplane's altitude was showing 2,200 ft and that they were "getting down" to 1,600 ft, which was consistent with radar information (aircraft equipped with DME, such as the accident airplane, can descend to an MDA of 1,600 ft msl after crossing the second waypoint of the VOR-A approach, FOGAG; the airplane had not yet reached FOGAG at this time). The CRW tower controller responded that the alarm may have been falsely triggered by the airplane's descent rate, which the National Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) radar performance study suggests was between 1,300 and 2,000 fpm. No further communications occurred between ATC and the accident flight crew.

At 0648:25, radar data indicated the airplane reached an altitude of 1,600 feet msl and leveled off about 2 miles before FOGAG. At 0650:18, radar data indicated the airplane began a descent from 1,600 ft at a calibrated airspeed of 124 knots about 0.5 mile west of the runway 5 displaced threshold. The NTSB's radar performance study of the accident flight calculated the airplane's descent rate about 2,500 ft per minute during the final approach to the runway. Nearby security cameras captured the airplane's final approach and descent to runway 5 as it emerged from the cloud bases about 1,600 ft msl. A ground eyewitness, also a pilot, corroborated that the airplane was "hugging the bases" less than a mile west of the airport.

The video and radar performance studies and witness marks on the runway indicate the airplane crossed over the runway 5 centerline in a steep left bank up to 42º. The descent rate reduced to about 600 fpm just before impact. At 0650:47, the airplane impacted the runway 5 centerline in a 22º left bank and 5º nose-down attitude with indications of increasing pitch, at an airspeed of about 92 knots, and on a north-northeasterly heading.

Video information and witness marks were consistent with the airplane's left wingtip striking the pavement first, followed by the left main landing gear and left propeller. The fuselage impacted the pavement and the left wing separated from the airplane during the impact sequence. The airplane slid off the left side of the runway through the grass safety area and down a hill through trees, coming to rest about 380 feet left of the runway centerline and 85 ft below the runway elevation.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

Captain

The 47-year-old captain resided in Charleston, West Virginia. His date of hire with ACC was July 1, 2015. Before working for ACC, the captain worked as a "bush" pilot with several cargo and passenger operators in Alaska. Friends of the captain reported that he slept "a lot" but did not appear to have a lack of energy. He wore a continuous positive airway pressure (CPAP) machine when he slept to treat diagnosed obstructive sleep apnea. According to his girlfriend, he occasionally drank alcohol on weekends and ate well. The captain was overweight and was attempting to lose weight by playing sports several times a week. No history of illicit drug use or alcohol abuse was reported.

The captain was current and qualified under ACC and FAA requirements. He held an airline transport pilot (ATP) certificate issued July 25, 2016. The captain held a current first-class medical certificate with a limitation to have glasses available for near vision. Records indicated he had 4,368.5 hours total flight experience, with 3,970 hours as pilot-in-command (PIC). He had 1,094.1 hours total flight experience in the SD-3-30, with 578.8 hours as PIC. A review of FAA records found no incidents or accidents. A review of the FAA's complete airman file for the captain found several notices of disapproval going back to 1999. Most recently, during the ATP certificate checkride, on July 22, 2016, the captain received a notice of disapproval due to excessive deflection of both the glideslope and localizer for an instrument landing system approach, repeated glideslope and sink rate warnings from the ground proximity warning system, and his subsequent failure to initiate a go-around. He passed the practical reexamination 3 days later.

Historical ATC data (between January and April 2017) of three VOR-A approaches to CRW flown by the captain indicated that the captain descended below the MDA while still in instrument conditions in all three instances. A friend of the first officer mentioned an occasion when the first officer texted that the captain flew at low altitude in hilly terrain while trying to resolve a problem with the landing gear not retracting. Another friend of the first officer reported that she and other ACC personnel had observed that the captain's IFR skills "were not strong." The same friend reported that the first officer indicated during a phone call that the captain had difficulty staying on heading, speed, and course when flying in IMC. She also told him about an occasion when the captain lost situation awareness during a missed approach and almost hit a mountain. The friend indicated that the first officer was hesitant to speak up and believed it was due to her being new and wanting to avoid any hostility while being paired with the captain although she didn't say so.

First Officer

The first officer was 33 years old and resided in Charleston, West Virginia. She began ground school and training with ACC in September 2016, and it was her first professional pilot job. Before working for ACC, the first officer was a flight attendant with Republic Airlines. According to family, the first officer was "pursuing a dream" and had always wanted to be a pilot. Friends and family of the first officer stated she was positive, healthy, and very adaptable. According to pilot-rated friends, she had a difficult time getting used to night flying, but her positive outlook and healthy lifestyle helped her to adapt quickly. No drug or alcohol abuse was reported for the first officer and, according to friends, she rarely drank alcohol. Her sleep patterns were reported as 7 to 8 hours of sleep per night.

A review of FAA records for the first officer found no incidents or accidents. The first officer's records indicated one notice of disapproval in 2015 for her commercial pilot certificate due to lack of satisfactory performance in takeoffs/landings and go-around...