N806NW

HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn April 18, 2018, about 1809 eastern daylight time, Delta Air Lines (DAL) flight 30, an Airbus A330-300, N806NW, experienced a right engine fire during initial climb from Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport (ATL), Atlanta, Georgia. The flight crew received a right engine fire electronic centralized aircraft monitor (ECAM) indication when the airplane was at an altitude of about 700 ft above ground level (agl), declared an emergency, shut down the right engine, discharged both fire bottles, and initiated a turn back to ATL. During the return to ATL, the fire warning indication cleared, and the crew made an uneventful overweight single-engine landing. No passengers or crewmembers were injured. The airplane sustained substantial damage to its right engine pylon. The flight was operated under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 as a regularly scheduled flight from ATL to London Heathrow International Airport, London, England.

The captain, first officer, line check pilot, and relief first officer all provided postaccident statements. (The cockpit voice recorder had been overwritten, and the crew was not interviewed.) The relief first officer stated that he had conducted an exterior walk-around inspection of the airplane before departure and noted nothing unusual or abnormal.

The captain was the pilot flying at the time of the engine fire. He was receiving a 6-month line check at the time of the event. The flight departed from runway 26L. The captain stated that, when the airplane was between 500 and 1,000 ft agl, the flight crew received the ECAM warning “ENG 2 FIRE” and the associated visual (red lights: Master Warning, Fire Pushbutton and Engine Master Lever) and aural (continuous repetitive chime) cockpit indications, which included a red “LAND ASAP.” The captain also stated that, during the first minute of the ECAM messages, all the non-normal messages disappeared for about 2 to 3 seconds, and then the engine fire alert and associated visual and aural indications reappeared. The captain transferred control of the airplane to the first officer, performed the ECAM procedures, and discharged both fire extinguishing bottles. The relief first officer contacted air traffic control (ATC) to declare an emergency and coordinate the airplane’s return to ATL, and he aided the captain in performing the ECAM action items.

Flight data recorder (FDR) data showed that the right engine thrust lever went to idle at 1810:13 and was shut down at 1811:49 and that engine parameters, including exhaust gas temperature, spooled down at a nominal rate. According to the captain, the fire indication remained “on for some time” after both fire bottles were discharged, and the right engine was shut down. While the flight was being vectored by ATC for the approach, the first officer transferred control of the airplane back to the captain, and the first officer resumed the duties of the pilot monitoring.

According to the line check pilot’s statement, when the captain transferred control of the airplane to the first officer, the line check pilot changed his role to a regular flight crewmember to assist the crew. While the captain and the first officer completed the ECAM checklist, he coordinated communication with the cabin crew and supported the captain with the checklist actions. After the checklist was completed, he contacted the purser about the nature of the problem and stated that the airplane would be returning to ATL and that the cabin crew should prepare the cabin for landing. In addition, he made an announcement to the passengers, advising them that the airplane had engine trouble, the flight would be returning to ATL and stopping on the runway, and emergency vehicles would be approaching the airplane so that emergency personnel could inspect the airplane.

The fire warning remained illuminated for more than 10 minutes. The fire warning was replaced with the ENG 2 FIRE DET FAULT caution, which indicated the fire detection capability was lost. Also, the red LAND ASAP indication changed to amber. At the time of the fire detection fault, the airplane was being flown on an extended downwind. A few minutes later, the flight made a 270° left turn to enter the right base leg. According to FDR data, at 1820:30, the right engine exhaust gas temperature spiked from about 200ºC (392ºF) to about 600ºC (1,112ºF).

Air traffic control voice recordings and radar data indicated that, about 1831, one of the pilots contacted the tower controller, who cleared the airplane to land on runway 27R. About 1 minute later, the tower controller advised the flight crew that the right engine appeared to still be smoking; the timing correlated to the airplane’s position on an approximate 5-mile final. Radar data indicated that the airplane touched down about 1834. During the landing rollout, the flight crew queried the controller if a fire could still be seen on the right engine; the controller responded, “affirmative.”

After landing, the autobrake remained engaged until the airplane had decelerated to about 40 knots. The captain stopped the airplane about 7,800 ft from the approach end of the runway. The flight crew informed airport rescue and firefighting (ARFF) via the tower frequency that there was an indication of hot brakes in addition to the engine fire.

ARFF crews met the airplane on the runway and observed smoke and flames emanating from the right engine. ARFF sprayed the engine with fire-retardant foam and extinguished the fire. Afterward, the flight crew shut down the left engine, the airplane was towed to the gate, and the passengers disembarked via the jet bridge.

PERSONNEL INFORMATIONSpecific training related to this event that the pilots accomplished was the following:

Captain—engines and auxiliary power unit (APU), November 2, 2017.

First officer—engines and APU, April 22, 2017; systems review for Airbus A330 engines and APU, September 9, 2017.

Line check pilot—engines and APU, June 22, 2015; systems review for Airbus A330 engines and APU, September 1, 2017.

Relief first officer—engine and APU, May 30, 2016; systems review for Airbus A330 engines and APU, October 3, 2017.

Additional information about training appears in the Organizational and Management Information section of this report.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONThe airplane was powered by two Pratt & Whitney PW4168A engines and was configured with 2 pilot seats, 2 cockpit observer seats, 12 flight attendant seats, and 293 passenger seats. The right engine had about 49,723 hours and 6,515 cycles since new and about 25,009 hours and 3,170 cycles since overhaul in Singapore in November 2012. The engine was installed on the accident airplane the next month.

The A330’s fire indication system consisted of indications for the left and right engines. Each system comprised two detection loops that sensed a fire and/or overheat conditions. When the system sensors detected a high temperature, it would trigger an ECAM warning “ENG 1 (2) FIRE” and the Master Warning light illuminate the FIRE pushbutton light located on the center overhead panel and activate a continuous repetitive chime (except during take-off between V1 and lift-off +15 seconds).

The fire loops were fire-resistant (not fireproof) and had a 5-minute certification requirement to function as designed. For a fire with a duration of more than the 5-minute certification requirement, the loops could be destroyed and fail to operate as intended. If a component in each loop fails, a FIRE DET FAULT caution would appear on the ECAM display to indicate that the system is no longer able to detect a fire. If the fire loops were to fail, DAL’s A330 operations manual required flight crews to monitor engine parameters more closely than normal for signs of fire and/or over-temperature.

Airbus’ software for the ECAM was designed to provide stacking of messages in order of priority. Specifically, the software identifies the most important message and places it at the top of all the ECAM messages, and each subsequent message follows in order of importance. The system was also designed to stack all red warning messages on top of amber caution messages.

The A330 has three closed-loop hydraulic systems. The blue hydraulic system is for the left engine, the yellow system is for the right engine, and the green system is for both engines, thereby providing hydraulic system redundancy. The hydraulic system operating pressure is regulated to 3,000 psi, and the reservoir tanks are pressurized to 70 psi. FDR data showed that the flight crew received a YELLOW HYDRAULIC RESERVOIR LOW LEVEL warning about 14 minutes after the ENG2 FIRE warning.

The A330 was designed to isolate the engine from the wing/airframe in the event of a fire. The ECAM procedure instructs flight crews to pull back on the throttles to the idle position for the affected engine, and turn off the engine. When the engine master switch is selected off, the fuel low-pressure shutoff valve (SOV) in the pylon and the high-pressure SOV at the engine fuel pump both close, cutting off fuel flow to the engine. The crews were then instructed to press the engine fire button in the cockpit, which sends a signal to close the green and yellow hydraulic fire shutoff valves (FSOV) near the pylon. The hydraulic pressure (return) lines from the hydraulic engine-driven pumps (EDP) and the EDP case drain lines have inline one-way check valves that prevent hydraulic fluid from flowing back to the engine after passing through the check valve.

The thrust reverser doors are attached to the engine pylon structure. The thrust reverser doors include an internal fixed structure that has two pressure relief doors on each side. The pressure relief doors were designed to prevent over-pressurization of the core compartment.

The handbook instructed flight crews to discharge agent 1 (fire bottle No. 1) 10 seconds after the engine fire button was pressed to allow time for the FSOVs to...