Accident Details
Probable Cause and Findings
An in-flight fire of undetermined origin. Contributing to the accident were the severe icing conditions encountered during the final minutes of the flight, which led to a loss of airplane control.
Aircraft Information
Registered Owner (Historical)
Analysis
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On November 9, 2018, about 1500 eastern standard time, a Cessna 310R, N5044J, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Walton, New York. The airline transport pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 personal flight.
According to Leidos Flight Service, the pilot filed an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan from Niagara Falls International Airport (IAG), Niagara Falls, New York, to Teterboro Airport (TEB), Teterboro, New Jersey. The pilot was employed by a 14 CFR Part 135 charter company based at TEB and was assigned to begin a charter flight as the second-in-command pilot the next day.
Review of air traffic control communications and radar data provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) revealed that, about 1442, the pilot contacted the Binghamton, New York, approach controller and reported flying at 7,000 ft mean sea level (msl). The controller provided the altimeter setting, which the pilot read back. About 1459, the pilot stated, "I need to get on the ground immediately." The controller advised the pilot that the nearest airport was behind him. There were no further intelligible radio transmissions from the pilot. At 1500:21, the airplane had descended to 6,550 ft, slowed from about 200 knots (kts) to 151 kts groundspeed, and began a turn to the northeast. The airplane continued flying northeast and, at 1500:36, the airplane had descended to 5,100 ft at 196 kts groundspeed. The final radar return was recorded at 1500:50 about 1.8 nautical miles from the initial impact point and showed that the airplane had climbed to 7,350 ft msl on a heading of 308° and was at 151 kts groundspeed.
A witness, who was located about 1/2 mile from the accident site, reported that she was outside and heard engines revving up and down for about 1 minute. She subsequently realized the noise was coming from the air, and then saw an airplane "overhead." She stated, "it was so loud" and it flew in a straight line over a pond near her. She reported that she could see a "gray round column of smoke" trailing the airplane and saw a "red orange glow" originating from under the right wing area. The airplane flew out of view; she then heard a loud explosion and subsequently saw a plume of smoke.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
According to FAA records, the pilot also held a mechanic certificate with airframe and powerplant ratings. The pilot's logbook was not recovered; however, according employer records, he completed an airman competency/proficiency check on July 6, 2018. An airplane logbook that detailed recent flights the pilot had flown in the airplane was located in the debris. The entries that were legible revealed that, from July 11, 2018, through the date of the accident, the pilot had flown 16 hours in the accident airplane, and each of the flights originated from IAG or TEB.
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION
Fragments of the original maintenance records were located in the debris field; the majority of the records located were damaged and illegible. Copies of annual inspections completed on July 14, 2017, and August 21, 2018, were provided by the maintenance facility that completed the inspections. The July 2017 annual endorsement stated in part that FAA Airworthiness Directive (AD) FAA-AD-81-09-09 for the Stewart Warner Combustion cabin heater was found to be previously complied with and noted that the heater Hobbs total time was 305.3 hours.
FAA AD-2017-06-03 became effective on May 5, 2017, and superseded FAA-AD-81-09-09. There was no record in the 2017 or 2018 annual endorsements that the new AD had been complied with.
FAA AD-2017-06-03 stated in part: "This AD was prompted by an airplane accident and reports we received that the combustion heater was malfunctioning. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct a hazardous condition caused by deterioration of the combustion heater, which could lead to ignition of components and result in smoke and fumes in the cabin." The AD was required to be complied with within the next 10 hours of service of the combustion heater after May 5, 2017, or at the next scheduled annual inspection, which for the accident airplane would have occurred on July 14, 2017. The AD required checking several components of the combustion heater in addition to performing a pressure decay test.
According to the August 2018 annual inspection endorsement, the onboard weather radar system's components, which included the radar display indicator (King Model KI-244) and radar antenna (Narco Model KA-126), were removed for repair. According to work orders from an avionics repair facility, burning and overheating electrical discrepancies were identified with the weather radar system. The facility repaired the radar display and shipped a replacement radar antenna to the pilot. There were no records found indicating that the radar antenna, which had recently been delivered to the pilot's hangar, was re-installed on the accident airplane, nor was the antenna located in the wreckage. However, according to a friend of the pilot who was familiar with the ongoing troubleshooting of the radar unit, the replacement antenna was not located in the pilot's hangar where he had last seen it.
METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
Station models around the accident site depicted air temperatures in the low 30°F to low 40°F, a southeast to east wind of 5 to 15 knots, overcast sky cover, mist, light rain and snow to the west and north of the accident site, and light to heavy rain to the south and east of the accident site.
At 1456, the weather observation at Sullivan County International Airport (MSV), Monticello, New York, 29 nautical miles (nm) southeast of the accident site, reported wind from 350° at 4 knots, 5 miles visibility, light rain and mist, overcast ceiling at 2,000 ft above ground level (agl), temperature 1°C, dew point temperature 0°C; with remarks that rain began at 1448, snow ended at 1448, and freezing rain information was not available.
At 1511, the weather observation at Greater Binghamton Airport (BGM), Binghamton, New York, 35 nm west of the accident site, reported wind from 130° at 11 knots, visibility 1 1/2 miles, light snow, mist, broken ceiling at 500 ft agl, broken skies 1,100 ft agl, overcast skies 1,600 ft agl, temperature 0°C, and dew point temperature -1°C.
The Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite number 16 (GOES-16) visible and infrared images indicated an extensive layer of cloud cover over the accident site moving from southwest to northeast. Review of the infrared imagery indicated the approximate cloud-top heights over the accident site were 34,000 ft at 1502. Upper air data indicated that the freezing level was about 2,000 ft msl at the accident site.
The GOES-16 Icing index imagery for 1445 and 1515 for the accident area suggested likely moderate to heavy icing. Additional review of the BGM Weather Surveillance Radar (WSR-88D) revealed reflectivity values that indicated light to heavy precipitation was falling at 1457 along the route of flight and near the accident site. (refer to Figure 1.)
Figure 1. Weather Radar Imagery at 1457, with the airplane's flight track noted by the magenta line, the airplane's position at 1457 circled in red, and the accident site circled in black.
Review of the WSR-88D Dual-Polarization Product revealed signatures consistent with Supercooled Large Droplet (SLD) icing conditions.
The eyewitness stated that at the time of the accident, it was "snowing and sleeting very heavy" and "everything from the kitchen sink was coming down." Another witness located about 1/4 mile from the initial impact point heard the impact and reported that, at the time of the accident, it was snowing and sleeting "very heavy." He further stated that it was "very windy," and you "couldn't see anything."
There was no record of the pilot retrieving any weather information before or during the accident flight from Leidos Flight Service or their third-party providers.
Before the pilot departed on the accident flight, AIRMET advisories Sierra, Tango, and Zulu were issued and remained valid for the accident site at the accident time for altitudes below FL200 (20,000 ft msl). The AIRMETs warned of IFR conditions due to precipitation, mist, and fog, mountain obscuration conditions due to clouds and precipitation, moderate icing between the freezing level and FL200, and moderate turbulence below 10,000 ft.
At 1254, the BGM Terminal Aerodrome Forecast stated in part to expect temporary conditions between 1300 and 1600 of 3 miles visibility, light snow and mist, scattered clouds at 800 ft agl, and an overcast ceiling at 1,200 ft agl.
Review of the publicly-available National Weather Service Forecast Icing Potential (FIP) charts issued before the pilot's departure indicated a 30 to 70% probability of icing at 6,000 ft to 8,000 ft above the accident site at 1500. The FIP also indicated that the icing near the accident site would likely be light to moderate.
WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION
The airplane sustained extensive impact damage and displayed evidence of a fire. The wreckage path was oriented on a 320° heading, and the initial impact point coincided with two 50-ft-tall trees atop a ridgeline at an elevation about 2,000 ft msl. Two additional trees atop the ridgeline that were about 40 ft tall and located about 20 ft forward of the initial impact point also displayed impact damage. The wreckage path continued through a heavily-wooded, down-sloping ravine about 620 ft, consistent with the airplane impacting trees atop the ridgeline in a steep, nose-down attitude.
All major components of the airplane were accounted for at the accident site. Flight control continuity could not be established due to the fragmentation of the wreckage. The cockpit, main cabin area, and instrument panel were fragmented, scattered throughout the debris field and displayed varying degrees of thermal ...
Data Source
Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# ERA19FA039