N959MJ

HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn October 29, 2019, at 1058 eastern daylight time, a Cessna 414A airplane, N959MJ, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident in Colonia, New Jersey. The commercial pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 personal flight.

The pilot’s spouse reported that he planned to depart Leesburg Executive Airport (JYO), Leesburg, Virginia, about 0900 local; however, he delayed his departure due to the weather at his destination, Linden Airport (LDJ), Linden, New Jersey. She reported that the pilot was scheduled to give a lecture in Queens, New York, in the afternoon.

Review of radar and flight plan data provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) revealed that the airplane departed JYO at 0950 on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan and proceeded on course to LDJ. At 1053:20, the airplane’s radar altitude was 2,000 ft mean sea level (msl) and its position was over the DAPVY GPS waypoint, which was the first waypoint associated with the GPS-A circling instrument approach procedure to LDJ. The airplane then turned to a northeast heading, which was consistent with the final approach course for the GPS-A approach.

For the next 2 1/2 minutes, the airplane descended along the final approach course and crossed the final approach fix (GEZSY) about 1,200 ft msl (radar altitude). During the descent from DAPVY to GEZSY, the airplane’s groundspeed varied from about 110 knots, to 140 knots, and then to 100 knots. The airplane continued to descend after GEZSY and crossed the subsequent waypoint of 3 nautical miles (nm) from BAUTZ about 700 ft msl. From GEZSY t0 3nm to BAUTZ the groundspeed varied from about 100 knots, to 115 knots, and to 85 knots.

The airplane subsequently descended to 600 ft msl, maintained course, and remained at 600 ft for about 1 minute. During this time, groundspeed varied and increased from about 80 knots to 90 knots before decreasing to 65 knots. At 1058:02, the airplane’s flight track turned left off course and the airplane rapidly descended. The final radar return, at 1058:07, was less than 1/10 mile from the accident site and showed the airplane at 200 ft msl headed northwest.

Figure 1 shows the automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) data for the final 5 minutes of the flight. The data presented are calculated groundspeed and geometric altitude, which is the height of the airplane above the earth ellipsoid calculated by GPS (the airplane’s ADS-B signal did not report barometric altitude). The yellow bars denote the position of the aforementioned GPS approach waypoints.

Figure 1: ADS-B data from the final 5 minutes of the flight.

Review of air traffic control communications provided by the FAA revealed that the pilot was communicating with New York Approach during the arrival into the LDJ area.

About 1050, the controller provided the pilot with a recently received pilot report (PIREP) for cloud bases at 500 ft overcast at nearby Newark Liberty International Airport (EWR). The pilot acknowledged and subsequently informed the controller that LDJ was reporting bases at 700 ft. The controller then informed the pilot that the automated report at EWR was reporting an 800 ft broken ceiling.

At 1051:50 the pilot was cleared for the GPS-A nonprecision circling instrument approach procedure to LDJ. At 1056:56, the controller stated to the pilot, “say flight conditions.” The pilot immediately responded, “say again oh we're still IFR.” At 1058:06 the controller again asked the pilot to say the flight conditions; however, there was no response. At 1058:12, the controller stated to the pilot, “check altitude immediately;” however, there was no response from the pilot. This was the only altitude warning the controller provided to the pilot. The controller attempted to reach the pilot again multiple times, but there was no response.

Figure 2 provides an overview of the flight track, ATC and pilot communications during the final minutes of the flight, the missed approach point (BAUTZ), and LDJ. The solid red line denotes the flight track, and the dotted yellow lines and blue lines reflect the possible courses to be flown during the approach.

Figure 2: Overview of the flight track and radar data with excerpts of the ATC transcript.

Two home surveillance cameras captured the final portions of the flight. The first video, taken about .20 nautical mile south of the accident site, showed the airplane in a shallow left bank as it entered the camera view, and subsequently the airplane entered a rapid descending left turn and exited the camera view.

The second video, which was positioned about .20 nautical mile north of the accident site, captured about the final 4 seconds of the flight. The airplane entered the camera view in a descending steep left turn near the treetops, continued to roll to the left, and subsequently descended out of view. The sound of an impact was recorded about 1 second after the airplane exited the camera view. Both cameras showed the airplane flying below an overcast cloud ceiling.

Two additional home surveillance cameras captured the audio of the final portions of the flight. Both audio recordings revealed that the engines were running until an impact was heard, and the sound of the engines increased in the few seconds prior to the impact. About 10 seconds after the sound of impact, a loud explosion was recorded.

A witness, who was in his car about 200 ft from the accident site, reported that he heard a loud noise coming from behind him that kept getting louder. He slowed his vehicle, looked out his left window, and saw the accident airplane in a 45° left bank about 80 ft above the ground, flying west. He did not observe the landing gear extended. He subsequently witnessed the airplane strike a tree and then a house. He reported that the engines were “extremely loud.”

A second witness, located about 1/2 mile south of the accident site, reported that while outside of his home, he saw the airplane descend through an overcast cloud layer. He added that the engines were “running fine, no stuttering.” He noted that the landing gear were down and that the airplane was “lumbering along with the nose up” in level flight several hundred feet above the trees. The airplane subsequently exited his view, and he heard a loud impact about 10 seconds later.

PERSONNEL INFORMATIONFragments of the pilot's logbook were recovered in the wreckage; however, the majority of its contents were illegible. On the application for the pilot’s most recent medical certificate, dated April 3, 2019, he reported 7,173 total hours of flight experience, including 66 hours in the previous 6 months. On an aircraft insurance application from January 2019, the pilot reported a total of 2,284 multiengine airplane flight hours, including 1,384 flight hours in the accident airplane.

According to the pilot’s spouse, he had flown into the destination airport “hundreds of times,” as he was accustomed to commuting to the New York City area on a regular basis.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONAccording to FAA airworthiness records, the six-seat, multiengine, low-wing airplane was manufactured in 1980. It was powered by two Continental TSIO-520-NB, 335-horsepower engines, which had been modified with the RAM Aircraft conversion. The airplane was also equipped with RAM Aircraft winglets and vortex generators.

According to the RAM winglets, vortex generator airplane flight manual supplement, the aerodynamic stall speeds varied with weight, bank angle, and the configuration of the landing gear and wing flaps. Figure 3 shows the range of stall speeds that could be expected. For example, at weight between 6,750 lbs - 5,200 lbs, 20° bank, flaps 15°, and landing gear down, the stall speed would vary from 76 to 67 knots indicated airspeed. The supplement stated that the maximum altitude loss during a conventional stall was approximately 550 ft.

Figure 3: Aerodynamic stall speed chart provided in the applicable airplane flight manual supplement

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONA search of archived ForeFlight information indicated that the pilot requested weather information via ForeFlight Mobile at 1206 on October 28 with a planned departure of 0830 on October 29. The weather briefing information contained all the standard weather information valid at that time; however, most of the weather forecast information was only valid through 0500 on October 29.

The pilot obtained an additional weather briefing at 0920 the day of the accident via telephone from Leidos Flight Service. The pilot specifically requested the current conditions and outlook for LDJ and Teterboro Airport (TEB), which was the pilot’s alternate airport. The briefer asked whether the pilot was aware of the AIRMETs for IFR conditions, and the pilot confirmed that he was aware. The briefer provided the pilot with current and forecast weather conditions at LDJ and TEB, which included visibilities between 5 and 10 statute miles with drizzle and mist and ceilings between 700 ft above ground level (agl) to 2,500 ft agl.

The pilot subsequently inquired when the weather was expected to improve in the Linden-Newark area. The briefer stated, “there may be a slight improvement, still remaining marginal.” The pilot asked when the improved conditions were expected, and the briefer reported that, “it could be 1,400 broken through 1500 zulu [1100 local].”

The 1055 recorded weather observation at LDJ included an overcast ceiling at 700 ft agl, 10 statute miles visibility, and calm wind. At 1115, LDJ reported 2 miles visibility, mist, and an overcast ceiling at 700 ft agl.

The 1051 recorded weather observation at EWR, located about 8 miles northeast of the accident site, included a broken ceiling at 800 ft and 4 statute miles visibility with light drizzle and mist. At 1135, EWR reported 2 statute miles visibility, light drizzle and mist, and broken ceiling varying be...