N733CD

HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn September 4, 2020, about 2055 central daylight time, a Cirrus SR22 airplane, N733CD, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Chester, Arkansas. The private pilot and three passengers sustained fatal injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.

After working his job the day of the accident, the pilot intended to fly with three passengers to visit a family member that evening. About 1900, the pilot called his flight instructor/airplane mechanic and advised that he intended to fly to North Carolina. The mechanic advised the pilot to leave in the morning. Fueling records showed the accident airplane was fueled about 1949 with 36.41 gallons of 100 low lead aviation gasoline.

Radar and air traffic control information indicated that the airplane departed from Muskogee-Davis Regional Airport (MKO), near Muskogee, Oklahoma, about 2027 and proceeded east. About 2049, while climbing through 8,500 ft mean sea level (msl), the pilot established radio communication with air traffic control and requested visual flight rules (VFR) flight-following to the destination airport. The controller subsequently suggested a 20° right turn for moderate to heavy precipitation ahead of the airplane. Shortly thereafter, the airplane turned into the area of precipitation; when the controller queried the pilot about the course change, the pilot replied that he was returning to the departure airport. The airplane subsequently proceeded northwest, and the controller advised the pilot that the airplane appeared to be on a heading of 340°. The pilot replied that “the wind caught me” and that he was correcting course. However, the airplane turned northeast and began descending. The controller then advised the pilot to turn left heading 270°. The pilot acknowledged the instruction; however, the airplane continued to descend and turn right. The controller advised the pilot to level the airplane's wings and fly southbound. Radar contact was lost about 2055.

An alert notice was issued, and the wreckage was found in wooded terrain the following day.

PERSONNEL INFORMATIONA Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector recovered the pilot’s logbook and supplied a summary of the pilot’s flight experience based off the last entry on August 2, 2020. The recorded entries showed the pilot did not meet recency of experience requirements to carry passengers at night.

According to the pilot’s primary flight instructor, the airplane’s autopilot did not initially function; however, it was repaired and during two post-maintenance local flights, the autopilot worked properly. The pilot subsequently demonstrated basic knowledge of autopilot usage. The pilot received training in turbulent conditions and the pilot “calmly responded” with “no unreasonable reactions” to the turbulence. The pilot received simulated instrument conditions training and was “good at it.” The pilot had experience using the ForeFlight application along with a Stratus receiver.

The pilot requested and was granted Cirrus Embark training on January 13, 2020. According to Cirrus, Cirrus Embark is a safety program designed to provide free transition training to pilots that are new to Cirrus SR operations. The program consists of a maximum of 3 full days of flight training. From instructor recollections, the accident pilot had accumulated about 100 to 120 hours total time at the time of his application. Direct owners or designated pilots of pre-owned Cirrus aircraft must enroll into Cirrus Embark within 30 days of aircraft delivery. Once enrolled into the program, the owner or designated pilot must complete the training within 60 days. According to Cirrus training records, the pilot completed all the flight training lessons, but there was no record of him completing all of the online self-study lessons.

Instructors who provided the Cirrus Embark transition training reported that the accident pilot’s training comprised of a VFR transition to the SR22. The training was not conducted at night or in instrument meteorological conditions, and no extensive training on exiting inadvertent instrument conditions was conducted. The pilot was given autopilot instruction to include following headings and holding altitudes; however, the instructors described the ARNAV Systems Inc. display installed in the airplane as “old technology” and stated that the Sandel electronic horizontal situation indicator (EHSI) was “not easy to use.”

AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONThe airplane was sold to the accident pilot on January 4, 2020. According to copies of airplane logbook entries, an annual inspection was completed on June 2, 2020, and the airplane had accumulated 2,053.8 hours total time at the time of that inspection.

The accident airplane was equipped with avionics that included dual Garmin 430s/Terrain Avoidance and Warning System, Sandel 3308 EHSI, ARNAV ICDS (integrated cockpit display system) 2000, WX-500 Stormscope, S-Tec 55X Autopilot with GPSS (GPS Steering) and Glideslope Tracking, and Digital Altitude Preselect. The ICDS 2000 is a moving map multifunction display that also displays engine data.

The airplane was fitted with a Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS) advertised by the manufacturer to recover the airplane and its occupants to the ground in the event of an in-flight emergency.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONThe 1900 Surface Analysis Chart depicted a developing stationary front that extended from Kansas southeastward through northeast Oklahoma and into Arkansas in the immediate vicinity of the accident site. A col (or neutral point) in the pressure field was identified between two high pressure systems and where the stationary and cold fronts changed identity. The accident was in the immediate vicinity of the stationary front and on the cool air side of the front, and to the northwest of the col. The 1500 Convective Outlook expected a general risk of air mass type thunderstorms across the eastern Oklahoma and Arkansas.

Drake Field Airport, near Fayetteville, Arkansas, about 16 miles to the north of the accident site, and Fort Smith Regional Airport (FSM), near Fort Smith, Arkansas, about 22 miles south of the accident site, reported visual meteorological conditions around the time of the accident. In the observation about one hour before the accident, FSM reported lightning in the distant north.

The 2100 high-resolution rapid refresh (HRRR) sounding indicated that the equilibrium level, or expected top of convective clouds, was at 42,500 ft. The HRRR sounding supported clouds between the lifted condensation level (about 2,408 ft msl) and 10,000 ft msl and was classified as unstable with a moderate risk of air mass type thunderstorms. The maximum vertical velocity of potential updrafts was estimated at 56 meters/second or 109 kts, and the T2 Gust of any potential outflow winds was 31 kts. The precipitable water content was 1.70 inches.

Satellite data showed an area of cumulonimbus clouds in the immediate vicinity of the accident site with tops near 38,000 ft, with another larger area located 70 miles to the southeast with tops near 42,000 ft based on the HRRR sounding. The radiative cloud top temperature or brightness temperature over the accident site corresponded to tops near 18,260 ft based on the HRRR sounding, with higher cloud tops located immediately east of the accident site.

The 2056 Geostationary Lightning Mapper depicted significant lightning flashes from the cumulonimbus cloud to the south-southeast of FSM and to the north in the vicinity of the accident site.

Weather Surveillance Radar-1988, Doppler (WSR-88D) composite reflectivity image depicted light intensity echoes of 15 to 20 dBZ along the flightpath, when the airplane entered echoes above 20 dBZ and reversed course. The airplane then turned north-northwest, remaining in echoes of 20-30 dBZ, before entering a descending right turn near the edge of higher reflectivity, without entering the moderate to intense echoes.

Base reflectivity images showed the accident site located along the edge of a larger cluster of echoes with maximum reflectivity near 58 dBZ northwest through east of the flight track. A review of the lower elevation scans indicated very light intensity echoes of 20 dBZ from the lowest 0.4° through the 1.7° elevation scans or below approximately 7,000 ft, and echoes of 15 dBZ or less through the 3.03° elevation scan or through 8,800 ft near the accident airplane’s altitude.

Lightning data showed 19 total lightning flashes recorded in an approximate 10-mile radius of the accident site. The closest in-cloud lightning flashes were detected approximately 2 miles northeast of the accident site, with no lightning flashes detected along the flight path.

A pilot flying an emergency medical flight nearby about the time of the accident reported that the storm he observed had almost constant lightning such that the storm could be seen easily from Little Rock, which was about 115 miles from the accident site. He estimated that the tops were near 40,000 ft or higher and it looked like a hot air balloon being lit from the inside by a very bright lamp. The pilot indicated that it was the most intense lightning in any storm that he had ever seen in his 25-year aviation career.

A Convective SIGMET was issued at 1955, including the area of the accident site, for a line of thunderstorms with tops to 42,000 ft with movement to the southeast at 5 kts.

The sun set at 1939, and the moon had not risen at the time of the accident.

The FAA contract flight service provider had no contact from the pilot for any weather briefing services, or in-flight contacts. ForeFlight indicated that the pilot requested a standard weather briefing at 0026 on September 4, 2020. The request was for the route of flight between MKO and LQK with a planned altitude of 7,500 ft, a planned estimated time of departure of 1730, an estimated time enroute of 4:08, and an estimated t...