N266DC

HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn January 13, 2021, about 1033 eastern standard time, a Beech F33A, N266DC, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Columbia, South Carolina. The private pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.

Radar and air traffic control voice communication data provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) indicated that the airplane departed runway 19 at Greenville Downtown Airport (GMU), Greenville, South Carolina, about 0959 under visual flight rules and that the pilot was cleared to climb the airplane to 5,500 ft mean sea level (msl). About 1006, while the airplane was airborne, the pilot requested an instrument flight rules clearance and continued southeast toward Jim Hamilton – L B Owens Airport (CUB), Columbia, South Carolina. The controller provided the clearance, and the pilot descended the airplane to 5,000 ft. Soon afterward, the pilot requested clearance to descend to 3,000 ft, which the controller provided.

About 1015, the controller asked the pilot to advise the receipt of weather information for CUB and advise the type of approach to the airport. The pilot requested the area navigation (RNAV) runway 13 approach and asked the controller to provide a pilot report (PIREP) and the weather minimums for CUB (the pilot did not state that he had received the current weather conditions at CUB, nor did the controller provide that weather information to him). The controller stated that a PIREP was received about 45 minutes earlier (about 0930) and that the pilot was trying to land there but was not able to “make it.” The controller cleared the pilot for the RNAV approach, and the pilot continued the flight.

About 1030, the controller advised the pilot of the alternate missed approach instructions, which consisted of entering controlled airspace on a heading of 050° and climbing and maintaining 2,500 ft. Soon afterward, the pilot announced that he was performing a missed approach, and the controller instructed him to fly a heading of 360° when able and climb and maintain 2,500 ft. The pilot acknowledged the information and asked if a left turn was required for the 360° heading, which the controller confirmed. The pilot acknowledged the information and requested the weather conditions at Columbia Metropolitan Airport (CAE), Columbia, South Carolina, which was about 6.5 nautical miles west of CUB.

About 1033, the controller provided the weather conditions at CAE. The pilot did not acknowledge this transmission, and the controller advised the pilot that radar contact was lost. The controller made additional attempts to establish communication with the pilot, which were unsuccessful.

Review of ADS-B data showed that during the instrument approach, the airplane remained about 3/4-mile left of course until the airplane was about 1 1/4 miles from the approach end of the runway. At that time, the airplane made a right turn, descended to 325 ft msl, and made a climbing left turn to 800 ft msl before descending into a residential neighborhood (see figures 1 and 2).

Figure 1. Airplane flight track during the approach (in red) and extended runway centerline at CUB (in magenta). Note: JSSTN is the initial approach fix for the RNAV runway 13 approach, and PEPHR is the final approach fix for the approach.

Figure 2. Three-dimensional view of the airplane’s flight track (in red) with the minimum descent altitude overlay of the flight track (semi-transparent gray layer). Note: The lowest minimum descent altitude for the RNAV runway 13 approach was 780 ft mean sea level. The airplane descended below the MDA three times before the accident occurred.

Witnesses who heard the airplane during the final moments of the flight stated that the engine sounded normal. One eyewitness saw the airplane emerge from the fog in a left-wing-low attitude and then impact the roof of a residence. The airplane came to rest in the backyard of the residence against a wooden fence. A postimpact fire ensued. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONThe pilot’s logbook was not recovered. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONThe 0953 recorded weather observation at CUB included calm wind, visibility 1/4-mile in fog, vertical visibility of 200 ft above ground level (agl), temperature of 2°C, dew point of 2°C, and altimeter setting of 30.20 inches of mercury.

The 1053 recorded weather observation at CUB, included wind from 240° at 5 knots, visibility 1/4-mile in fog, a vertical visibility of 200 ft agl, a temperature of 3°C, a dew point of 3°C, and an altimeter setting of 30.20 inches of mercury.

The 1029 recorded weather observation at CAE, which was about 6 miles southwest of the accident site, included wind from 240° at 3 knots, visibility 1/2-mile, fog, vertical visibility of 200 ft agl, temperature 3°C, dew point 2°C, and altimeter setting of 30.18 inches of mercury. The observations from CUB and CAE surrounding the accident time indicated low instrument flight rules (IFR) conditions with light and variable wind at or below 5 knots over the area.

AIRMET advisory Sierra, which was issued at 0945, was valid for the accident site at the accident time. AIRMET Sierra indicated IFR conditions in the area due to fog and mist.

The pilot did not request or receive weather information from Leidos Flight Service. A search of archived ForeFlight information indicated that the pilot did not request weather information via ForeFlight. The investigation found no other record of the pilot receiving or retrieving any weather information before or during the flight. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONThe airplane impacted a tree in a residential area before impacting the ground at an elevation of 270 ft msl. The postimpact fire consumed most of the fuselage. All major components of the airplane were located near the main wreckage.

Sections of left wing and the pitot tube were observed near the initial tree impact. The right wing separated from the fuselage and exhibited thermal damage. The vertical stabilizer separated from the empennage, and the rudder separated from the vertical stabilizer. The cabin and seats were consumed by fire. The instrument panel was fragmented, and the avionics exhibited thermal damage. The landing gear and the flaps were in the retracted position. The flight control cables were examined, but flight control continuity could not be confirmed as a result of fragmentation and thermal damage. The gyro and gyro housing exhibited rotational scoring.

The engine remained partially attached to the airframe. Both magnetos had separated from the accessory housing due to impact. The ignition leads were consumed by fire. The No. 5 cylinder head rocker assembly had separated from the cylinder head due to impact. The Nos. 1, 3, and 4 rocker covers exhibited impact damage. The fuel injection mixture control was separated from the engine. The throttle butterfly housing was fragmented, and the butterfly valve remained attached to the throttle linkage.

The propeller had separated from the engine due to impact, but all three propeller blades remained attached to their hub. All three blades exhibited tip curling and chordwise scratching. ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONSpatial Disorientation

The FAA's Pilot's Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge contained the following guidance:

Under normal flight conditions, when there is a visual reference to the horizon and ground, the sensory system in the inner ear helps to identify the pitch, roll, and yaw movements of the airplane. When visual contact with the horizon is lost, the vestibular system becomes unreliable. Without visual references outside the airplane, there are many situations where combinations of normal motions and forces can create convincing illusions that are difficult to overcome.

The handbook also advised, "unless a pilot has many hours of training in instrument flight, flight in reduced visibility or at night when the horizon is not visible should be avoided."

The FAA’s Airplane Flying Handbook (FAA-H-8083-3) described hazards associated with flying when visual references, such as the ground or horizon, are obscured.

The vestibular sense (motion sensing by the inner ear) in particular tends to confuse the pilot. Because of inertia, the sensory areas of the inner ear cannot detect slight changes in the attitude of the airplane, nor can they accurately sense attitude changes that occur at a uniform rate over a period of time. On the other hand, false sensations are often generated; leading the pilot to believe the attitude of the airplane has changed when in fact, it has not. These false sensations result in the pilot experiencing spatial disorientation.

The FAA’s publication "Spatial Disorientation Visual Illusions" (OK-11-1550), stated in part the following:

False visual reference illusions may cause you to orient your aircraft in relation to a false horizon; these illusions are caused by flying over a banked cloud, night flying over featureless terrain with ground lights that are indistinguishable from a dark sky with stars, or night flying over a featureless terrain with a clearly defined pattern of ground lights and a dark starless sky.

The publication provided further guidance on the prevention of spatial disorientation. One of the preventive measures was "when flying at night or in reduced visibility, use and rely on your flight instruments." The publication also stated the following:

If you experience a visual illusion during flight (most pilots do at one time or another), have confidence in your instruments and ignore all conflicting signals your body gives you. Accidents usually happen as a result of a pilot's indecision to rely on the instruments.

The FAA publication “Medical Facts for Pilots” (AM-400-03/1) described several vestibular illusions associated with the operation of aircraft in low-visibility conditions. The somatogravic illusion, which involves the semicircular canals of the vestib...