Accident Details
Probable Cause and Findings
The pilot’s impairment due to exposure to carbon monoxide as a result of undetected engine exhaust penetration into the cockpit, resulting in the pilot's failure to maintain a minimum controllable airspeed after partially securing an engine after takeoff.
Aircraft Information
Registered Owner (Current)
Analysis
HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn February 1, 2022, about 1006 eastern standard time, a Cessna 310R airplane, N622QT, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Danville, Virginia. The commercial pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was operated by Sol Aerial Surveys as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 aerial surveying flight.
According to another company pilot, on the morning of the accident, he and the accident pilot arrived at the Danville Regional Airport (DAN), Danville, Virginia, conducted their flight planning together, and completed the preflight inspections of their respective airplanes. They then taxied their airplanes to runway 2 for engine run-up and surveying computer start-up. During the taxi and engine run-up, the accident airplane was heading 196º true (205° magnetic). The company pilot estimated that the accident pilot was on that heading for about 8-10 minutes while they completed these pre-departure tasks. The company pilot departed first, and the accident pilot departed several minutes later at 1003.
A performance study was prepared based on automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) data obtained from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The study and ADSB-B data showed that that the airplane departed DAN and turned toward the southeast. Shortly after takeoff, the airplane’s climb rate decreased from 1,200 ft/minute to about 500 ft/minute, and the airplane’s acceleration stopped. The airplane reached an altitude of about 2,625 ft above mean sea level (msl) about 2 minutes into the flight and began a 10°-bank-angle left turn at an airspeed of 136 knots. About 10 seconds after turning left, the airplane returned to wings-level and then rolled right at a rate of about 3º/second while descending at a rate of more than 1,000 ft/minute. The last estimated bank angle was over 60° to the right at an altitude of 1,175 ft msl. The airplane impacted a wooded area about 4 nautical miles southeast of DAN. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONAccording to the operator, the pilot had previously flown aerial surveying and had accrued 85 hours of flight experience in the same make and model of the accident airplane. The accident flight was his first solo aerial surveying flight for the company following several observation flights with the company’s owner.
Interviews with friends and family of the pilot revealed that he was happy to have been hired by the operator, got along well with the company’s owner, and was pleased that the company’s airplanes were newer and better equipped than those at his previous surveying job. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONReview of maintenance records revealed that the airplane’s overhauled engines and propellers had accumulated 18.6 hours of operation before the accident.
The airplane was equipped with an adhesive, disposable “spot” carbon monoxide (CO) detector. In the presence of CO, the spot would turn gray/black, and the spot would return to normal color after it is exposed to fresh air.
The Pilot’s Operating Handbook (POH) and airplane checklist required the fuel selectors to be placed in the "main" position for takeoff. In the event of an engine failure during takeoff, the POH directed the pilot to feather the inoperative propeller and establish a 5° bank into the operating engine. With an engine shut down, in addition to the reduction in available power, the lateral/directional handling qualities of the airplane change significantly, and the indicated airspeed must be maintained faster than the Vmc of 80 knots to maintain directional control.
The complete POH checklist for an engine failure after takeoff includes the following:
1. Mixtures - AS REQUIRED for flight altitude.
2. Propellers - FULL FORWARD.
3. Throttles - FULL FORWARD.
4. Landing Gear - CHECK UP.
5. Inoperative Engine:
a. Throttle - CLOSE.
b. Mixture - IDLE CUT-OFF.
c. Propeller - FEATHER.
6. Establish Bank - 5° toward operative engine.
7. Wing Flaps - UP, if extended, in small increments.
8. Climb To Clear 50-Foot Obstacle - 92 KIAS.
9. Climb At Best Single-Engine Rate-of-Climb Speed - 106 KIAS at sea level
10. Trim Tabs - ADJUST 5° bank toward operative engine with approximately ½ ball slip
indicated on the turn and bank indicator.
11. Cowl Flap - CLOSE (Inoperative Engine).
12. Inoperative Engine - SECURE as follows:
a. Fuel Selector - OFF (Feel For Detent).
b. Auxiliary Fuel Pump - OFF.
c. Magneto Switches - OFF.
d. Alternator - OFF.
13. As Soon As Practical - LAND.
Cabin Heat System
Review of maintenance records revealed that the cabin heat system was installed in December 2019 at an airframe total time of 5,878.3 hours. Records show that it was serviced and inspected in February 2020, April 2020, and January 2022. It had accrued 317.2 hours in service at the most recent servicing. AIRPORT INFORMATIONReview of maintenance records revealed that the airplane’s overhauled engines and propellers had accumulated 18.6 hours of operation before the accident.
The airplane was equipped with an adhesive, disposable “spot” carbon monoxide (CO) detector. In the presence of CO, the spot would turn gray/black, and the spot would return to normal color after it is exposed to fresh air.
The Pilot’s Operating Handbook (POH) and airplane checklist required the fuel selectors to be placed in the "main" position for takeoff. In the event of an engine failure during takeoff, the POH directed the pilot to feather the inoperative propeller and establish a 5° bank into the operating engine. With an engine shut down, in addition to the reduction in available power, the lateral/directional handling qualities of the airplane change significantly, and the indicated airspeed must be maintained faster than the Vmc of 80 knots to maintain directional control.
The complete POH checklist for an engine failure after takeoff includes the following:
1. Mixtures - AS REQUIRED for flight altitude.
2. Propellers - FULL FORWARD.
3. Throttles - FULL FORWARD.
4. Landing Gear - CHECK UP.
5. Inoperative Engine:
a. Throttle - CLOSE.
b. Mixture - IDLE CUT-OFF.
c. Propeller - FEATHER.
6. Establish Bank - 5° toward operative engine.
7. Wing Flaps - UP, if extended, in small increments.
8. Climb To Clear 50-Foot Obstacle - 92 KIAS.
9. Climb At Best Single-Engine Rate-of-Climb Speed - 106 KIAS at sea level
10. Trim Tabs - ADJUST 5° bank toward operative engine with approximately ½ ball slip
indicated on the turn and bank indicator.
11. Cowl Flap - CLOSE (Inoperative Engine).
12. Inoperative Engine - SECURE as follows:
a. Fuel Selector - OFF (Feel For Detent).
b. Auxiliary Fuel Pump - OFF.
c. Magneto Switches - OFF.
d. Alternator - OFF.
13. As Soon As Practical - LAND.
Cabin Heat System
Review of maintenance records revealed that the cabin heat system was installed in December 2019 at an airframe total time of 5,878.3 hours. Records show that it was serviced and inspected in February 2020, April 2020, and January 2022. It had accrued 317.2 hours in service at the most recent servicing. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONThe wreckage was highly fragmented along the 382-ft debris path oriented on a true heading of 246°. The accident site elevation was about 488 ft mean sea level. There was a strong fuel odor but no evidence of fire.
The largest portion of the wreckage, consisting of the empennage, an engine, and the remnants of the cockpit was located about 214 ft beyond the severed treetops at the base of a 16-in-diameter pine tree that was broken about 15-20 ft above the ground. A second engine was located about 150 ft farther along the debris path. Neither the wings nor the fuselage was intact. The flap setting could not be determined. The landing gear were fractured off from their mounts and located in various parts of the debris field. The landing gear actuator indicated the nose and main landing gear were in the retracted position at the time of impact. The pitch trim actuator indicated the elevator trim tab trailing edge was about 10° tab up. Six propeller blades were recovered, all fractured from their mounts. All blades displayed impact damage, and some displayed leading-edge gouging, chordwise abrasion, twisting and aft bending.
Postaccident wreckage examination was limited by a high degree of fragmentation. Examination of the wreckage revealed that no cockpit instruments were intact. The throttle control quadrant was impact-damaged with the left throttle near idle, the left propeller near feather, and the mixture set full rich for both left and right engines. Flight control continuity could not be confirmed for the elevators, rudder, and ailerons due to impact damage. The rudder trim actuator indicated that the rudder trim tab was about 14° right. The left fuel selector handle was found in the OFF position. The right fuel selector handle was found in the left main position. The left and right fuel selector valves were impact separated and had tumbled through the trees. The left fuel selector valve displayed a witness mark indicating it had been forced from the off position toward the auxiliary tank position.
Both engines exhibited significant impact damage. Continuity of the crankshafts and camshafts on both engines was observed. Thumb compression was achieved for all but one cylinder on the right engine which was impact damaged. Examination of the cylinders using a lighted borescope revealed no anomalies to the pistons and valves. All magnetos sparked at all towers. All spark plugs which remained intact displayed normal coloration when compared to the Champion Check-A-Plug AV-27 chart. Oil filters were opened and found free of debris. Examination of both engines revealed no preimpact anomalies or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation.
Postaccident examination of the airplane’s heater assembly revealed that it was impact damaged and exhibited deformation of the outer casing, heat exchanger and combustor chamber sections as well as separation of some of the external accessories. The heater ...
Data Source
Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# ERA22FA114