N76075

HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn May 20, 2022, about 1842 central standard time, a Cessna 140 airplane, N76075, was substantially damaged when it impacted terrain near the Wayne Municipal Airport (LCG), Wayne, Nebraska. The private pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was operated by the pilot under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.

According to a representative with STOL Drag Events LLC, who was a participant organization in the 2022 Wayne County Mayday STOL Drag Races, the day before the accident the event began with short takeoff and landing drag racing (STOL Drag) training. The course was oriented to parallel runway 5-23 at LCG. On the day of the accident, additional STOL Drag training had been completed in the morning and qualifying STOL Drag races were planned for the afternoon. However, due to the northwest gusting winds, the qualifiers were postponed until the next day.

After the postponement decision was made, several of the competing pilots expressed a desire to perform traditional STOL (without any drag racing component) on the grass runway 31, given the favorable headwinds. A safety briefing was held with STOL Drag representatives, FAA inspectors who were present to provide oversight of the aviation event, and pilots who planned to fly in the traditional STOL. A representative with STOL Drag informed the pilots that the flying was optional and not a part of the formal STOL Drag competition. In order to limit pattern congestion, multiple groups of 5 airplanes were organized.

According to multiple witnesses and video/photographic evidence, the accident airplane was the last airplane within the third group of 5 airplanes, and each of the airplanes in that group had performed two landings without incident. During the third approach, with the accident airplane on final approach and following a Zenith STOL 701, the accident airplane descended and appeared to be lower than the airplane ahead. Subsequently, the pitch attitude increased, the airplane rolled to the right, completed a 3/4-turn right spin, and impacted terrain in a near-vertical attitude. Figure 1 depicts a series of four photographs taken by a witness during the approach and descent toward impact, with the accident airplane circled in red.

Figure 1: Four photographs showing the right roll and descent.

The STOL Drag representative who coordinated the traffic pattern operations over the radio, and who was standing near the runway threshold when the accident occurred, reported that about 45 seconds before the accident, he stated over the radio to the accident pilot, “lower your nose you look slow.” From his view, the accident airplane turned final approach early and appeared slow. About 15 seconds before the airplane’s roll and descent, he stated again to the accident pilot, “lower your nose.” There were no communications received from the accident pilot and none of the other pilots in the pattern were talking on the radio around the time of the accident.

The pilot of the Zenith airplane who was ahead of the accident airplane on final approach reported that his approach speed on final approach was about 50 MPH. He recalled that although the wind during the approach to land was gusting, it was not any different on the accident approach than it had been during the previous two approaches. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONReview of the accident pilot’s logbook revealed that he had accumulated about 310 hours of flight experience in tailwheel-equipped airplanes, with the majority of the flight experience taking place in the accident airplane. On October 16, 2021, while attending the STOL Drag Events LLC. High Sierra Fly-in event, the pilot was issued a letter from the STOL Drag Chief Flight Instructor denoting that he had satisfactorily completed the STOL Drag training course and had full permission to participate at any sanctioned STOL Drag Events LLC race event. The letter was valid for 24 months and the pilot subsequently competed in the STOL Drag racing at the High Sierra event. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONThe airplane’s operation manual provided a stalling speed table (Figure 2) for pilot reference. The manual also suggested that a glide speed to landing should be 65-70 MPH.

Figure 2: Stall speed table provided within the airplane operating manual.

Review of several videos and photographic evidence showed no sign that the flaps had been extended on the accident final approach. The video also showed the flaps were utilized for a previous landing. Per the airplane’s stall speed table, this would have resulted in a stall speed between about 49 to 40 MPH dependent upon the pilot’s application of engine power. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONAbout the time of the accident at the airport, an hourly observation reported that wind was from 290° at 15 knots, gusting to 21 knots, which was consistent with witness video that showed the movement of tall flags positioned at the runway threshold. The video showed that the gusting wind varied from about 290° to a direction nearly aligned with runway 31. AIRPORT INFORMATIONThe airplane’s operation manual provided a stalling speed table (Figure 2) for pilot reference. The manual also suggested that a glide speed to landing should be 65-70 MPH.

Figure 2: Stall speed table provided within the airplane operating manual.

Review of several videos and photographic evidence showed no sign that the flaps had been extended on the accident final approach. The video also showed the flaps were utilized for a previous landing. Per the airplane’s stall speed table, this would have resulted in a stall speed between about 49 to 40 MPH dependent upon the pilot’s application of engine power. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONThe airplane came to rest about 1,600 ft from the runway 31 threshold and about 250 ft right of the extended centerline. During a postaccident examination, flight control continuity was established from the cockpit to the corresponding control surface with no preimpact anomalies noted. Fuel remained in both wings. The flap position and flap handle could not be correlated to a flap setting position due to impact-related damage.

The engine had crushed rearward into the cockpit. The airspeed indicator needle was found indicating about 57 MPH and a rub mark at this speed was observed on the face of the instrument. Examination of the engine found no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The airplane was not equipped with shoulder harnesses. ORGANIZATIONAL AND MANAGEMENT INFORMATIONFAA Certificate of Waiver

Review of the STOL Drag Events LLC. organization website found that they conducted multiple STOL Drag Racing events around the country yearly, and as of this writing, continue to conduct air race events. This was the second STOL Drag event held at LCG, with the first event occurring April 28 - May 1, 2021.

In a letter from the FAA, dated April 26, 2021, and signed by the manager of the FAA Flight Standards Technical Branch (AFS-840), STOL Drag Events LLC. was qualified to be the responsible person of a STOL Drag race event and was allowed to apply for a Certificate of Waiver (CoW) using FAA Form 7711-2, Application for a Certificate of Waiver or Authorization of an Aviation Event.

The letter also established that STOL Drag Events LLC was accredited to act as an air race organization. The STOL Drag Events LLC. accreditation and air racecourse approval letter were effective April 28, 2021, and valid through April 30, 2023.

On April 14, 2022, the Lincoln, Nebraska FAA Flight Standards District Office (FSDO) issued a CoW to STOL Drag Events LLC. as part of the 2022 Wayne County Mayday STOL Drag aviation event. The waiver outlined specific Federal Aviation Regulations that were to be waived and noted operations authorized in accordance with operational policies submitted by STOL Drag.

The FAA CoW was effective from 0900 local May 19, 2022, to 1500 May 22, 2022 and a schedule of waiver periods was outlined for the entire weekend of activities. On the day of the accident, the waiver time was scheduled from 0800 to 1900, with qualification racing scheduled as a waivered event from 1600 to 1900. A corresponding NOTAM had closed the airport until 1901, which remained published at the time of the accident, in addition to the runway 31 closure NOTAM.

Review of the FAA CoW and the attached document found no authorization, operational procedure, or policies for traditional STOL operations to be conducted during the aviation event. Two specific regulations were waived as part of the CoW:

91.119(c) Minimum Safe Altitudes

Federal regulation 91.119(c), minimum safe altitudes, stated in part that, except when necessary for takeoff or landing, no person may operate an aircraft below certain altitudes. Section c stated that, over other than congested areas, an altitude of 500 feet above the surface must be maintained, except over open water or sparsely populated areas. In those cases, the aircraft may not be operated closer than 500 feet to any person, vessel, vehicle, or structure.

91.126(b)(1) Operating on or in the vicinity of an airport in Class G Airspace

Federal regulation 91.1269(b)(1) required in part that pilots in class G airspace make all turns to the left in the vicinity of the airport unless specific signage or lights at the airport requires turns to the right. The accident airport had no such signage or lights that the investigation located.

According to the president of STOL Drag Events LLC., wind limitations in order to conduct STOL Drag racing were a part of their National Air Race Accreditation letter, which was issued by the FAA. During the accident day, he reported that crosswind and tailwind limitations were exceeded. The FAA inspector overseeing the event reported that a 10-knot tailwind limitation had been exceeded to conduct STOL Drag racing.

As part of the accreditation letter, STOL Drag Events LLC., was given the authority to conduct ST...