Accident Details
Probable Cause and Findings
The pilots’ failure to climb and complete a normal traffic pattern after making a low approach and their failure to extend the flaps for reasons that could not be determined, and the flight instructor’s failure to ensure adequate airspeed and bank control during the turn to final approach, which resulted in an accelerated stall.
Aircraft Information
Registered Owner (Current)
Analysis
HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn June 18, 2022, at 0655 mountain standard time, a Beech E-35, N13AR, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Buckeye, Arizona. The student pilot and flight instructor were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 instructional flight.
A review of the automated dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) flight data revealed that the airplane departed from the Glendale Municipal Airport (GEU), Glendale, Arizona, its home base, at approximately 0625. Following a normal takeoff from runway 19, the pilot conducted maneuvers predominantly to the south before altering his course westward towards Buckeye Municipal Airport (BKX). About 20 minutes later, the airplane passed to the south of BKX, subsequently executing a right turn to adopt a northward heading.
Approximately 5 miles north of BKX, the airplane initiated a descending 270° left turn, followed by a right turn as it continued on a southbound trajectory indicative of a direct approach towards runway 17 at BKX (Figure 1).
The airplane executed a low approach, reaching an altitude of approximately 200 feet above ground level (AGL) before initiating a level right turn near the midpoint of runway 17. The airplane proceeded beyond a parallel runway heading toward the downwind leg and then began angling toward runway 17, maintaining an altitude of about 200 feet AGL and a speed between 63-68 knots. The last recorded ADS-B data point occurred at 0654, at which point it recorded the airplane was approximately 0.43 miles west-northwest from the threshold of runway 17 (Figure 2).
The airport (BKX) was equipped with a VirTower traffic monitoring system. An image of the airplane’s flight path in the traffic pattern was recovered that mostly mirrored the flight path generated by the ADS-B data (Figure 3). The VirTower flight path continued past the last recorded ADS-B point and showed the airplane made a right turn and maintained a heading of about 030° before the flight track ended near the accident location bearing 313° and .22 miles from the approach end of runway 17. A postimpact fire occurred that destroyed the airplane. There were no witnesses to the accident and there were no recorded communications from the airplane while it operated in the BKX traffic pattern.
Figure 1 – Traffic Pattern Flight Path
Figure 2 – Final Flight Path
Figure 3 – Traffic Pattern Flight Path (VirTower Generated) PERSONNEL INFORMATIONThe flight instructor’s logbooks were not located during the investigation and his experience in the make and model of aircraft could not be determined. The student pilot’s logbook contained only one entry indicating the student pilot had operated the airplane prior to the accident. The entry stated the student pilot and the flight instructor attempted to fly together in the accident airplane on June 11, 2022. The entry indicated the student pilot logged 0.5 hours of dual instruction received. The entry also stated “Flight with intention of taking off, lost coms holding short.” The entry was signed by the flight instructor. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONThe student pilot purchased the airplane January 25, 2019. The airplane was equipped with a dual yoke. AIRPORT INFORMATIONThe student pilot purchased the airplane January 25, 2019. The airplane was equipped with a dual yoke. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONThe airplane impacted flat, sparsely vegetated desert terrain. Impact marks on the ground were consistent with the airplane hitting the ground in a nose- and left-wing-low attitude. A propeller cut mark was observed in the dirt near the engine impact point. Postimpact fire consumed most of the airplane fuselage, cockpit, and inboard portions of the wings. Both wing leading edges exhibited aft crushing damage perpendicular to the leading edge, with the left wing being crushed further aft.
The fuselage and cockpit from the firewall aft to about two feet forward of the empennage was consumed by postimpact fire. Cockpit instrumentation, switches, and controls were mostly destroyed by fire. Flight control continuity was verified to all control surfaces from the cockpit. The left and right flaps were in the retracted position and the position of the flap control handle could not be determined. All landing gear were in the extended position.
Both propeller blades exhibited leading edge polishing and chordwise scratches. One blade was bent aft about 45° near the midpoint of the blade and was loose on the hub. The second blade was bent aft about 80° about 1/3 the length of the blade outward from the hub.
Engine continuity, cylinder compression, and valvetrain continuity were verified by rotating the propeller by hand. The top spark plugs were removed and exhibited normal burn signatures.
No preimpact mechanical anomalies were noted with the engine or airframe during post-accident examination. ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONThe Federal Aviation Administration Airplane Flying Handbook (FAA-H-8083-3C) states the following regarding standard airport traffic patterns:
- The traffic pattern altitude is usually 1,000 feet above the elevation of the airport surface.
- The downwind leg is a course flown parallel to the landing runway, but in a direction opposite to the intended landing direction. This leg is flown approximately 1/2 to 1 mile out from the landing runway and at the specified traffic pattern altitude.
- Pattern altitude is maintained until at least abeam the approach end of the landing runway. At this point, the pilot should reduce power and begin a descent. The pilot should continue the downwind leg past a point abeam the approach end of the runway to a point approximately 45° from the approach end of the runway, and make a medium-bank turn onto the base leg. Pilots should consider tailwinds and not descend too much on the downwind in order to have sufficient altitude to continue the descent on the base leg.
- The base leg is the transitional part of the traffic pattern between the downwind leg and the final approach leg. Depending on the wind condition, the pilot should establish the base leg at a sufficient distance from the approach end of the landing runway to permit a gradual descent to the intended touchdown point. While on the base leg, the ground track of the airplane is perpendicular to the extended centerline of the landing runway.
Stall Speeds
The airplane’s gross weight at the time of the accident was not determined. Estimated gross weight using a generic empty weight for an E-35 airplane (1791 lbs), 17 gallons of fuel (102 lbs), no baggage, and the reported weights of both occupants (463 lbs) resulted in a gross weight estimate between 2,300-2,400 pounds.
According the aircraft performance charts, the no-flap stall speeds (indicated airspeed) for the airplane are as follows:
2300 lbs
2400 lbs
Level
54 kts
55 kts
30° Bank
58 kts
59 kts
45° Bank
65 kts
66 kts
The flap DOWN stall speeds (indicated airspeed) for the airplane are as follows:
2300 lbs
2400 lbs
Level
46
47
30° Bank
50
51
45° Bank
55
56
The pilot’s operating handbook (POH) Before Landing checklist, step 7, states “Flaps – Down.” MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATIONStudent Pilot
The Maricopa County Office of the Medical Examiner performed the student pilot’s autopsy. According to the autopsy report, his cause of death was blunt force injuries and his manner of death was accident. His heart was described as enlarged, with a slightly dilated shape. His heart weight was 625 grams (upper limit of normal is roughly 570 grams for a male of body weight 270 pounds), his left cardiac ventricular wall thickness was 1.5 cm (normal is roughly 0.9 cm to 1.6 cm), his right cardiac ventricular wall thickness was 0.3 cm (normal is roughly 0.2 cm to 0.6 cm), and his cardiac intraventricular septal thickness was 1.4 cm (normal is roughly 0.9 to 1.8 cm). His right coronary artery had up to 25% narrowing by plaque. Visual examination of his heart was otherwise unremarkable for natural disease. The remainder of his autopsy did not identify other significant natural disease. His reported weight at his last flight physical dated January 31, 2022 was 270 pounds.
The FAA Forensic Sciences laboratory performed toxicological testing of postmortem specimens from the student pilot. Phentermine was detected in cavity blood and urine. Phentermine is a prescription weight loss medication. It is the most frequently prescribed medication for weight loss in the United States. It is a Schedule IV controlled substance under federal law, with some potential for abuse. It may sometimes be associated with adverse cardiovascular effects including increased blood pressure, rapid or irregular heartbeat, or heart attack. Side effects of phentermine may include insomnia, nervousness, and dizziness. Uncommonly, more extreme side effects such as psychosis may occur. The drug typically carries a warning that it may impair the ability to engage in potentially hazardous activities such as operating machinery or driving a motor vehicle. The FAA considers phentermine to be a “do not issue/do not fly” medication.
Flight Instructor
The Maricopa County Office of the Medical Examiner performed the pilot’s autopsy. According to the pilot’s autopsy report, his cause of death was blunt force and thermal injuries, and his manner of death was accident. His autopsy did not identify any significant natural disease. His reported weight at his last flight physical dated December 13, 2019, was 193 pounds.
The flight instructor initially survived the accident and was transported to a hospital for treatment. During treatment he received blood and plasma under massive transfusion protocols. Because the pilot received a large amount of donated blood products before his death, toxicological results in his postmortem specimens were not considered useful for this investigation, as donated blood may contain drugs. The screening routinely performed on donated blood does not test for drugs....
Data Source
Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# WPR22FA215