N37513

HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn June 21, 2022, about 0945 eastern daylight time (EDT), United Airlines flight 2627, a Boeing 737-9 MAX, N37513, was cleared for a visual approach to land on runway 28C at Pittsburgh International Airport (PIT), Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, but the flight crew landed on runway 28L instead. None of the 174 occupants aboard the airplane were injured, and the airplane was not damaged. The regularly scheduled passenger flight was operating under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulation Part 121 from Chicago O’Hare International Airport (ORD), Chicago, Illinois, to PIT.

The flight crew reported that the incident flight was the first leg on the first day of a 3-day trip. The captain was the pilot flying, and the first officer was the pilot monitoring. Before the flight, the crew reviewed and accepted the operational flight plan to PIT, which indicated an arrival on runway 28L. Flight data recorder (FDR) data showed that the airplane departed ORD about 0845 EDT (0745 local time) and that the autopilot was engaged shortly after takeoff until shortly before the final approach to PIT.

The flight crewmembers reported that, before the airplane began its descent into the terminal area, they obtained automatic terminal information service (ATIS) information for PIT via the airplane’s aircraft communication addressing and reporting system (ACARS). Per the ATIS information, they briefed the JESEY4 area navigation (RNAV) arrival. and the first officer programmed the flight management computers (FMC) for the RNAV approach to runway 28C.

The flight crew made initial contact with PIT approach control when the airplane was about 25 miles northwest of the airport. The approach controller told the flight crew to expect a visual approach to runway 32. The flight crew retrieved landing data for runway 32, briefed the approach, and programmed and loaded the FMC with the instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 32 to back up the planned visual approach.

The controller subsequently offered the crewmembers radar vectors for the visual approach to runway 28C, which they accepted. The captain selected “heading select” on the autopilot and flew the assigned heading while the first officer programmed the FMC for the RNAV approach to runway 28C.

The flight crew established communication with the tower controller when the airplane was about 6.5 miles east of the airport. The crew advised the tower controller about the visual approach to runway 28C, and the controller cleared the airplane to land. According to the crew, the airplane turned from the downwind to the base leg for the runway at an altitude of about 4,000 ft mean sea level (msl), which would allow the airplane to join the final approach for the runway about 2 miles east of the SUPPR waypoint. The flight crew told the controller that the airport was in sight, and the controller cleared the airplane for the visual approach to runway 28C. During a postincident interview, the captain stated that he visually acquired the precision approach path indicator (PAPI) when the airplane was about 6.5 miles away from the airport. (The captain was using the PAPI for vertical guidance because runway 28C had no ILS. Runways 28C and 28L had PAPI lights associated with the runway, and both sets of PAPI lights were located on the left side of their respective runway.)

The captain requested that the first officer extend the virtual centerline of the approach from the SUPPR waypoint, at which time the first officer announced that both FMC control displays had blanked; thus, only the “ACARS” prompt was showing and available on the menu page of the FMC display units. According to FDR data, the FMC blanking occurred at 0940:13 (as discussed further in the Flight Recorders section), after which lateral and vertical guidance on the MAX display system was unavailable. The captain reported that, at the time of the screen blanking, the PAPI lights were still in sight and that he continued the visual approach to the airport. The captain disconnected the autopilot and autothrottle at 0942:07 when the airplane was at an altitude of about 2,300 ft above ground level (agl).

The flight crew stated that the FMCs came back on when the airplane was between 700 and 1,000 ft agl, but no approach guidance was displayed. The captain stated that, at that time, he could see the airport and the PAPI lights, and that he continued to the airport visually.

About 2 miles from the runway threshold, the first officer contacted the tower controller to confirm that the airplane was cleared to land on runway 28C, and the controller provided confirmation. The airplane then aligned with and landed on runway 28L instead of runway 28C at 0944:42 and subsequently turned right to exit the runway. The figure below is a Google Earth screenshot that is overlaid with automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast ground tracks showing the incident flight aligned with and landing on runway 28L.

During another postincident interview, the tower controller stated that, after he cleared the airplane to land on runway 28C (when the airplane was on a 2-mile final), he observed that the flight crew had aligned the airplane with runway 28L instead of runway 28C. The controller decided that, given the airplane’s altitude, it would be appropriate for the airplane to land on runway 28L. The controller decided not to issue a go-around instruction given that no airplanes or vehicles were on or near runway 28L. The PIT air traffic manager reported that, at the time of the incident, the traffic volume was “light with routine complexity.” AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONThe airplane was equipped with a General Electric Aviation (GE) FMC system, which interfaced with other airplane systems to support lateral, vertical, and time-based navigation guidance. The FMC system comprised two computers and two control display units.

Both computers were removed from the airplane and sent to the manufacturer for evaluation. Data obtained from the computers showed that the dual blanking of the FMC displays was caused by a dual FMC reset that occurred during the descent into PIT. GE stated that this reset was consistent with a known software exception (problem) related to a vector/discontinuity combination followed by a waypoint with a “required navigation Performance.” This problem was introduced in a version of the Boeing 737 flight management system software that included refinements to GE’s earth model.

The software exception occurred in the air and resulted in a “numeric error” exception in the earth model. The FMC manufacturer developed a procedural workaround, and the error was corrected in the subsequent version of the software. Boeing issued a service bulletin about the software update in May 2022. AIRPORT INFORMATIONThe airplane was equipped with a General Electric Aviation (GE) FMC system, which interfaced with other airplane systems to support lateral, vertical, and time-based navigation guidance. The FMC system comprised two computers and two control display units.

Both computers were removed from the airplane and sent to the manufacturer for evaluation. Data obtained from the computers showed that the dual blanking of the FMC displays was caused by a dual FMC reset that occurred during the descent into PIT. GE stated that this reset was consistent with a known software exception (problem) related to a vector/discontinuity combination followed by a waypoint with a “required navigation Performance.” This problem was introduced in a version of the Boeing 737 flight management system software that included refinements to GE’s earth model.

The software exception occurred in the air and resulted in a “numeric error” exception in the earth model. The FMC manufacturer developed a procedural workaround, and the error was corrected in the subsequent version of the software. Boeing issued a service bulletin about the software update in May 2022. ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONRunway Awareness and Advisory System

The United Airlines 737 Flight Manual stated that the runway awareness and advisory system (RAAS), an enhancement to the ground proximity warning system (GPWS), provides aural callouts and visual alerts on the navigation display to assist pilots with situational awareness during ground operations, approaches to landing, and go-arounds. RAAS required the following conditions for proper operation:

• terrain and airport runway database is in the GPWS computer,

• aircraft is approaching an airport in the RAAS airport runway database, and

• GPS and other required signals are available with an accuracy that meets minimum requirements.

When enabled, RAAS callouts operate without any required action from the pilots. Visual display of RAAS callouts and alerts on the navigation display requires the selection of the terrain feature.

Audible alerts associated with an approach and landing included “caution taxiway,” which would sound if an airplane aligned with a taxiway when the airplane was at an altitude between 150 and 250 ft agl. United Airlines selected, as part of its option package for RAAS, to disable the airborne alerts that announces the runway that a company flight was approaching to minimize any distractions while on final approach and maintain a “quiet cockpit” environment.

Federal Aviation Administration Order 7110.65Z

Federal Aviation Administration Order 7110.65Z prescribed air traffic control procedures and phraseology for use by air traffic control personnel. The order required controllers to be familiar with the provisions in the order that pertained to their operational responsibilities. The order stated that, if a controller becomes aware that an aircraft is aligned with the wrong surface, the controller should “inform the pilot” and either “issue control instructions/clearances” or “if time permits, verify the pilot is aligned with the correct runway” and “issue control instructions/clearances as necessary. In addit...