N14FC

On June 26, 2022, about 1410 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-24-250 airplane, N14FC, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Warm Springs, Georgia. The private pilot and passenger sustained serious injuries. The airplane was operated by the pilot as a personal flight conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.

The pilot reported that the instrument flight rules flight departed from St. Pete-Clearwater International Airport (PIE), Clearwater, Florida, at 1153 and proceeded en route to his home airport of Newnan Coweta County Airport (CCO), Newnan, Georgia. After about 2 hours and 15 minutes, 20 miles south of the destination, the pilot completed an en route descent from 8,000 ft mean sea level (msl) to 5,000 ft msl. Upon reaching 5,000 ft msl, the engine power was set to 2300 rpm; however, it abruptly decreased to 1500 rpm. The pilot reported that the engine did not sputter, but rather it just “rolled back.” He then moved the mixture to rich, ensured the fuel selectors were selected to the main tanks, and turned on the electric fuel pump; however, power did not increase. He then declared an emergency with air traffic control, and they advised him of the Roosevelt Memorial Airport (5A9), Warm Springs, Georgia behind his flight path.

The pilot completed a left 180° turn and saw the runway at 5A9 about 6-7 miles ahead, and as he maneuvered toward the runway, the engine lost all power. The pilot realized that he did not have the glide performance to reach the runway and turned toward a small logging road. The airplane impacted terrain and trees during the approach to the small road, which was about 1.5 miles north of the runway.

According to a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector who examined the airplane at the accident site and supervised the recovery of the airplane, the airplane sustained substantial damage to the wings and fuselage. When the airplane’s electrical power was turned on, the left and right main fuel tank gauges displayed a reading of about 1/4 full, and the left tip tank gauge measured just below 1/4 full. When turned on, the electric fuel pump could be heard running. Both fuel selectors were found selected to the main positions.

The inspector observed that the main wing fuel tanks were found with no trace of fuel, no breaches of the fuel bladders were observed, and when the wings were removed for recovery, no fuel exited either main fuel tanks. The left tip tank remained connected to the wing, was not breached, and contained about 3 gallons of fuel. The right tip tank separated from the wing, was partially breached, and no fuel was present in the tank.

Further examination of the engine at the recovery facility found that the engine displayed crankshaft and camshaft continuity and thumb compression on all cylinders. Both magnetos produced spark and the spark plugs exhibited normal combustion signatures. No anomalies were observed with the engine-driven fuel pump, and it contained no residual fuel.

During low pressure air tests of the fuel lines, with the fuel selector positioned to the main wing tanks, no fuel was observed to exit the lines, and no blockages were present. There was no evidence of oil or fuel leakage on the airframe.

According to the pilot, throughout the accident flight he switched from using the left and right main tanks and did not use the tip tanks at any point. When he initiated the descent preceding the loss of engine power, he recalled moving both left and right fuel selectors to the main tank on positions. The pilot reported using the electric fuel pump during the loss of engine power; however, carburetor heat was not used during the accident flight.

The pilot recalled that the fuel level on both main tanks were near his finger length from full when visually checked during the preflight, but the main tanks were not topped-off. He reported that he utilized the airplane’s onboard fuel calculator to monitor the fuel flow; however, it was not his practice to use the device as a calculator to determine or track the total fuel onboard. He recalled after the accident that 59 gallons of fuel was onboard at takeoff, and that the fuel flow throughout the accident flight was 13 gallons per hour en route. According to basic fuel calculation estimates, the accident flight would have burned about 31 gallons.

According to the airplane’s owner handbook and the tip tanks supplemental type certificate (STC), the airplane was equipped with two main fuel tanks per each wing that totaled 60 gallons (30 per main tank) and two tip tanks totaling 30 gallons (15 per tip tank). Photographs of the two fuel selector switches revealed that the engine could be operated from one or both main tanks, and either tip tank. The STC flight manual supplement warned that the fuel selector should not be selected to any tank that is empty, and that the switch should either be placed to a tank with fuel remaining or turned off. The tip tank fuel was only to be used during level flight.

Review of the FAA Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) CE-09-35 Carburetor Icing Probability Chart found that the airplane was at risk of serious icing at glide power while descending from 8,000 ft msl to 5,000 ft msl.