Accident Details
Probable Cause and Findings
The inadequate maintenance of the airplane fuel system that resulted in fuel exhaustion and a loss of engine power.
Aircraft Information
Registered Owner (Historical)
Analysis
HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn July 2, 2022, at 1135 central daylight time, a Piper PA-24-250, N5235P, was involved in an accident near St. Jacob, Illinois. The airplane was destroyed. The pilot rated passenger received serious injuries and the pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was operated under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 as a personal flight.
The private pilot/airplane owner and his son departed in the accident airplane from St Louis Metro-East Airport/Shafer Field (IL48), St Jacob, Illinois, to pick up the airline-transport-pilot-rated passenger at Eagle Creek Airpark (EYE), Indianapolis, Indiana. The pilot was to familiarize the pilot-rated passenger with the airplane so that he could later provide flight instruction to the pilot’s son.
Before departure from IL48, the airplane was “topped off” with fuel by the pilot’s son, and no fuel was obtained at EYE. Before departure from EYE, an “abrupt” airplane preflight was performed and the airplane fuel system was not sumped, and the fuel level within the fuel tanks was not [visually] checked. Upon return to IL48, the pilot’s son stated that he exited the airplane and at that time the right fuel tank gauge indicated just under a ¼ tank, and the left fuel tank gauge indicated just under ½ tank; he estimated there was about 12 gallons of fuel remaining.
The pilot’s son stated that after he exited the airplane, his father and the pilot-rated passenger switched seats so that the pilot-rated passenger was in the left seat and the his father was in the right seat. They then performed five normal takeoffs and full-stop landings. He heard the engine sputter on the last takeoff, the landing gear retracted, and the airplane began to climb. The airplane then rolled to the right, nosed down, and impacted the terrain.
The pilot-rated passenger stated that they were “just above the treetops” when the engine lost power during climbout from the sixth takeoff. He noted that the pilot took control of the airplane and began “actions that you would undertake following engine power loss.” Although he recalls the pilot turning the airplane to the right “pretty aggressively,” he did not recall any indications of a stall, such as a stall warning horn, before the airplane quickly descended in a nose-low attitude into the ground.
A witness stated that he saw the airplane make several full-stop takeoff and landings before the accident takeoff, during which the “engine started to sputter right after it lost power, in and out couple of times.” The airplane’s right wing then dropped down, and the airplane started to rotate clockwise as viewed from above. He saw the airplane descend behind a hill with a soybean field, at which time he lost sight of the airplane. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONThe pilot/owner held a mechanic’s certificate with airframe and powerplant ratings in addition to his pilot certificate and ratings. The pilot’s logbook showed entries for the completion of flight reviews in 2017, 2019, and an undated entry for the completion of a flight review.
A National Transportation Safety Board Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident/Incident form was not received from the airline-transport-pilot-rated passenger. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONThe Piper Comanche PA-24-250 Owner’s Manual, Design Features, 1. Specifications, stated that the cruising range with 60 gallon fuel tanks, at sea level, and 75% power is 4.3 hours.
Aircraft logbooks provided by the pilot’s son included a separate page that was not part of the “Aircraft Log”. The separate page did not cite the aircraft’s registration number and had only three printed entries that were not consistent in completion and format as those entries in the “Aircraft Log” and “Engine Log.” These entries did not meet requirements cited in 14 CFR Part 43.11, “Content, form, and disposition of records for inspections conducted under parts 91 and 125 and 135.411(a)(1) and 135.419 of this chapter.”
The first entry on the separate page stated that an annual inspection was completed and it was signed by an airframe and powerplant mechanic with inspection authorization. The first entry had a date entry of April 12, 2022, and had blank entries for aircraft total time and tachometer time.
The second entry on the separate page was for a 100-hour inspection of the engine with the pilot’s printed name and airframe and powerplant certification number; there was no signature. The second entry’s aircraft total time, tachometer, time since major overhaul, and date were blank.
The third entry on the separate page was for an oil change with the pilot’s printed name and airframe and powerplant certification number; there was no signature. The third entry’s aircraft total time, tachometer, time since major overhaul, and date were blank. AIRPORT INFORMATIONThe Piper Comanche PA-24-250 Owner’s Manual, Design Features, 1. Specifications, stated that the cruising range with 60 gallon fuel tanks, at sea level, and 75% power is 4.3 hours.
Aircraft logbooks provided by the pilot’s son included a separate page that was not part of the “Aircraft Log”. The separate page did not cite the aircraft’s registration number and had only three printed entries that were not consistent in completion and format as those entries in the “Aircraft Log” and “Engine Log.” These entries did not meet requirements cited in 14 CFR Part 43.11, “Content, form, and disposition of records for inspections conducted under parts 91 and 125 and 135.411(a)(1) and 135.419 of this chapter.”
The first entry on the separate page stated that an annual inspection was completed and it was signed by an airframe and powerplant mechanic with inspection authorization. The first entry had a date entry of April 12, 2022, and had blank entries for aircraft total time and tachometer time.
The second entry on the separate page was for a 100-hour inspection of the engine with the pilot’s printed name and airframe and powerplant certification number; there was no signature. The second entry’s aircraft total time, tachometer, time since major overhaul, and date were blank.
The third entry on the separate page was for an oil change with the pilot’s printed name and airframe and powerplant certification number; there was no signature. The third entry’s aircraft total time, tachometer, time since major overhaul, and date were blank. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONThe airplane impacted terrain and came to rest in an upright attitude in a field southeast of the departure end runway 13. The airplane wings, fuselage, and empennage exhibited vertical crush/deformation and low-speed impact features. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces.
Postaccident examination of the airplane’s fuel system revealed that both wing fuel lines were attached and secured to their respective fuel tanks and to the fuel selector assembly. The fuel lines were unbroken and did not exhibit fuel leakage. There was no usable fuel in either the left- or right-wing fuel tanks.
Air was heard flowing from the wing’s respective fuel filler ports and into their respective fuel tanks when air was blown into the left- and right-wing fuel tank underwing vent tubes.
Fuel system diagrams show that the airplane’s main fuel tank lines connect to the fuel selector assembly, which provide left, right, and off positions. Fuel cannot flow from a fuel tank when the selector is selected to the opposite tank. The fuel selector handle was found positioned to the right fuel tank. The fuel selector handle was rotated by hand and no detents were felt.
The fuel selector handle was positioned to the right and then the left fuel tank, and air was blown into the fuel selector output line. The resultant airflow could be heard from each wing’s respective filler port. Air could not be blown through the fuel selector when the fuel selector handle was in the off position.
The fuel flow transducer, which was part of the cockpit fuel flow indicator, was tested and met the manufacturer’s test specifications.
Removal of left- and right-wing fuel tank fuel senders revealed that the metal float arm of the left fuel tank sender had an acute angular bend near its midpoint and near its float. The right fuel tank sender float arm had an approximate 45o angular bend near its midpoint. The shapes of both fuel sender arms were not in accordance with the airplane manufacturer’s design specifications.
Both sender float arms were able to free fall without binding in both directions of travel and their respective floats did not display weighting from fluid within the floats.
Resistance measurements of both senders at the bottom stop, mid-travel, and top stop, showed values of:
Left fuel tank: bottom stop - 3 ohms, mid-travel – mid-travel - fluctuated 13-35 ohms, top stop - 32 ohms
Right fuel tank: bottom stop 3 ohms, mid-travel - 20 ohms, top stop - 35 ohms
The Piper Comanche Service Manual for PA-24-250 (May 1, 2010), Section 8-10, Fuel Quantity Indicating System, specifies the fuel sender resistance when the fuel sender arm was at the bottom stop as: 0.0 to 0.5 ohms. There is no mid-travel resistance specification in the service manual. The fuel sender resistance when the sender arm is at the top stop is specified as 29.6 to 31.3 ohms. The manual states that if incorrect resistance or fluctuation is found, the sender should be replaced.
Examination of the wing tank fuel tank bladders revealed that the left-and right-wing tank fuel bladders were collapsed and those areas of collapse were equipped with bayonet attachment clips.
The left-wing fuel tank bladder was collapsed at the inboard and forward middle sections from the wing filler port. Three inboard and one forward middle bladder mounting clips were not connected to the top of wing. The left-wing tank fuel bladder was part number (P/N): 524, serial number (S/N) CR544, which replaced original equipment manufacturer (OEM) P/N 454-324, manufactured 6/1998.
The right-wing fuel tank fuel bladder was collapsed at the inboard section of...
Data Source
Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# CEN22FA298