N877FE

HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn July 13, 2022, about 1852 mountain daylight time, a Cessna 208B airplane, N877FE, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident at Salt Lake City International Airport (SLC), Salt Lake City, Utah. The pilot sustained minor injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 cargo flight.

The flight was operated as CPT 7727, a Federal Express Corporation feeder flight, which departed from Friedman Memorial Airport (SUN), Hailey, Idaho, about 1729 and climbed to 15,000 ft mean sea level (msl). The en route portion of the flight to SLC was uneventful. About 1817, the airplane began a descent into SLC. About 1823, when the airplane was at 12,000 ft msl, the pilot checked in with Salt Lake Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON), and the controller cleared the airplane to descend to 11,000 ft msl and provided waypoints for the approach. About 1835, the controller issued a transmission to all aircraft near SLC to expect light-tomoderate precipitation once abeam the airport. About 1844, the controller instructed the pilot to descend to and maintain 9,000 ft msl. About 1845, the pilot reported that the airport was in sight, and the controller told him to expect to land on runway 34R.

About 1846, the controller instructed the pilot to follow a heading of 150° and to descend to and maintain 8,000 ft msl. The controller also provided a PIREP to all aircraft in the area, indicating a windshear gain of 20 knots on an 8- to 9mile final approach. The controller then instructed the pilot to follow a Boeing 757 on final approach for runway 34R, cautioned him about wake turbulence, and cleared the airplane for the visual approach to runway 34R.

The controller then instructed the pilot to contact the SLC tower, and the pilot acknowledged this instruction. About 1848, approach controller and the local controller both transmitted, to all aircraft on frequency, a windshear alert for runway 34L, which was parallel to runway 34R. The alert cited 15-knot loss 2 miles out for arriving airplanes.

The pilot contacted the SLC tower, and the local controller instructed the pilot that he was following a Boeing 757 on a 5-mile final approach, reported the wind from 300° at 18 knots with gusts to 29 knots, and cleared the airplane to land on runway 34R. The controller then asked the pilot of an airplane that just departed from runway 34R if they encountered windshear on climbout. The pilot reported no wind shear on climbout but stated that the midfield wind gusts were strong. The controller solicited a PIREP from the Boeing 757 that was ahead of the accident airplane. The 757 crew reported that they encountered windshear of ± 10 knots on final approach. The controller then transmitted to all aircraft on frequency, a windshear alert for runway 34R arrivals and departures, indicating a 15-knot loss over the runway.

The pilot reported that he was flaring the airplane when the local controller reported that the Boeing 757 had encountered windshear on landing. The pilot stated that, during the flare, the airplane started going sideways across the runway. The pilot also stated that he “elected to go around” because he was unable to maintain direction control of the airplane due to wind from the left and that he informed the local controller about the go-around. The pilot reported that, after adding power and climbing to about 30 ft agl, he “lowered the left wing” to counteract the drift from the runway centerline. Subsequently, he encountered a “downdraft” that was “pushing” the airplane toward the ground.

Surveillance video showed that the airplane impacted terrain off the right side of the runway in a left-wing-low, nose-down attitude. The airplane’s tail came up to a nearvertical position and then settled back down. The airplane came to a rest on its belly and right main landing gear; the nose and left main landing gear had collapsed. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONThe pilot was hired by Corporate Air in June, 2001, and was current and qualified in accordance with FAA regulations and Corporate Air requirements. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONAccording to the Corporate Air operations specifications, the CE-208B airplane was authorized to conduct cargo operations in instrument flight rules (IFR) and visual flight rules (VFR) and during the day and night. The accident airplane’s weight and balance were within operational limits for taxi, takeoff, and landing. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONThe pilot reported that he checked the weather on his phone before the flight using Aviation Digital Data Service. The pilot also reported that he reviewed the terminal area forecast, meteorological aerodrome reports, and the radar for the route of the flight.

The pilot stated he did not use the onboard weather radar during the flight. He stated that, as the airplane approached SLC, “some weather” was occurring over the mountains to the west of the airport that was moving slowly to the east. He recalled that the automatic terminal information service (ATIS) information for SLC changed a few times, mostly due to barometric pressure updates, and that the wind was from the northwest at 20 to 30 mph. The pilot stated that he was not provided with any wind information after being cleared to land.

SLC had an ASOS that was augmented by a certified weather observer. At 1833 (19 minutes before the accident), the following observations were reported: wind from 340° at 16 knots with gusts to 21 knots, visibility 10 miles or greater, thunderstorm, few cumulonimbus clouds at 11,000 ft agl, and broken ceiling at 24,000 ft. The thunderstorm began at 1827, with cumulonimbus clouds southwest moving northeast.

At 1854 (2 minutes after the accident), the following ASOS observations were reported: wind from 300° at 29 knots with gusts to 48 knots, visibility 9 miles, thunderstorm with light rain, and broken ceiling at 14,000 ft agl. The thunderstorm began at 1827, ended at 1842, and began again at 1850 with cumulonimbus cloud overhead and moving northeast.

The National Weather Service issued three SLC airport weather warnings between 1800 and 1900. The first warning, at 1817, was issued for outflow wind gusts of 30 mph/26 knots or greater. The second warning, at 1826, was issued for lightning within 5 miles of the airport through 1845. The third warning, at 1845, extended the time to 1900 for lightning within 5 miles of the airport.

The GFA applicable to the accident site that was valid at 1800 (before the airplane’s departure) indicated VFR surface visibilities, scattered thunderstorms, and a southwest surface wind at 10 knots with gusts to 15 knots. The GFA cloud forecast indicated clouds above the accident site.

At 1354, the National Weather Service Storm Prediction Center issued a convective outlook with areas of general thunderstorms forecast for the accident site.

Weather radar base reflectivity images between 1836:37 and 1854:11 depicted reflectivity values between 20 and 40 dBZ moving from southwest to northeast over the accident site at the time of the accident. An increase in windspeed toward the accident site was noted at the accident time. In addition, the base reflectivity core, or the main portion of the rainfall from the thunderstorm, descended toward the accident site at the accident time.

Fifty lightning flashes were reported within 25 miles of the accident site in the 10 minutes before and after the accident time, with the closest lightning flash occurring 1 mile west of the flight track at 1850:46.

Airman’s Meteorological Information (AIRMET) advisory Sierra was issued at 1445 and was valid for the accident site at the accident time. The AIRMET forecast mountain obscuration conditions due to clouds and precipitation. Convective SIGMET advisory 66W was issued at 1755 and was valid for the accident site at the accident time. The SIGMET forecast an area of thunderstorms with little movement and with cloud tops above flight level 450. Convective SIGMETs indicate the potential for windshear, lightning, and severe turbulence, among other hazards. Rain showers and convective clouds can produce downdrafts, microbursts, outflow boundaries, and gust fronts, which can create an environment favorable for unexpected changes in wind direction and speed at the surface. According to the FAA Aeronautical Information Manual, section 7-1-24, microbursts are typically relatively small in area (less than 1 to 2 1/2 miles in diameter) and produce strong divergent winds and downdrafts that can reach 6,000 ft per minute. Microbursts can be found in and beneath convective clouds, usually embedded in heavy rain or in “benign-appearing” virga, (trails of precipitation that fall from the underside of a cloud but evaporated before reaching the surface). If little or no precipitation is occurring at the surface, a ring of blowing dust may be the only visual cue of the microburst

Review of video imagery around the accident time revealed that virga was descending toward the accident site with gusting winds and rain.

About the time of the accident, the wind sensor that the SLC ATC tower used reported a wind gust of 16 knots. The sensor did not report a gust above 25 knots between 1852 and 1915. In addition, the Integrated Terminal Weather System and windshear displays that the tower used provided no microburst alerts until about 10 minutes after the accident. AIRPORT INFORMATIONAccording to the Corporate Air operations specifications, the CE-208B airplane was authorized to conduct cargo operations in instrument flight rules (IFR) and visual flight rules (VFR) and during the day and night. The accident airplane’s weight and balance were within operational limits for taxi, takeoff, and landing. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONPostaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the outboard 6 ft of the right wing was bent up about 30° and that the outboard 5 ft of the left wing was bent up about 5°. The left side of the fuselage was crumple...